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 South Africa’s connection with the sea is most prevalent in its founding harbor at 
Cape Town. Until the opening of the Suez Canal, the passage around the Cape of Good 
Hope via Table Bay represented the most important oceanic trading route to the East. The 
passage, however, became known for its characteristic storms that devastated shipping at 
Table Bay and developed the area’s reputation as the Bay of Storms. This thesis 
examines the way the British government at the Cape managed the risks associated with 
using Table Bay and demonstrates how risk is reflected in the historical and 
archaeological record of Cape Town. Specifically, research will focus on the initial 
development of the harbor during the Second British occupation at the Cape from 1806 to 
1910. 
 This thesis will utilize an amalgamation of social theories pioneered by Anthony 
Giddens and approaches of risk analysis to examine how risk is incorporated in and 
reflected by the remains of past societies. A combination of statistical and geo-spatial 
analyses will be used to reflect the maritime risks of using Table Bay during the selected 
timeframe. Through the use of these theoretical and methodological foundations, it is 
 possible to assess risk as a measureable entity in the cultural landscape of the harbor. It is 
ultimately argued that the harbor’s historical development was intrinsically linked to the 
concept of risk and risk management.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Cape of Good Hope is situated at one of the most important and strategic 
locations in the world. Since the beginning of the 17th century until the opening of the 
Suez Canal, this area located along the Southern African coastline has acted as the sole 
maritime shipping route between the Western and Eastern markets in the Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans. With the rise in maritime traffic passing through the Cape, the 
establishment of landing sites along the coastline became essential to the replenishment 
of stocks for vessels making the voyage to the East and back. Table Bay, located above 
the Cape Peninsula along the Western Cape, became the most visited landing site since 
the first Europeans arrived at the foot of Table Mountain in 1503. 
Previously the home to generations of indigenous Khoisan people, Table Bay 
became a permanent port of call for European colonizers with the establishment of the 
Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, or Dutch East India Company (VOC) victualing 
station by Jan van Riebeeck in 1652. This outpost would later be integrated into the 
British Empire and develop into one of the most visited harbors in the world with 
hundreds of vessels from various nationalities calling in the bay annually. The frequent 
amount of ships and people that called at the Cape intrinsically linked the development of 
the city and harbor with maritime activity. From the time of original Dutch settlement 
through its eventual occupation by the British, Cape Town would become a thriving port 
city and resting stop on the voyage east, which led to the adoption of its symbolic role as 
the Tavern of the Seas. 
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Despite the preeminence of the Cape route in world maritime commerce, the 
turbulent geographical nature of the southern Cape coastline has caused major problems 
for shipping throughout the centuries and generally hindered the development of harbors 
and ports. It was because of this turbulent environment that Vasco de Gama originally 
deemed the passage around the southern tip of Africa ‘Cabo Tormentoso,’ or ‘the Stormy 
Cape’. It was not until the mid-19th century, which was over 150 years since the 
establishment of the outpost at Cape Town, that the beginnings of a sufficient harbor of 
refuge were begun. During these early years, the lack of sufficient harbor facilities made 
maritime commerce within the bay inefficient, costly and dangerous. 
It is estimated that over 2,700 ships of various nationalities have perished along 
the South African coastline (Sharfman et al 2012:90). Over any other region, Table Bay 
boasts the largest concentration of wreck material. Approximately 450 shipwrecks have 
been reported lost in and around Table Bay since its first recorded wreck in 1619 (Werz 
2003:48-120). This collection of shipwreck material is composed of more than 28 ship 
types, representing over 21 different nationalities. Both the VOC and particularly the 
British government, who oversaw the greatest percentage of these shipping losses at Cape 
Town, needed to find ways of managing the conflicting notions of the increasing 
importance of the Cape Colony and the dangers or risks associated with its primary port 
city. How the colonial Cape government responded to these issues is reflected in the 
archaeological record of Table Bay. 
The variety and scale of the archaeological resources associated with maritime 
activity within a relatively small geographical area illustrates the staggering maritime 
archaeological potential of Table Bay. Due to a combination of cultural, political, legal, 
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and economic factors, archaeological work on maritime sites in South Africa has been 
limited (Deacon 1988; Werz 1993a; Gribble 1998, 2002; Sharfman et al 2012). 
Compounding these issues, 20th century foreshore reclamation projects in Cape Town 
buried the historic shoreline with dredge spoil, which consequentially covered up the 
majority of archaeological material (Figures 1.1, 1.2). As a result, much of the maritime 
archaeological reports have been in response to urban development projects consisting 
primarily of cultural impact assessments (Lightley 1976; Cox 2000; Hart 2001, 2002, 
2003; Werz 2003; Halkett 2012). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1. Photograph of diver returning from a survey of the harbor during 
twentieth century harbor reclamation (Photo courtesy of the National Library of South 
Africa, PHA 4921). 
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Despite this, fieldwork in Table Bay has generated a wealth of information. With 
the exception of sparse compilations of shipping incidents in Table Bay, the most 
extensive being one published in the South African Shipping News and Fishing Industry 
Review (1982), no comprehensive list of shipwrecks in South Africa existed until the 
National Monuments Council began a formal register in 1993. This database is now 
administrated by the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA). 
 
 
 
Remote sensing and diver surveys in the bay area have located wreck material 
near the current shoreline, along with the others around the rocky shores of Robben 
Island (Werz 1990, 1993b-c, 1999; Harris 1993; Maitland and Winton 2010). New 
FIGURE 1.4. 20th century dredging activity in Table Bay harbor covered the majority of 
archaeological remains located on the old shoreline of the bay including shipwrecks as 
well as older harbor works (Photo courtesy of the National Library of South Africa, PHA 
4932). 
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methods of recording sites with different theoretical and methodological frameworks 
such as the use Geographical Information Systems (GIS) have also been applied to a 
wreck near the old mouth of the Salt River (Sharfman 1998). Further use of GIS 
identified its potential application to the study of archaeological artifact distributions 
(Breitenmoser 1991). As development on the foreshore increased, exposed original 
harbor works and facilities have also been investigated (Saitowitz et al 1993). The overall 
maritime archaeological potential of Cape Town, particularly for shipwreck material, has 
also been reviewed (Durden 1992; Mavrodinov 1999). 
The historiography of the harbor is equally limited. In 1972, David Rush studied 
the history of the colony and harbor in terms of maritime trade relative to other ports in 
South Africa. The development of the harbor until 1860 was also examined through an 
economic perspective, gleaned by compiling the various letters, correspondence, and 
reports of the Cape Officials and Imperial Government (Soonike 1974). Peterson (1978) 
provided a detailed examination of the construction of the Breakwater and Alfred Basin, 
the first attempt at establishing a harbor of refuge in Table Bay. These studies and 
resources have produced invaluable statistics and details concerning the maritime cultural 
material of Cape Town. What is lacking is the application of a broader theoretical 
framework for synthesizing the existing information, which is underutilized for 
interpreting the heritage resource on a regional basis. 
Theoretical Approach 
Maritime archeology as a discipline has branched out from analyzing solely 
shipwreck material viewed as isolated sites to include a diverse range of maritime 
activities and material. The maritime cultural landscape approach within archaeology, 
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originally devised by Westerdahl (1992), is a proven way of synthesizing and analyzing 
existing sources of information on a regional basis to integrate both social behavior and 
cultural practices as well as the linkages between underwater and terrestrial sites within a 
single generalist theoretical framework (McErlean et al 2002; Ruppé and Barstad 2002; 
Duncan 2006; Ford 2009, 2011). One potential avenue of research within this broader 
framework is the analysis of landing sites and harbors, which exist at the confluence of 
the land and the sea and facilitate the interaction between the two (Ilves 2009, 2011, 
2012; Harris 2010). Therefore, examination into the development and use of harbors and 
ports has the potential to significantly contribute to the understanding of past maritime 
activity of an area. 
It is argued that the concept of risk is integral to the establishment of any harbor. 
To define what is meant by risk and risk management, contemporary theories of the 
concept derived from the research of Ulrich Beck and Charles Perrow will be utilized. By 
complementing these theories with Giddens’ Structuration Theory as a basis for 
explaining how people can enact change within society and the cultural landscape along 
with Crook’s concepts of risk management strategies it is possible to examine the 
element of risk as a measurable entity that was the driving force in the construction of a 
harbor at Cape Town. 
Past Studies 
This approach originated with Bradley Duncan’s honor’s thesis Signposts in the 
Sea: An investigation of the shipwreck patterning and cultural seascapes of the 
Gippsland region, Victoria (2000).  In this work, Duncan pioneered a method for 
identifying cultural seascapes and how risk affected the development of seascapes by 
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analyzing merchant shipwreck patterning in southeastern Australia. Duncan extended the 
range of evidence to not only include shipwrecks, but also the cognitive perceptions and 
behavioral responses to risks through a predominantly economic lens. This was the first 
attempt to establish a methodology for examining risk in the cultural landscape and 
identified risk as a major factor influencing maritime activity throughout the study area. 
A second study by Joshua Marano titled, Ship Ashore! The role of risk in the 
development of the United States Life-Saving Service [USLSS] and its effects on local 
wrecking patterns along the North Carolina coast modified Duncan’s scheme to examine 
how the USLSS developed on North Carolina’s Outer Banks and its relationship to 
perceptions of risk in the coastal community. The analysis employed by Marano was 
made possible through the investigation of a series of annual reports distributed by the 
USLSS that helped to mold the community's concept of risk and its impact on local 
wrecking patterns. Marano used an assortment of data sources to collate historical and 
geospatial information that was analyzed at the national and local level to determine how 
the development of the USLSS related to risks of shipping along the east coast of the 
United States. By examining individual shipwreck reports supplied by the USLSS, 
Marano was also able to create a GIS database to examine the patterning of shipwrecks 
along a stretch of the North Carolina coastline and how these shipwreck incidents related 
to the development of USLSS stations for the study area. 
This past research has demonstrated through an examination of the cultural 
landscape one can collate all of the existing historical and archaeological material for a 
region and examine the relationship between these data sources within a single 
framework. The application of risk theory to the study of cultural landscapes is 
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particularly useful when analyzing the maritime cultural landscape that includes 
shipwrecks and the effects of shipwreck patterning on risk in a given area. This thesis 
will employ different aspects of these past studies to determine and analyze how the 
behavioral responses to risk affected the development of Cape Town’s harbor and harbor 
facilities. 
Research Objectives  
Maritime archaeologist Bruno Werz (2003:39) remarks that because Table Bay 
has played a focal role in international maritime traffic during the last 500 years, the 
current South African nation has some of its more important roots there. Therefore, the 
efforts of maritime archaeologists are of the utmost importance from both a national and 
international perspective. With the recent revitalization of Cape Town’s harbor and focus 
on the cultural heritage of the waterfront, studies into the past usage of South Africa’s 
capital port are essential to further understanding of the historical significance of the 
harbor (Worden 1994:33). 
This research represents a compilation of primary and secondary sources that 
document the development of the harbor and associated shipping activity in 19th century 
Cape Town. Investigation into the historic maritime activity and associated infrastructure 
in Table Bay create a picture of the past landscape that ultimately set the stage for the 
contemporary status of the modern waterfront. Given the abundance and temporal range 
of maritime archaeological material within Table Bay, this analysis will focus on a 
snapshot of the cultural landscape during the second British occupation at the Cape from 
1806 to 1910 when the initial effort of constructing a harbor in Table Bay was begun. 
Collected information was used to create a data set that is potentially indicative of 
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risk in the history of Cape Town’s harbor. The role that risk played in the development 
and use of the harbor facilities at Cape Town will be quantifiably measured through the 
application of statistical and geo-spatial analyses. With the suppression of the old 
shoreline by modern harbor developments, these analyses will aid in the re-creation of the 
historic landscape of Table Bay and examine how it developed through the lens of risk 
assessment and management. Furthermore, by identifying past landscape usage that is 
currently concealed underneath the modern harbor, this study will provide a potential 
benchmark for future monitoring of known shipwreck sites as well as contribute to the 
relocation of unidentified sites potentially impacted by further development on the Cape 
foreshore area. Specific research questions for this project include: 
 Primary 
Ø What role has risk and risk management played in shaping the cultural 
landscape of the harbor in Table Bay between 1806 and 1910? 
 
Secondary 
Ø What features on the landscape represent the management of risk such as 
jetties, wharves, quays, breakwaters, lighthouses, and natural landmarks? 
Ø What factors influenced behavioral responses of both Cape Officials and 
the wider maritime community to determine the development of the 
harbor? 
Ø What natural and cultural variables influenced shipping losses in Table 
Bay? 
Ø What is the correlation between the natural and cultural factors affecting 
shipping in Table Bay and the spatial distribution of shipwrecks and 
harbor facilities? 
Ø How did the lack of harbor infrastructure or the addition of harbor 
infrastructure influence shipwreck events and shipping statistics in Table 
Bay? 
 
Tertiary 
Ø How is the temporal development of the harbor and factors that influenced 
harbor construction demonstrated by the wrecking of Fame (1822), RMS 
Athens (1865), and SS Hermes (1901)? 
Ø Can historic maps, photos, and artwork yield pertinent locational and 
chronological information about the development of harbor facilities? 
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Research Methodology 
In order to study how risk is evident in the cultural landscape of Table Bay and 
the effect that risk had on the development of the harbor at Cape Town, this study utilized 
three tiered approach. First, historical research was conducted to identify the historical 
development of harbor works in Cape Town and how these harbor works affected 
shipping in the bay. This line of inquiry focused on the specific chronology of harbor 
constructions along with the extent of harbor operations in the given timeframe. Research 
utilized a range of data sources to obtain a holistic interpretation of the historic landscape 
of Table Bay. This included extensive research into the life history of three shipwrecks of 
Fame, RMS Athens, SS Hermes, that were used as case studies that exemplify certain 
risks that predominantly influenced harbor development.  
Next, statistical analyses were employed using Microsoft Excel and IBM’s SPSS 
statistical toolkit to determine any trends in shipping activity in Table Bay throughout the 
development of the harbor. This statistical analysis temporally distributed general 
shipping data as well as the number and dispersal of archaeological shipwreck sites 
identified during historical research. Both shipwreck data as well as historical 
information pertaining to the historic locations of harbor works were also entered into a 
GIS database to facilitate geo-spatial analysis. The combination of these analytical 
methods allowed for the delineation of any existing relationships between shipping, 
shipwrecks, the extent of harbor operations and identifiable risks in the historic landscape 
of Table Bay. 
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Thesis Structure 
 The approach used in this study requires the research design to be conducted in a 
way that accurately reflects the range of information concerning the role of risk in 
shaping the cultural landscape of Table Bay and the development of the harbor. Chapter 
Two, Theoretical Foundation for Risk Analysis, discusses the correlation between 
cultural landscape theory and socio-cultural theories that relate human action to the 
dynamic structuring or formation of the landscape. Furthermore, the concept of risk and 
risk analysis is outlined. Discussion of these paradigms in conjunction with one another 
lays the foundation for this study and describes how risk can be imbued into the cultural 
remains of past societies. 
 Chapter Three, A Methodology for Measuring Risk, outlines the specific 
methodological approach enacted in this study to quantify and measure the effects of risk 
in the development of the harbor at Cape Town. This chapter will outline the reasoning 
for choosing 19th century Table Bay as a viable snapshot of the cultural landscape of 
risk. Furthermore, specific reference will be made to the various archival collections, 
publications and databases utilized for this research, which allowed for an assessment of 
the history of the harbor through a combination of various data sources. The chapter will 
also outline the integration of statistical and geo-spatial analyses with historic data. GIS 
creation and application for historic analyses of shipwreck and harbor spatial patterning 
will be discussed in detail.  
 Chapter Four, Risk and the History of Cape Town’s Harbor, documents the 
relative chronological development of the harbor in Table Bay from original Dutch 
settlement through the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. In order to 
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examine how risk is evident in the cultural landscape of Table Bay, this chapter will also 
serve to delineate the different aspects that comprise cultural landscape in the historical 
record of Cape Town.  
 Chapter Five, The Bay That Shaped the Harbor and the Harbor That Shaped the 
Bay, describes the physical landscape of Table Bay. In addition to outlining the 
environmental characteristics that potentially had an effect on perceptions of risk in the 
maritime community, the manner by which the physical layout of the bay influenced 
alterations to the historic shoreline to accommodate the growing harbor will be discussed. 
How these modifications had a corresponding influence on shaping the natural dynamics 
of the bay and cultural material located along the shore will also be explained. 
 Chapter Six, Analyzing Risk in the Bay of Storms and Tavern of the Seas, 
introduces the archaeological remains of shipping activity in Table Bay and collates the 
historical and environmental data to analyze how risk is evident in the cultural landscape 
of Cape Town. This chapter uses shipwreck incidents as potential indicators of risk and 
provides a statistical breakdown of shipping activity in the harbor along with the geo-
spatial distributions of harbor works and shipwrecks. The analysis will offer evidence of 
the effects of risk in historical trends of maritime activity in Table Bay. Furthermore, two 
prevailing themes of how this risk was managed in the history of the harbor will be 
discussed. It is argued that these themes were the guiding force in defining the cultural 
landscape of risk for the development of the harbor. The concluding chapter will provide 
general observations and conclusions presented through this research. Recommendations 
for future study and application of the methodologies used will also be discussed.
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR RISK ANALYSIS 
 
 
Introduction 
Recently there was a fundamental shift in maritime archaeology to move away 
from purely descriptive approaches to material culture and instead focus on examining 
the social implications of cultural remains (Muckelroy 1978; Babits and Van Tilberg 
1998; Gould 2000; Catsambis et al 2011). Port and harbor archaeology was largely 
neglected within such works, which suggests that this area of study has received a paucity 
of the same theoretical and methodological developments seen in other areas of the 
discipline. Any inclusion of this subject matter instead typically only refers to a 
description of the technological developments and structures rather than a more 
theoretical or all-encompassing analysis (Rogers 2013:183-4). In order to come to a more 
informed interpretation of ports and harbors within archaeology it is equally important to 
focus on meanings as it is descriptions. One method of accomplishing this goal is through 
the application of approaches grounded in social theory. 
A social approach to the archaeology of ports and harbors will allow 
archaeologists to develop more critical perspectives of the remaining cultural material 
through the study of the cultural remains, their use, and how they were experienced in 
order to place them within a wider social and historical context. These locations have 
played an integral role in many of the key themes that resonate throughout history 
including travel and exploration, social interaction, trade, imperialism, resource 
exploitation, slavery, war and peace, environmental manipulation and technological 
development. Through contextual studies of ports and harbors it is possible to emphasize 
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local values as well as the importance of human experience, ideology, and human action 
in creating cultural meanings associated with a harbor (Rogers 2013:182-3). The wide 
range of potential influences for the creation of meaning includes both the physical or 
tangible features and intangible or abstract values of an area, and therefore a generalized 
theoretical approach is necessary to incorporate the range of data included in contextual 
analyses. 
It is argued in this chapter that a holistic approach is needed to investigate the role 
of risk in the creation of a harbor in Table Bay. Previous studies by Brad Duncan (2000; 
2006) and Josh Marano (2012) will be drawn upon to create a framework for analyzing 
the relationship between risk and the creation, development, and evolution of the harbor 
in Table Bay. By combining the notion of cultural landscapes and Giddens’ Theory of 
Structuration, it is possible to look beyond the features of the harbor in isolation and 
instead examine how the wider cultural landscape is related to human behavior and 
action, namely through the assessment and management of risk. Both of the 
aforementioned theories will be described in detail followed by a discussion of risk 
analysis and why it can be a useful method for examining ports and harbors. 
A Cultural Landscape Approach 
The cultural landscape approach was recently widely integrated into 
archaeological discourse and cultural heritage management. A cultural landscape is the 
idea that cultural identities and collective histories are anchored to the physical landscape 
features as well as contained within the cognitive perceptions of a given area. This notion 
provides a mechanism to amalgamate a variety of different approaches to compare and 
contrast different perspectives regarding the complexity of people’s social interactions 
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and relationships with their environment over space and time (Duncan 2006:7). The study 
of cultural landscapes has been used archaeologically to investigate the physical 
signatures of cultural presence on the landscape and the generation of cognitive meaning 
associated with them in the archaeological record. 
Tilley (1994:25) defines a landscape as, “the physical and visual form of the earth 
as an environment and also as a setting in which locales occur and in dialectical relation 
to whom meanings are created, reproduced and transformed.” Landscapes exist at the 
intersection of space, culture, and time. Space is a medium for human activity and does 
not have significance apart from that activity. Until humans utilize a space and make it a 
place, it does not exist culturally (Ford 2009:9). In addition, space provides a context or 
arena for culture to take shape within; both culture and space are inextricably interwoven 
with one another and form the foundation for cultural landscapes. 
Carl Sauer first established the term cultural landscape. Sauer used it as a way to 
interpret regional settlement patterns associated with cultural and social organization. 
According to Sauer (1925:46), culture acts as the agent, the natural area serves as the 
medium, and the cultural landscape is the result of the interaction between the two. 
Sauer’s progression is significant for the study of cultural landscapes as it stresses the 
agency, or ability, of culture and society to act as a compelling force in shaping the 
visible elements of the physical environment. This has particular relevance to the central 
principles of Giddens’ Structuration Theory, outlined below.  
There is a further duality between cultural landscapes and human behaviors in that 
landscapes are constantly being constructed and altered because neither the people nor 
the environment within a landscape is passive, and both function to construct and 
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reconstruct the other (Ford 2009:11; 2011:2). In other words, human action or culture 
creates or modifies the landscape, and the landscape influences or shapes human action. 
Over time, culturally determined landscapes shift and change to form distinct and 
frequently overlapping landscapes within a single geographic region. Therefore, 
landscapes can be viewed as culturally dynamic, continuing forces of cultural 
construction that are influenced by the natural features of an area and evolve over time 
alongside culture or society. 
Cultural landscape studies that traversed the land/sea divide began with the 
introduction of the maritime cultural landscape by Christer Westerdahl in the early 1990s. 
Westerdahl (1991) used the term to describe the connection between maritime-related 
terrestrial and underwater material culture during a regional survey along the north 
Swedish coast. He advocated that a maritime cultural landscape approach can be used to 
analyze the past maritime cultural remains located on both land and underwater that have 
resulted from the human utilization of maritime space (Westerdahl 1992:5-6). His theory 
argued that within the total topography of an area, maritime features located in the 
vicinity of a waterfront are as significant as submerged features because the entire range 
of maritime activities can yield information on past maritime activity including tangible, 
intangible, cognitive and social activities or aspects of a study area (Westerdahl 
1994:266).  
This groundbreaking theoretical framework disregarded traditional notions of a 
land/sea divide and instead sought to view the two as seamless components within the 
cultural landscape as a whole. This idea of the totality of the cultural landscape to include 
both the land and the sea has been researched extensively within the study of indigenous 
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landscapes and seascapes (Irwin 1992; Lewis 1994; Hviding 1996; McKinnon et al 
2014), but was applied to Western society/culture through Westerdahl’s application of the 
maritime cultural landscape. He argued that the boundary of one environment was also 
the beginning of another and despite being opposite in nature – on land or submerged 
underwater – one could not be understood without reference to the other (Westerdahl 
2000:3). Both the sea and the land are cognitively perceived as a singular landscape, and 
cultural remains located within each are complementary to one another. 
This allowed for data sources derived from either terrestrial or maritime 
environments to be opened to the researcher because they were perceived by their users 
as collective components of the same landscape (Duncan 2006:16). The line of 
archaeological evidence can then be extended to not only include shipwrecks, but also 
serve to integrate the data set into the maritime history and physical residue of past 
maritime systems (Ford 2009:16; 2011:4). All of the features in the landscape are 
analyzed to explore how people perceived and understood the sea and used this 
knowledge and understanding to order and constitute their society and landscape 
(O’Sullivan and Breen 2007:15). 
In his doctoral dissertation titled, The Maritime Archaeology and Maritime 
Cultural Landscapes of Queenscliffe: A nineteenth century Australian coastal community, 
Brad Duncan (2006:8-35) compared a range of different studies to identify the key 
features of maritime cultural landscape analysis and provided a succinct summation of 
the concept to date. Duncan noted that cultural landscapes tie in the history of an area 
through a combination of written and oral histories, toponymy or the study of place 
names, as well as archaeological sites. Ford (2009:13) groups these into two main 
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categories: 1) living knowledge, including place names, myths/folklore, beliefs, and 
practices; and 2) reconstructed knowledge, based on archaeological remains, historical 
documentation, and environmental studies. Several other factors that could have 
significant bearing on the constitution of a maritime cultural landscape are the study of 
empty space, authoritarian structures, technological changes, actions and events 
themselves in addition to their archaeological signatures, sailing or shipping routes and 
the landscape of movement, ancestral knowledge, environmental change, social 
hierarchy, gender studies, and rituals or symbolism within the landscape (Duncan 
2006:36). 
For archaeologists, the landscape is “the richest historical record we possess,” and 
can be viewed as a part of the material culture of a society (Hoskins 1955:14; Anschuetz 
et al 2001:190). It is only through the examination of all of the potential aspects of a 
cultural landscape that a truly holistic representation can be achieved. What makes 
achieving this representation difficult is due to the vagueness of the concept. This makes 
the definition of a singular methodology for identifying cultural landscapes incredibly 
challenging. Given the breadth of information and lack of data that is often available, it is 
less pertinent to attempt to define an all-encompassing approach, but rather to identify the 
methodology that will be utilized for any given study (Duncan 2006:37).  
Since the formation of the maritime cultural landscape concept, it has since been 
developed further by Westerdahl (1995, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2006, 
2011) and many others (Jasinski 1994; Hviding 1996; Parker 1999, 2001; McErlean et al 
2002; Flatman 2003; O’Sullivan 2004; Ash 2005; Busch 2006; O’Sullivan and Breen 
2007; Ford 2009, 2011). Its application on the African continent, however, is much more 
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limited. The push for a cultural landscape approach has been focused along the East 
African coast mainly in association with the ‘Swahili’ archaeology that prevails 
throughout the region (Breen and Lane 2003). Pollard (2008) took this a step further by 
examining the coastal landscapes of local fishing sites in Kilwa Kisiwani, Tanzania. 
Pollard’s analysis looked at the role of the environment in shaping the economic and 
religious systems of the harbor through excavations into the historic shoreline as well as 
ethnographic study of the continued use of fishing techniques and locations. 
In Western Africa, Harris and others (2013) defined a maritime cultural landscape 
associated with the enduring legacy and memory of an early twentieth century shipwreck, 
locally used surfboats and an abandoned diamond mining community along Namibia’s 
Skeleton Coast. Other work by Martin Hall (2006) in Cape Town looked at how the 
urban landscape served to express different stages of identity associated with the city’s 
past and how this is currently being redefined and used by contemporary society to 
celebrate or oppose certain memories. Coastal Ghana has received some maritime 
archaeological attention suggesting the potential for a cultural landscape approach 
associated with the slave trade and West African diaspora (Gijanto and Horlings 2012; 
Horlings 2012).  
It is important to note that this thesis is not a maritime cultural landscape study in 
the traditional sense, but rather an analysis of risk in the development of Cape Town’s 
harbor. The cultural landscape approach is used as a backdrop for analyzing the cognitive 
perception of and behavioral responses to risk in Table Bay. A comprehensive 
examination of the cultural landscape from the founding of the harbor to the present day 
is beyond the scope of this work, but the aim will instead be to provide a snapshot of the 
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cultural landscape of risk for the port city during the time that efforts to build a harbor 
were initiated. Harbors represent the physical and cognitive linkage of land/sea and are 
integral within any maritime cultural landscape. Risk is a fundamental component in the 
formation of all harbors and therefore should be reflected in the cultural landscape of any 
given port city. Furthermore, a landscape approach in this study will allow for the 
examination of a variety of different data sources that might otherwise not be considered. 
To examine how risk and risk management is linked to the cultural landscape of harbors 
it is necessary to turn to another approach based on social theory. 
Giddens’ Theory of Structuration 
 Sociologist Anthony Giddens formulated his Theory of Structuration in his 1984 
book The Constitution of Society. Giddens’ work was largely a response to the increasing 
influence of environmental determinism, functionalism, structuralism, and world systems 
theories in the shaping of human cognition and societal structures (Kilminster 1991:74-
77). He argued that these theories reduced human ability to think for themselves to a 
mechanistic level without the capacity for individualistic decision making. Instead, his 
theory of structuration proposes a new rationale for how humans make decisions despite 
being constrained by societal, economic, and environmental conditions within society. 
 Structuration theory is an attempt to explain how human beings make decisions 
within the structured nature of their society, while at the same time emphasizing the 
reflexive or circular relationships that exist between the individual actors or agents and 
the various structures within a given society. The key point of this sociological paradigm 
is the emphasis on the recursive relation between social structure and agency. Giddens 
argues that there is a duality of structure in that social structures are both constituted by 
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human agency and yet at the same time is the very medium of this constitution (Bryant 
and Jary 1991:7). 
 To clarify this idea, it is necessary to define some of the key components of 
structuration theory. The term, agent, denotes someone, or an actor, who exerts power or 
produces effect, while agency concerns the capability of the agent to act independently 
and make their own choices. Within structuration theory, agency dictates that there are 
numerous human reactions to any given situation. At any point in an individual’s 
decision-making process, that individual made a conscious decision and could have acted 
differently (Giddens 1984:9). Linked to this is the notion of knowlegability, which refers 
to everything that the actor knows about the circumstances of his or her action and that of 
others (Giddens 1984:375). What an actor knows or does not know, which includes 
implicit as well as broadly available knowledge, has an effect on the production and 
reproduction of an individual’s actions. 
How individuals come to make a decision, the subsequent effects of that decision, 
and how the actor uses the consequences in future decision-making processes are 
addressed through varying forms of consciousness modeled within Giddens’ theory. He 
defines discursive consciousness as what actors are able to say regarding their social 
conditions and actions, and practical consciousness as what actors know about social 
conditions, but cannot express verbally (Giddens 1984:375). The difference between the 
two is the ability to verbally articulate one’s own actions. Subsequently, the capability to 
recognize or examine one’s own actions as well as those of others is termed reflexive 
monitoring, and is a chronic feature of everyday action (Giddens 1984:5).  
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Agency refers not to the intentions behind human action, but rather the ability to 
act itself. Therefore, both the intended and unintended consequences of action are of 
equally importance. The flow of action continually produces intended and unintentional 
consequences, which may form unacknowledged circumstances that are brought into 
consciousness through the reflexive monitoring of daily social activity (Giddens 
1984:27). Thus, reflexive monitoring represents the agent’s recognition of both the 
intended and unintended consequences of a given situation, which continuously affects 
the decision-making process in an evolving process. Ultimately, reflexive monitoring 
provides a mechanism by which information, such as a perception of risk, can be 
evaluated and reintroduced as a component in future decision-making processes.  
 To summarize, Giddens provides several different factors that influence the 
decision-making process for actors within society along with identifying the agent’s 
function in society. The role of social structures and how agents can reproduce structural 
properties must now be ascertained. Structures are defined by Giddens (1984:377) as the 
rules and resources of society that are recursively implicated in the reproduction of social 
systems and instantiated in action. In other words, structure describes the rules that 
govern social conduct within society (Marano 2012:24). Social systems are then the 
patterning of reproduced social relations between actors or groups, organized as regular 
social practices (Giddens 1984:25). For Giddens, systems are viewed as surficial patterns 
of interaction, while structures give form and shape to social life but do not constitute that 
form or shape.  
Societal structures do not only influence human action, as implicated in 
structuralist and functionalist thought, but are also formed by human action. Structures 
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exist in and through the activities of human agents (Giddens 1989:256). In other words, 
structures represent the implicit or explicit standards or rules within a society that are 
replicated through human action; they not only restrict behavior, but also create 
possibilities for human behavior. Rules are viewed as the practices that can be seen in 
normal everyday conduct that is performed by individuals on a routine basis that create a 
structure or norm within society. Resources are the bases of power that the agent has the 
ability to manipulate or influence to alter or transform social events (Giddens 1984:258). 
Agents utilize resources within the structured nature of society, the enactment and 
reincorporation of behavior through reflexive monitoring enables them to alter those 
structures, thusly becoming both the mechanism and the product of social behavior 
(Marano 2012:24). 
Referred to above as the duality of structure, this central tenet of Giddens’ theory 
suggests that although people go through a socialization process and become dependent 
upon existing social structures, those social structures are also being altered by their 
activities. Despite the constraints of the established norms or rules of society, individual 
reaction and response to any given situation contains a certain degree of personal choice, 
or agency (Cohen 1987:283). Therefore, the agent has the ability to act freely within 
these rules and enact change in them. As a result, society structures human action, and 
human action structures society in an on-going process.  
Social structuring is further determined by the historical, economic and ecological 
boundaries in which the society exists. Giddens accounts for this by defining social 
praxis, which states that the nature, conditions, and consequences of historically and 
spatio-temporally situated activities and interactions are produced through the agency of 
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social actors (Cohen 1989:1-2; Marano 2012:26). Social praxis is essentially the creation 
and evolution of social life. It is the means of transforming an agent’s actions into an 
external reality. 
Cohen (1987:288) elaborates on this, stating that it is necessary to examine the 
historical, economic trends, cultural behaviors, and ecological factors of the locale that 
was extant when the society was being structured. Giddens defines a locale as the 
physical region involved as part of the setting of interaction, which help concentrate that 
interaction in one way or another (Giddens 1976:106-107; 1984:375). This includes not 
only the physical aspects and human artifacts associated with institutionalized activities 
but also the way that these are used in the course of normal social routines. The inclusion 
of this concept is important as it identifies material culture remains as an active medium 
of social reproduction rather than as a passive backdrop that merely reflects the abstract 
process (Firth 1993:2). 
This thesis will center around one form of social structure: risk. Structuration 
theory is applicable to the analysis of risk by addressing the manner in which both 
individuals and systems have the ability to identify, assess, and manage risk in daily life, 
while also identifying the reflexive mechanisms whereby information regarding risk can 
be evaluated and reintroduced as component in future decision-making processes 
(Marano 2012:29). Structuration theory underpins the notion of maritime cultural 
landscapes and provides a theoretical framework against which to interpret cultural 
behavior on a broader scale by defining the continuing nature of society along with the 
role of past cultural and associative aspects of the landscape (Duncan 2000:28). Risk 
mitigation and behavioral responses to risk can therefore be viewed as one form of 
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cognitive reactive framework that actively shapes and reshapes societal structure, and 
therefore the cultural landscape. 
Defining Risk and Risk Management 
 At this point it is necessary to define the meaning of the term “risk” and why the 
study of risk and risk management is useful for examining past maritime society, 
particularly as it pertains to the construction of harbors. The etymological origins of the 
concept can be found in the Arabic word risq, which meant the acquisition of wealth or 
good fortune, or the Latin risco, which was used as a navigational term by sailors 
entering uncharted waters (Mythen 2004:13). Combined, these terms express themes of 
uncertainty and monetary value, which translated within the ancient medieval application 
of the concept for laws regarding maritime insurance and navigation. Bolstered by 
mathematicians as well as an increase economic development during the 18th and 19th 
centuries, the concept of risk cemented itself to calculation and the quantifiable measure 
of the primarily economic considerations of society (Mythen 2004:13-14). Under this 
banner, risk became recognized as the balance between some form of potential danger 
and acquisitive opportunity. 
Throughout its history, risk is continually linked with the quantification of 
dangers that are either extant or unknown within a society versus the probability of those 
dangers causing some form of loss to an individual or group. For most people, risk is 
typically synonymous with a hazard or danger (Fox 1999:12). Another definition posits 
that a hazard represents a potential threat to people and what they value, while risk is the 
measure of hazards. More precisely, risk can be seen as the likelihood or probability of 
some adverse effect of a hazard, while a more neutral definition specifies risk as simply 
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the probability of some future event (Lowrance 1976; Kates and Kasperson 1983:7027).  
This definition is useful for this study as it concentrates any analysis of risk onto the 
range of things that people value. These may include people’s health (both mental and 
physical), their lives and lifestyles, the quality of their lives or economic well-being and 
environment, along with the social values placed on a physical location (Short 1984:711). 
Social theorist Ulrich Beck elaborates upon this notion of risk, deeming it the 
systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by 
modern society (Beck 1992:21). This definition suggests that risk has a position or 
purpose within society. As society evolves, humans utilize risk and risk calculation for 
decision-making at both the individual and institutional level of society. As modernity 
changes society through either technological, economic, social, cultural, or ecological 
means, people continue to make decisions based on their perception of and willingness to 
accept certain risks. Therefore, risk functions as a form of societal structure. At the 
individual level, these decisions are made throughout the course of people’s daily lives 
whereby the cognitive perception of potential hazards and the ability to recognize these 
hazards dictates certain reactions over others. As shown by Giddens’ theory, these 
reactions have the ability to make risk an influential driving force not only in individual’s 
daily lives, but also within the larger systems of culture such as the development and 
evolution of cultural landscapes (Marano 2012:18). Therefore, managing and mitigating 
for conceivable dangers or risks are not only a psychological issue, but also above all a 
social problem. 
Corresponding with this idea, Luhmann (1993:3) explains that risk managers are 
likely to act in a fashion that coincide with a pertinent reference group, either in 
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conformity to or in breach of prevailing opinion, in terms of one’s socialization. This 
brings to the foreground further questions of who or what takes responsibility for the 
consequences of action or non-action and decides whether, and within which material or 
temporal contexts, the measures of precaution and controlling manufactured uncertainty 
in the dimensions of space, time, money, or knowledge are appropriate (Luhmann 
1993:4; Beck 2000:xii). The action ultimately taken is informed not only by an overall 
understanding of the extent of the problems facing the society, or the knowledgeability of 
an agent(s), but also the technological and ecological issues associated with each concern.  
The assessment of risk can be viewed as the cognitive identification of a hazard 
within a society. Risk management is then defined as the practices and methods by which 
the future consequences of individual and institutional decisions based on potential 
hazards are controlled in the present (Beck 2000:xii). This definition alludes to a 
society’s ability to control and predict the future: “To calculate risk is to master time, to 
discipline the future. To provide for the future does not just mean living from day to day 
and arming oneself against ill-fortune, but also mathematizing one’s commitment” 
(Ewald 1991:207). 
Both risk assessment and risk management form the heart of risk analysis. As 
evidenced in Perrow’s (1984:63) investigation of “Normal Accidents,” any risk analysis 
must first begin with the social and cultural context of hazards and attendant risks. This 
includes first the determination of what is at risk, followed by the investigation of the 
perception of those risks within society, leading finally to the acceptability of risk and a 
behavioral response in the form of risk mitigation strategies (Short 1984:712). This 
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progression will have particular significance for the methodology used in this thesis to 
determine how risk impacted the landscape usage in Table Bay. 
In addition, Duncan (2000:29) and Marano (2012:27) have identified Stephen 
Crook’s (1999) article titled, “Ordering Risks,” as particularly relevant when discussing 
risk in society. Crook (1999:163) advocated that societies identify, assess, and manage 
risks through a series of orderings and management strategies. Orderings are viewed in 
this sense as the framework upon which models of order are projected and contested 
(Crook 1999:163). He argues that social dimensions of risk are at least partially revealed 
through regimes of identification, assessment, and management. Crook (1999:170) 
defines regimes as extremely broad, historically contingent networks for the ordering of 
risk. Complimentary to Giddens, Crook’s regimes can be seen as one form of structuring 
agent. He identified three primary, but not comprehensive, regimes of risk management: 
ritualized, ordered, and neo-liberal. The latter two will be discussed briefly. 
Risks are often either proactively managed or passively managed. Ordered risk 
management seeks to control the type of risk that is extant in society and further limit 
social exposure to it through regulation or prohibition of access to the hazard (Crook 
1999:170). In this case societal hierarchy controls risks, and minimal freedom of choice 
to decide the level of risk exposure is granted to the individual or group. The activities of 
scientific and technical experts, inspectors, legislators and enforcement are not only used 
to process observed risk but through surveillance and discipline routinely identify, assess 
and manage the risk, another example of reflexive monitoring (Crook 1999:171). 
In contrast, neo-liberal risk management strategies provide the individual or group 
with the means to assess the available risk, but ultimately leave the decision of acceptable 
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level of risk exposure and susceptibility to them. While ordered management operates 
through certain regulatory bodies, these are still present, but their function changes to 
focus on the dissemination of information regarding risk rather than preventing exposure 
to it (Crook 1999:171). Duncan (2000:29) argues that the greater freedom of choice 
allowed in this management period may oftentimes result in increased risk-taking 
behavior due to capitalism and the pursuit of economic gain. 
The analysis of risk is complimentary to Giddens’ theory of structuration and the 
notion of maritime cultural landscapes. As agents respond to risks within society, risk 
mitigation through risk assessment and risk management can be conceived as a type of 
reflexive monitoring scheme that actively reshapes societal structure, specifically the 
conception of risk. This, in turn, affects the decision-making processes of those people or 
groups interacting with a given area and results in a unique cultural landscape for that 
locale. 
The combination of these concepts provides a useful theoretical framework for 
the analysis of risk in past landing sites and harbors. Risk, as a concept, has been a factor 
in the theoretical and methodological study of shipwreck events and patterns within 
several maritime archaeological studies (Souza 1998; Gibbs 2006). The explicit 
application of risk to the cultural landscape approach, however, has only recently been 
outlined (Duncan 2000; Marano 2012). Since risk management is expressed in cognitive 
behavior through the use of the landscape and its physical elements, it creates a distinct 
cultural assemblage of tangible (i.e. harbor facilities, lighthouses, shipwrecks, 
environmental modifications, etc.) and intangible (i.e. place names, cultural traditions, 
myths, folklore, spiritual associations) material culture imbued within any harbor.  
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has demonstrated the close theoretical ties between the cultural 
landscape approach, Anthony Giddens’ Theory of Stucturation, and the concept of risk. 
Giddens, Beck, Perrow, and Crook all contributed to an understanding of the way that 
individuals and groups identify, assess, and manage risk in daily life. Giddens further 
provides a means for the reincorporation of information regarding risk through reflexive 
mechanisms in society. The manner by which the colonial government and local 
maritime community at Cape Town identified and responded to the risks of using Table 
Bay imbued the landscape with implicit and explicit signs or features that reflect the 
cultural landscape of risk in Table Bay. The following chapter will discuss the 
methodology utilized for identifying these characteristics within the landscape of Table 
Bay. 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: A METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING RISK 
 
 
Introduction 
In order to examine the role that risk played in the development of the harbor at 
Cape Town, a research methodology was needed that allowed for a comprehensive 
investigation of the diversified data sources that inform a cultural landscape approach. 
This chapter will discuss the specific methodology used for this survey. It is first 
necessary to outline the parameters and limitations of the study. Next, each data source 
utilized will be discussed individually and the potential for the application of each 
towards the determination of risk in the cultural landscape of 19th century Table Bay will 
be outlined. The final section of this chapter will describe the statistical and geospatial 
analysis of the harbor and associated features in the cultural landscape. The benefit of 
GIS spatial and temporal data representation for identifying trends or patterns that reflect 
risk or the management of risk in the cultural landscape of Table Bay will be 
demonstrated. 
Defining the Study Area 
The primary aim of this thesis is to define and examine the cultural of landscape 
of risk in relation to harbor development. Table Bay has historically been a locus of 
maritime activity since the original passage of 15th and 16th century explorers and 
traders around the Cape of Good Hope. Therefore, the timeframe and extent of the survey 
needed to encompass the study area’s unique culture, history and variety of resources 
while fitting in the scope of a Master’s thesis. It was not until 1652 that a permanent 
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outpost and the beginnings of a harbor were actually initiated in Table Bay, which 
allocates over 350 years for potential research. To accomplish research goals given the 
breadth of potential research, focus needed to be scaled in order to make the data set 
more manageable. 
One issue with scaling the temporal focus of a cultural landscape study is that it 
can potentially lead to biases imposed by the researcher and neglect of certain aspects of 
past landscape usage that could reveal landscape values and inter-relationships associated 
with the chosen area (Duncan 2006:38). As stated in the previous chapter, the aim of this 
study is to define how the cognitive perception of and behavioral response to risk is 
evident within the cultural landscape. The decision to build and utilize a harbor represents 
the acknowledgment of risk and the subsequent responses are the attempt to mitigate that 
risk manifested in diverse ways. Therefore, the ideal timeframe to study risk in Table 
Bay’s cultural landscape should begin with the initial concerted efforts of mitigating risk 
through the construction of a harbor of refuge. 
The British Empire inherited a singular dilapidated jetty from the previous Dutch 
government at the Cape when the colony was taken in 1806 and officially ceded in 1814. 
During the ensuing century, the intensification of maritime activity coupled with the rise 
of the British to global supremacy necessitated the modification of its harbor at Table 
Bay, which was situated at the oceanic crossroads of the Empire. It was during this 
second British occupation at the Cape beginning in 1806 that a harbor at Cape Town 
came to fruition. In 1910, four separate British colonies, the Cape Colony, Natal Colony, 
Transvaal Colony, and Orange River Colony amalgamated into the Union of South 
Africa. What had been an imperial colony became a sovereign nation and historic 
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predecessor of the modern Republic of South Africa. After this event, the harbor at Cape 
Town underwent extensive alterations to bring it into the modern age, which submerged 
the historic shoreline and harbor beneath the contemporary city. Therefore, the time 
period between 1806 and 1910 represents an ideal snapshot of the cultural landscape that 
was defined by risk and risk management for Cape Town’s harbor.  
Data Acquisition 
This section will discuss each source of data that was used for this thesis. With 
limitations in fieldwork and necessary access to relevant material and subjects, certain 
ethnographic and folkloric information were excluded from the study. This information 
could have potentially provided invaluable insight into how risks were perceived and 
dealt with at a local level within Cape Town. The following resources were used in a 
complementary manner to one another and the order they are presented does not 
necessarily reflect the way that they were used in the process of analyzing risk in the 
landscape. 
Historical/Documentary Sources  
 Historical research performed for this study was carried out with three primary 
objectives. First, research was conducted to determine the overall extent of harbor 
development by investigating the construction, development and evolution of harbor 
works and infrastructure throughout the 19th century. In order to create a relative 
chronological history of the harbor, regional heritage syntheses and broad thematic 
histories relating to the harbor were initially consulted. It was found that relatively few 
overview histories discuss the progression of the harbor in its entirety (Newall 1993; 
Veitch 1994). Other secondary sources were dedicated to a specific timeframe of the 
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harbor’s history (Rush 1972; Soonike 1974; Peterson 1978; Dimond 2009) and several 
had short synopses as part of a larger analysis of shipping in South Africa (Murray 1933; 
Burman 1976; Wiese 1981; Worden 1994; Worden et al 1998; Newall 1999b).  
Several of the secondary source materials were particularly useful for establishing 
the perceptions and responses to risk in the foundational period of British governance at 
the Cape. In particular, Hans Erik Soonike’s (1974) master’s thesis titled, The 
Development of the Port and Harbor of Table Bay with Special Reference to the Period 
1825-1860 was vital in establishing the history and economic difficulties in forming the 
harbor during early stages of development. Soonike’s thorough coverage of archival 
material including personal correspondence between Cape Officials and Parliament along 
with requests from the local mercantile community made identifying local as well as 
official attitudes towards the potential risks and benefits of a harbor abundantly clear.  
 Official historical records provide insights into world, national and statewide 
views as well as governmental attitudes that present official views towards risk. Local 
government and regulatory authority records often provide better insights into regional 
official mercantile and thematic issues as well as the occasional glimpse of local 
ideologies, practices and behaviors, specifically as it pertains to risk mitigation strategies 
and the potential for risk-taking behaviors (Duncan 2006:42-43). In Cape Town, the local 
agents in charge of the oversight and construction of the harbor were the various Harbour 
Boards for Table Bay. 
In 1836 the original Harbour Board for Table Bay was authorized to raise money 
and administer the construction of several works in the bay (Table Bay Harbour Board 
1895:8). As Governor of the Cape in 1847, Sir Henry Pottinger first introduced the Table 
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Bay Improvement Bill and set forth legislation for the overall port and harbor 
improvement in the colony. Ordinance 11, passed in 1848, provided further 
administrative backing for the establishment of multiple Boards of Commissioners for the 
Improvement of the Ports and Harbors in the colony, which was established in Table Bay 
later that same year (Soonike 1974:105). 
Each of these regulatory entities provided Annual Harbour Board Reports on the 
state of the harbor with updates and recommendations for further works to the Houses of 
Parliament in London. These sources were found in the Cape Town Archives Repository 
inventory of Reports of the Select Committees of the Legislative Council and House of 
Assembly (CCP). To find each report, a list of potential reports was compiled from the 
aforementioned secondary sources and by searching the National Automated Archival 
Information Retrieval System (NAAIRS) database for the archives. During two months 
of field research in Cape Town, 32 volumes from the CCP collection with dates ranging 
from 1854-1904 were consulted and the reports scanned for future reference. 
Submitted each fiscal year, the Annual Harbour Board Reports also contained 
detailed statistics on the expenditure and revenue for each individual harbor work, the 
labor used, and measure of progress for every change to the shoreline. Aside from merely 
listing data, the Harbour Board gave explanations for why modifications or additions 
were pursued or not. These reports provided the necessary clarification on the 
inaccuracies or inconsistent data in the secondary source material. Furthermore, these 
reports presented the views of the people that were actively pursuing the construction of 
the harbor. The Harbour Board represented the core of risk assessors and managers for 
Table Bay and largely dictated the course of harbor evolution throughout the 19th 
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century. Therefore, they were essential in establishing the disposition of local risk 
management and official perceptions of risk in Table Bay. One supplemental history 
from the Harbour Board in 1895 was also found that outlined the history of harbor works 
up to that point (Table Bay Harbour Board 1895). 
The second line of inquiry sought to determine the impact of the harbor on the 
colony and extent of harbor activity. This was assessed through general shipping statistics 
such as the tonnage of vessels entering and leaving, import and export values, etc. in 
Table Bay for the given time period. These statistics were compiled into a singular 
document annually within the Cape Annual Bluebook and Statistical Registers submitted 
by the colonial government to the Houses of Parliament. The earliest Annual Bluebook 
found during research was within the Colonial Office (CO) records dated to 1821 and 
continued to 1849. The volumes changed from the CO to the CCP collection from 1850 
to 1885, and then to the Cape Archives (CA) collection from 1886 to 1906. Due to time 
constraints statistical information from 1806 to 1814 and 1906 to 1910 were not recorded. 
The information gathered, however, allows for a reliable dataset of 85 years during which 
the main development of the harbor took place for the study timeframe. All figures were 
recorded in Microsoft Excel for further analysis. 
Lastly, the wrecking events associated with three chronologically distributed 
shipwrecks were investigated to demonstrate how the maritime landscape of risk is 
represented temporally by specific shipwreck incidents in the archaeological record of 
Table Bay. While shipwrecks represent a single component within the cultural landscape, 
they are an essential component and the wrecking events are intimately linked with other 
factors in the landscape. The wrecks of Fame (1822), RMS Athens (1865) and SS Hermes 
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(1901) were chosen as they all wrecked under unique circumstances that reflect the state 
of the harbor at the time of wrecking and the potential risks associated with its 
chronological development. 
Historical information on these shipwrecks was collected in a variety of locations. 
The National Library of South Africa (NLSA) housed microfilm collections of local 
newspapers that were present at the time each vessel foundered in the Bay. Papers 
researched included the Cape Argus, the Cape of Good Hope and Port Natal Shipping 
and Mercantile Gazette, and the Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser. This 
research centered on the wrecks themselves and the circumstances of their wrecking. 
Additional sources on each shipwreck were gathered at the Iziko Museum’s John H. 
Marsh Maritime Research Center and the Iziko Museum Social History collections.  
Several photographic and artistic image collections were also critically analyzed 
to ascertain past attitudes towards risk in the harbor. Photographs have the ability to 
demonstrate not only physical landscape components, but also display the symbolism as 
well as perceptions of the landscape at the time they were taken through their respective 
composition. Photographs were particularly useful for bringing a sense of reality to the 
descriptions of the harbor. Furthermore, created images, which include paintings, 
lithographs and drawings, represent a stylized reality of the landscape and the inclusion 
of certain features over others reflects upon the creator’s underlying perceptions of the 
landscape (Duncan 2006:45). This imagery, particularly artistic images of the harbor at 
Table Bay enabled the interpretation of elements of risk and risk management imbued 
within the iconography of the landscape. 
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Ethno-Historical Sources 
 The analysis of historical events through selective observer interpretation (i.e. 
personal accounts or testimonies) represents an inherent bias when researching historical 
accounts. Duncan (2006:45) argues that if these biases are recognized by the observer, 
these accounts can still offer valuable insights into the behavior, practices, and social 
structures of historical maritime communities. Newspaper accounts were specifically 
used in this study to provide local viewpoints on potential hazards and risks in Table Bay 
that are not necessarily recorded in official historical records. The three Cape Town 
newspapers listed in the previous section were examined for indications of these local 
insights. These papers represented valuable sources for understanding the perceptions of 
and beliefs regarding maritime risk in the local community.  
Cartographic Sources 
 Cartographic material in the form of maps and charts provide a diagrammatic 
portrayal of the historic landscape. Maps, similar to other created imagery, produce a 
reality that was chosen by the mapmaker during the particular historical period it was 
made (Wood 1992:20). Like other historical documents, maps contain inherent biases, 
but have the ability to provide insight into past landscape usage, archaeological site re-
location, changes in the shoreline along with the values and ideologies of the 
surveyor/mapmaker (Duncan 2006:47-48; Fontana 2013:280). Therefore, maps and 
charts allowed for the interpretation of the physical natural and cultural features of Table 
Bay as well as intangible values associated with those perceptible elements. 
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FIGURE 3.1. Historical chart detailing the extent of Table Bay and Cape Town as 
surveyed by British hydrographer Francis Skead from 1858-1860 (Chart courtesy of the 
City of Cape Town Environmental and Heritage Management). 
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Furthermore, maps and charts provide official names for landscape features, 
which have connotations for how the past landscape was viewed. Toponymy, or the study 
of place names, assists in defining the cultural landscape by delineating the encoded 
values of cultural agents within the tangible landscape. Place names act as reminders of 
cultural identity through the preservation of famous persons, events and history, operate 
as navigational signs, detail historical events, associate cultural activity with geographic 
features, and serve as a perceptible reminder of the community’s distant past (Barber 
1994:18). Toponymic data cross-cuts a variety of data sources and was therefore gathered 
through a combination of cartographic analysis and an examination of the historical 
record with special attention to the way different areas around Table Bay were described 
or labeled.  
Historic geospatial information relating to harbor works were not included in the 
Annual Harbour Board Reports, making it difficult to determine where these sites were 
located. Contemporary maps and charts aided in the delineation of Table Bay’s historic 
landscape and subsequently for the recreation a visual representation of the landscape’s 
chronological development on a modern GIS system (ESRI ArcGIS 10). To facilitate a 
geospatial analysis of the historic shoreline and harbor in Table Bay, 30 maps and charts 
were collected and either downloaded or digitized into .JPG or .TIFF files (Figure 3.1). 
Maps were principally selected based on the date they were created, but other factors 
included the potential for georeferencing, a process outlined below, on ArcGIS. 
The collected maps ranged in date from 1786 up to the present. The majority of 
maps (16) were provided by the City of Cape Town (CCT) Environmental and Heritage 
Management Office in Cape Town. In 2001 the CCT set in motion a plan to “identify, 
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assess, conserve, manage and enhance the heritage resources, structures and landscapes 
of all the people of Cape Town” (CCT Environmental and Heritage Management Branch 
2005:21). A significant section of this plan outlines the creation of a GIS database for 
historic heritage resources that can be updated as new sites are identified or researched. 
The management approach resulted in the collection of many historical maps of Cape 
Town to identify potential resource locations and the maps obtained for this study were 
included in that assemblage. 
Several other maps and charts (7) were collected from the African Studies 
Department’s digital map collection accessed at the University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Chancellor Oppenheimer Library. Some relevant maps spanning the temporal range of 
this study and beyond could not be downloaded from the library due to access limitations, 
but were viewed for substantive analysis online (uctscholar.uct.ac.za). Another key 
resource for cartographic data was located at the Chief Directorate of Mapping and 
Surveys in Cape Town, which contains the national mapping agency of South Africa, the 
National Geo-Spatial Information Agency (NGI). While the NGI contains the largest 
collection of aerial images of South Africa, it also holds a large repository of historic and 
modern topographical, aeronautical, and administrative maps. An additional 7 maps were 
identified and digitized by the NGI for use in this survey. 
Several modern maps that were digitized from the NGI already contained 
geospatial data and were particularly useful for relocating certain shipwreck sites (Figure 
3.2). All of the maps and charts collected for analysis varied in scale and differed in the 
manner of representing features in the landscape, which is problematic for establishing an 
exact estimate of site locations. The goals of this thesis, however, do not entail exact site 
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re-location, but rather an assessment of the general location of sites in relation to one 
another and what this reflects upon risk in the past utilization of the landscape. The 
potential error is therefore negligible for the analyses employed in this study. 
 
 
 
 
Environmental Data 
As previously indicated, the environment represents an essential component of 
any maritime cultural landscape. The topographic, hydrologic, geologic, meteorological, 
and climactic conditions of an area have a significant impact on the construction of a 
FIGURE 3.2. GIS overlay of a modern map of Table Bay, surveyed in 1961 and drawn in 
1962 by the Trigonometrical Survey Office of South Africa. The map contained locations 
of shipwrecks in the bay that could be used for site relocation (Map courtesy of the Chief 
Directorate of Surveys and Mapping). 
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cultural landscape. The natural or physical characteristics of Southern Africa and Table 
Bay had a direct influence on the perception of risk in Cape Town and subsequent 
management of that risk. For example, it is impossible to discuss the history of shipping 
in Table Bay without mentioning the influence of major storm systems distinctive to 
Africa’s southern coastline. Therefore, it was necessary to collect historical data 
pertaining to the physical landscape of Table Bay. 
The oldest continuously existing scientific institution in South Africa, the Royal 
Observatory, was built in 1820 and recorded meteorological and astronomical data for the 
Cape during the 19th century. Unfortunately there is a paucity of research that collates 
historical environmental statistics obtained from these observations. This was identified 
as one area of potential future research that will be discussed later in this thesis. 
Information pertaining to a select number of years, however, was recorded from 
observations made chiefly by astronomer Thomas Maclear (Stone 1871). For the 
purposes of this study the majority of the historic environmental data was determined 
from contemporary studies outlined above. 
To supplement this information, current statistics and research were surveyed and 
compared with past descriptions in historical sources to determine the range of natural 
factors that may have influenced the creation of a cultural landscape of risk. Modern 
environmental geospatial data was chiefly contributed by the South African Navy 
Hydrographic Office (SANHO). This information was part of an agreement between the 
SANHO and the author whereby digital vector data including soundings and depth 
contours for Table Bay were provided for analysis (Appendix 1). Other data was found in 
several theses and reports that contained past descriptions of the ecological and climatic 
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traits of Table Bay (Van Iperen 1971; Woodborne 1982, 1983; McLachlan 1991; 
Mavrodinov 1999). 
Archaeological Data 
 The historical and archaeological potential for 19th century Cape Town was 
previously recognized by Toby Durden (1992) in his honor’s thesis aptly titled, The 
Maritime Archaeological Potential of Table Bay, 1806-1900. Durden’s research 
concentrated on the relative temporal and spatial patterning of shipwrecks in Table Bay 
during the specified time period. While it did not address the concept of risk or the 
cultural landscape, the results of Durden’s survey provided an essential base upon which 
this thesis could expand into the range of potential data included in a cultural landscape 
study. 
 Duncan (2000:50; 2006:60) notes the benefit of using shipwreck databases and 
existing archaeological site documentation in the form of books, reports, and journal 
articles for the examination of large-scale data. In the 1990s the National Monuments 
Council of South Africa collated all of the historical records for shipwrecks along the 
South African coastline into a single shipwreck database. This database, now 
administered by the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA), provided 
historical information and general spatial data for shipwrecks in Table Bay. This data was 
essential for the statistical and spatial analyses outlined below. Further review of the 
archaeological literature helped to determine the extent of archaeological documentation 
of maritime sites in Table Bay.  
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Data Analysis 
 Using prior studies by Duncan (2000) and Marano (2012) as a point of departure, 
analysis of the complete data set collected throughout this survey was directed into three 
main sections. The first phase of analysis involved the historical and statistical 
examination of shipping in Table Bay with a focus on the measurement of potential risks 
in Table Bay and the range of values at risk within the maritime community. The next 
step in data analysis entailed the construction of a GIS database that outlined the 
chronological development of the harbor as well as the plotting and visual representation 
of landscape features relating to risk and risk management. The final analytic component 
of the study compared the geospatial data with the temporal and statistical trends to 
determine perceptions of risk and its effect on cultural and natural landscape features that 
reflect the management of risk in the historical and archaeological records. 
Statistical Analysis 
 The official colonial records sent annually back to London in the Annual 
Bluebooks and Harbour Board Reports provided detailed information on harbor 
operations. These statistics contained specific elements that can be examined to 
determine the potential effects of risk on the development of the harbor during this time 
period. The statistical analysis portion of this thesis involved two main components. The 
first part involved the compilation and examination of the statistics concerning the extent 
and effectiveness of harbor operations housed in both the historical documents. The 
second portion involved the investigation of shipwreck events in Table Bay for evidence 
of potential hazards and trends in risk taking behaviors as recorded in the SAHRA 
shipwreck database. 
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 As an imperial society within the British Empire, the Cape Colony was required 
to record annual statistics regarding all aspects of life within the colony. These Cape 
Annual Bluebook and Statistical Registers were submitted in annual reports to the Houses 
of Parliament that allowed London officials to assess the contemporary status of the 
colony and effect changes when as needed. These records collated various assortments of 
information that were partitioned according to several different aspects of society. 
Examples of sections within the Bluebooks included population data, financial statistics, 
and production outputs. Due to limitations mentioned above, and to fit these statistics 
best within the parameters of the research questions, statistics that would best reflect risk 
in the development of the harbor were selected. The most pertinent set of statistics 
contained within the Bluebooks was therefore information relating to imports, exports and 
general shipping for the colony. 
TABLE 3.1. Cape Town and Cape Colony statistics recorded from Annual Bluebook 
Statistical Registers, 1806-1910. 
 
The Bluebook statistics on shipping contained both aggregate data for the whole 
Cape Colony as well as localized information for each major port, such as Cape Town. 
To better assess potential risks of past utilization of Cape Town’s harbor, baseline data 
Cape Colony Cape Town Harbor 
• Total Tonnage Inwards 
• Total Tonnage Cleared 
• Total Revenue 
• Total Expenditure 
• Vessel Tonnage Entering Table Bay 
• Vessel Tonnage Clearing Table Bay 
• Value of Goods Entering Table Bay 
• Value of Goods Clearing Table Bay 
• Men Imported 
• Men Exported 
• Duty Collected on Imports 
• Customs Revenue 
• Expenditure on Harbor Works 
• Wharfage Revenue 
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for the extent and effectiveness of the harbor provided an estimation of the value Cape 
Town had within the colony. This information was then used to quantify what was at risk 
for the maritime community in Table Bay. The categories of data collected from these 
statistical registers are outlined in Table 3.1. For each year data was entered into an Excel 
spreadsheet for further analysis and to create graphs and charts to visually represent any 
observable trend. By examining the extent of shipping and the value that shipping had to 
the colony as a whole, it was possible to determine trends that would have affected the 
decision-making of Harbour Board officials to pursue different measures of risk 
management over time. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.3. Example of a shipwreck file for South African shipwrecks containing all 
known information for the vessel within the SAHRA shipwreck database (Image by 
author, 2015. Shipwreck database provided by SAHRA, 2014). 
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In addition to the compilation of data related to harbor development in Table Bay, 
statistics for shipwreck incidents were recorded based on information contained within 
SAHRA’s shipwreck database for South Africa. The database, housed in Microsoft 
Access format, is the product of an extensive survey of South Africa’s historical and 
archaeological records to determine all possible shipwrecks reported along the nation’s 
coastline. For the purposes of this study, the database was queried for all shipwrecks 
wrecked in Table Bay between 1806 and 1910. The file for each shipwreck provided 
information relative to the history of the vessel as well as data concerning its loss as 
shown in Figure 3.3. 
TABLE 3.2. Classification of the terminology used for wrecking events in Table Bay. 
 
Data related to the wrecking event for each shipwreck identified in the SAHRA 
database was then logged into an Excel spreadsheet. Specifically, the circumstances of 
the vessel’s loss, date of loss, general location of the wreck, and type of vessel were 
recorded. This information was imported into IBM’s predictive statistical analysis 
Circumstance of Loss Definition Other Terms Included 
Beached Intentional process by which a ship is laid ashore or grounded  
Grounded Unintentional impact of a ship on a seabed or beach due to natural factors Stranded 
Navigational Error Unintentional grounding or wrecking due to apparent human error in navigation  
Gale/Storm Severe storm system that produced a dangerous sea state and resulted in a wreck  
Abandoned Purposeful abandonment or wrecking of a vessel in a non-catastrophic manner  Condemned 
Collision Impact of a ship with another ship or obstruction to navigation  
Repurposed Intentional wrecking or salvage of a ship to serve a different function Broken Up 
Fire Wrecking of a vessel due to incendiary causes Explosion 
Wrecked Unknown circumstance of loss Unknown 
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software SPSS to determine any chronological or thematic trends in the wrecking events 
that could be indicative of risks and risk-taking behaviors for shipping in Table Bay. 
One issue that occurred during this analysis was that the circumstances of loss for 
some vessels were described using inconsistent or confusing terms. It was important to 
clarify this data as the circumstances surrounding the loss of a vessel could have different 
connotations for how risk was perceived following the wrecking event. To make the 
classifications used in this study clear, the supporting notes and history for each vessel 
were reviewed and a new terminology for classing the circumstance in which the vessels 
were lost was created. The new definitions are listed in Table 2. Vessels that were 
refloated after wrecking were included within the study since the wrecking event itself 
would have contributed to the perceptions of risk amongst the maritime community. 
GIS Creation and Spatial Analysis 
GIS technology enables the linkage of spatial representations of reality, such as 
maps, with related information that is stored in database and feature attribute tables. The 
use of GIS for analyzing shipwreck spatial patterning as well as for the plotting of 
multiple layers of different types of data representing cultural landscape features is a 
proven methodological tactic (Boyd et al 1996:58; Murphy 1998:167; Duncan 2000:31, 
2006:70; Kimura 2006:43; Kammerans et al 2009; Marano 2012:46). To analyze risk in 
the cultural landscape of Table Bay, a systematic process of relocating historic sites and 
structures for analysis of spatial patterning within the historic landscape was needed. GIS 
analysis was completed with two objectives. The first was to visually demonstrate the 
chronological development of the harbor and landscape of Table Bay. The second 
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objective was to determine any correlation between risk and the spatial distribution of 
shipwrecks and harbor facilities in the area. 
The first step in the creation of this GIS involved the digitization of historical 
cartographic source material. A base map consisting of modern satellite imagery of Table 
Bay within ArcMap was first inserted into the database and set to the WGS 1984 
projection to provide spatial reference for the modern landscape. Collected maps and 
charts were then overlaid onto the modern map coverage using a common GIS process 
called geo-referencing, which allowed the modern geographical coordinate system to be 
applied to the historic sources (Figure 3.4). 
 
 
In order to complete the geo-referencing process, a series of control points were 
selected using permanent structures with known spatial locations that could be identified 
on both images. A total of 10 maps were georectified within the GIS database. Each map 
FIGURE 3.4. Example of the geo-referencing process, where a historic map (left) is 
assigned spatial control points based on similar features in the modern satellite imagery 
(right) and overlaid onto the modern image (Image by author, 2015). 
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was selected based on the availability of detail within the image for matching control 
points onto the modern landscape, as well as for its temporal date of creation. This was an 
issue with past studies in Table Bay using earlier forms of GIS, whereby the lack of scale 
and detail resulted in distortions that would have negatively affected any interpretation of 
the cultural features (Mavrodinov 1999:112). The control points utilized varied according 
to each map, but generally included the Mouille Point and Green Point Lighthouses, 
Lion’s Head, Robinson Graving Dock, Cape Castle, and Diep River entrance. The 
amount of relative distortion between the control points on the two images could be 
assessed on a link table in the ArcMap geo-referencing toolbar with each remaining 
within acceptable levels. 
To recreate the chronological evolution of the harbor, the geo-rectified maps were 
traced and made into shapefile layers on ArcMap. Supplemental features in the landscape 
were also made into point, polyline, and polygon features. Of the 10 maps that were 
selected, four different sections of harbor development could be determined. The first 
was at the beginning of harbor construction in 1860, the next at the second stage of major 
harbor modification in 1884, the third at the turn of the century in 1900, and the last with 
the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. These representations of the historic 
harbor could then be coupled with the statistical information to examine the extent of 
harbor operations over time, and assess the cultural and natural features in the landscape 
that demonstrate the management of certain risks to maritime activity in the bay. 
To facilitate the spatial analysis of the harbor and its effect on shipwreck 
patterning in Table Bay, the shipwreck data obtained from the SAHRA database was 
transferred to the GIS. Using the layers for the historic shoreline at each time period as 
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well as the geo-rectified maps as references, the general shipwreck location for each 
wreck was plotted onto the map in a point layer. Few shipwrecks are archaeologically 
known with exact latitude and longitude data. Only the coordinates for the three 
shipwrecks mentioned above were collected since they are known archaeological sites. 
These points were recorded using a Garmin GPS Map 78s unit. Each shipwreck point 
was then given attributes specific to the vessel that it represented, which allowed for the 
analysis of the wrecks according to certain characteristics of the vessel or wrecking event. 
These points could then be analyzed using different functions on the GIS to display 
patterns of risk within the archaeological record. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter outlined the methodological approach utilized in this thesis. In an 
effort to stay true to this generalist type of analysis, care was taken to account for a 
variety of different data sources and analytical techniques. To successfully analyze the 
role of risk in the development of Cape Town’s harbor during the 19th century, it is first 
necessary to determine what is at risk, how risks are perceived by the maritime 
community, and finally how those risks were mitigated. It is argued that because the 
nature of risk is related to the quantification of potential hazards, the application of 
relevant historical statistical information is particularly useful for determining trends that 
may have affected decisions to enact certain measures of risk management over others. 
Coupled with the use of a GIS, this decision-making process of risk assessment and 
management can be analyzed further and visually represented on the cultural landscape. 
CHAPTER FOUR: RISK AND THE HISTORY OF CAPE TOWN’S HARBOR 
 
 
“The value of a secure and ample harbor at Cape Town cannot be overlooked…” 
- Captain James Vetch, R.E., Harbor Surveyor to the Admiralty 
(Table Bay Harbour Board 1895:11) 
 
Introduction 
The historical development and process behind the construction of the harbor at 
Cape Town is exceedingly important to this study. After control of the Cape Colony 
permanently shifted to the British in 1806, Cape Town continued to act as a crossroads of 
trade and ‘Gateway to the East’ for imperial expansion between Britain and Her 
Majesty’s interests worldwide. With the growth of the British Empire and exponential 
rise of vessels making the trip around the Cape in the years that followed, maritime 
activity became intrinsically linked to the city of Cape Town and to the maturity of the 
colony as a whole. The need to protect and facilitate this linkage would eventually 
necessitate a sufficient harbor befitting the most prominent port of call in southern Africa. 
The primary goal of this chapter will be to outline the chronological history of the 
harbor at Cape Town, with particular reference to the second British occupation of the 
Cape. This period prompted the initial expansion of the harbor. The calculation of risk is 
one of the most important considerations when deciding upon building a harbor of refuge. 
The decision to create certain harbor constructions over others, along with choosing 
which will be the most effective and where they should fit spatially within the landscape 
all reflect the cognitive perception of risk. Therefore, historical analysis of the decisions 
made to begin harbor development in Table Bay can shed light on what risks were most 
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prevalent in Table Bay and what measures were taken or not taken to mitigate these 
dangers. 
To fully understand and delineate the cultural landscape of risk, a more holistic 
understanding of the broader cultural landscape in Cape Town must first also be 
explored. In addition to analyzing the development of the harbor, this chapter will also 
function to describe the broader cultural landscape of risk as it appears in the historical 
record. To accomplish this, different features of the harbor will be discussed as they 
appear chronologically in the historical record. The expansion of the harbor was 
eventually the result of an outcropping of different social, political, economic, and 
environmental variables extant within the maritime economy of South Africa during the 
19th century. 
Table Bay and the VOC 
To begin, it is important to discuss the cultural landscape as it existed prior to the 
British reign at the Cape. Within the period of 150 years of Dutch administration at the 
Cape, the efforts towards constructing a port of call were likely to affect the potential 
decision making processes under the forthcoming British government. As the number of 
ships rounding the Cape of Good Hope increased following the establishment of the 
Dutch East India Company, the need for a sufficient anchorage amplified. Although 
Saldanha Bay to the north provided greater natural shelter, the supply of fresh water in 
Table Bay made it more suitable for a refreshment station along the southern African 
coastline (Liebbrandt 1898a:26-31). 
The initial 1649 blueprints for a settlement in the bay called for a means of getting 
the necessary supplies to the ships at anchor in the roadstead by means of a wooden jetty 
55 
 
immediately off the northwestern bastion of the established Fort de Goede Hoop, and 
later Cape Castle (Figure 4.1; Liebbrandt 1898a:3-16). In 1664, work on the wooden jetty 
was initiated and was eventually completed in 1658 with the structure stretching 300 feet 
into the bay. The jetty was built using timber felled from Newlands Forest and casks of 
water could be filled at a nearby reservoir, rolled onto the jetty and either handed or 
craned down to lighters waiting to take the cargo to the anchored ships (Leibbrandt 
1900:30). The purpose of the work was to ensure the better health of sailors who were 
previously required to wade through the surf to replenish their ship’s water supplies. 
 
Since Table Bay was more of a convenient provision depot to the VOC, there was 
little aspiration to establish a commercial port to supplement the relatively low volume of 
trade conducted. Therefore, focus was placed on the landing and loading of cargo for 
people making the voyage east and supplying a break in the long voyage, hence the 
establishment of hospitals, inns, and taverns that lead to the formation of Cape Town’s 
FIGURE 4.1. Engraving by J.H. Schneider depicting early Cape Town in 1778 with the 
Old South Jetty and Castle, ships at anchor in the roadstead and surfboats waiting on the 
beach (Courtesy of the City of Cape Town Environmental and Heritage Management). 
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symbolic role as the ‘Tavern of the Seas.’ By 1673, the wooden jetty had already been 
damaged from several storms and during repairs was lengthened to enable smaller craft to 
come aside it at low water (Soonike 1974:3). 
 
In order to secure the expanding trade with the East Indies, the Dutch needed to 
make sure that they could maintain freedom of the seas to ensure safe and profitable 
shipping. The Cape route was the only sea-route that led to the Indian Ocean, therefore 
all ships passed by the Cape on the way to Asia and the majority of them anchored in 
Table Bay to re-provision. By holding this anchorage the Dutch and later on the British 
both successfully secured its shipping access to the East Indies. Both nations were very 
much aware of the vulnerability of the Cape and its strategic importance, so a series of 
secret signals were used to warn unsuspecting captains should an enemy overrun the 
town (Leibbrandt 1898b:200). 
FIGURE 4.2. Section of 1794 map (left) highlighting the “Lion Mountain” with signal 
flag on the Lion's Rump and Head that overlooked the roadstead, the main entrance and 
southerly approach to the bay. Painting by T. Williams (right) illustrating the signals used 
on the Lion's Rump for communicating the arrival of mail steamships to the Port Offices 
(Map courtesy of the University of Cape Town African Studies Department; Veitch 
1994:69). 
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The Dutch originally utilized the landscape in these efforts and established 
outposts on Robben Island near the entrance of the bay as well as upon the Lion’s Rump 
or Signal Hill, which was a part of a larger mountain that resembles a lion overlooking 
the sea (Figure 4.2). These signals were changed annually and allowed vessels to choose 
to either anchor in Table Bay or St. Helena Bay when safe. With the development of mail 
steam lines these signals later facilitated communication with the Port Captain upon the 
arrival of mail steamships (Figure 4.2; 1898b:166; Veitch 1994:69). The mountains also 
served as aids to navigation in the bay and both the Dutch and the British usefulness of 
these points of reference to determine the best locations to weigh anchor at any given 
time of year (Stanier and McArthur 2010:482). 
To further defend the city against attack from the sea, a series of batteries were 
constructed including the original Castle under Jan van Riebeeck, the Chavonnes Battery 
built in 1726, Fort de Knokke and Imhoff batteries built in 1744, and the Amsterdam 
Battery in 1787 (Thunberg 1986:39). These coastal fortifications played a vital role in 
Britain’s second successful attempt at gaining control of the Cape during the Napoleonic 
Wars in 1805. When General Baird’s fleet entered Table Bay on 6 January, 1806 the forts 
along the bay’s rocky shoreline warded off any landing attempt made by the invading 
fleet, forcing them to anchor farther to the north and march over the mountains, which 
eventually led to the Battle of Blaauwberg and the full cessation of the Colony in 1814 
(Wilmot 1869:234). 
 In the 17th century, Cape Town became a desirable port of call but the severe 
northwesterly storms frequently caused entire flotillas and their precious cargoes to be 
lost in a single storm (Leibbrandt 1900:289-291). In 1729 a special levy, or Mouljegeld, 
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was imposed to finance the construction of a breakwater (Soonike 1974:8). Farmers were 
obligated under the Mouljegeld to take stones from a quarry at the base of Signal Hill to 
the site of the mole, or breakwater, whenever they brought their produce to the city 
markets. After a plague of locusts decimated crops in 1745 however, fewer farmers made 
the trip into the city and work on the breakwater languished until ultimately the project 
was abandoned in 1746 and the breakwater tax abolished. The remains of the incomplete 
mole could still be seen at low tide in 1904 and is reflected in the name of the 
surrounding neighborhood, “Mouille Point” (Table Bay Harbour Board 1904). With lack 
of funds and labor, the VOC never tried to reinvest efforts into building a larger harbor 
for the remainder of the Company’s time at the Cape. 
The Jetty Phase 
 Following British takeover of the Cape in 1795, General J.H. Craig remarked 
upon the poor state of the old VOC jetty whose piles had been eaten through by worms to 
such an extent that an inch of breadth was all that retained the structural integrity of the 
work in certain places (Theal 1897:275). This jetty represented the sole commercial 
artery of the Colony and the growth of trade made it increasingly difficult to handle cargo 
at the lone landing site in the bay (Figure 4.3). By 1815, the annual trade tonnage doubled 
from 8,892 tons in 1813 to 15,291 tons. Three years later in 1818, this number doubled 
once more to 30,775 tons of trade goods entering the bay, necessitating further repairs to 
the heavily used jetty and instigating further requests for an improved harbor (Soonike 
1974:14). 
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During this time, vessels continued to anchor some distance from shore while 
passengers and goods remained to be ferried using lighters and surfboats. The bulk of 
goods were conveyed by porters through the surf to the lighters waiting alongside the 
decaying jetty, but beyond the breakers, to take supplies to the ships anchored in the 
roadstead. Depending on the time of year, this process proved exceedingly difficult as 
southeasterly wind and wave conditions often pushed the empty lighters into the shore 
while heavy winter seas caused goods to be lost or damaged in transit, resulting in 
recurring losses for investors and traders. Ships typically spent an average of 30 days to 
load and unload cargo at Cape Town and 2 to 3 days a week were commonly lost due to 
adverse weather (Soonike 1974:44; Durden 1992:22). 
Table Bay boatmen, whose skills at traversing rough seas were utilized on a daily 
basis, enjoyed the reputation of being among the best in the world (Theal 1964:199; 
Hattersley 1969:76). The flagstaff on Lion Mountain would be raised when a ship 
approached the harbor from the south and immediately it would be surrounded by a 
crowd of small boats (Simmonds 1847:214). These boats ranged in size from small 
canoes to launches of fifty to sixty feet and were operated by not only Europeans, but 
FIGURE 4.3. The Old South Jetty, with cranes to load supplies for boats to take to larger 
vessels waiting in Table Bay (Cape Town Archives Repository J5173). 
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also Cape Malays and native Africans. Since boatmen were the only people adept at 
navigating the surf, and their use was necessary to conduct trading operations at the port, 
there were no fixed rates of hire and so they were able to charge increased rates to receive 
higher wages than they could inland (Simmonds 1847:214-215). What resulted from this 
system was the creation of a class of people whose livelihood on the waterfront began 
during the Dutch rule at the Cape and continued up through the construction of the Alfred 
Docks in the 1860s. 
 
 
Boatmen in Table Bay could also find work with numerous private firms that 
were formed at the waterfront as well as with the Colonial Port Offices. After a 
succession of wrecking events where ships were grounded on the shore in 1828, a group 
of individuals including the Port-Captain, Lieutenant James Bance, accumulated a 
significant sum of money to commission the James Lowe shipwright firm to build a 
launch from which spare hawsers and emergency anchors could be delivered to ships in 
FIGURE 4.4. The Cape Town Lifeboat Rescue Crew, circa 1910 (Veitch 
1994:84). 
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danger on running aground. Appropriately named the ‘Northwester,’ the business was led 
by boatman James Buckley and commenced in October 1828 (Soonike 1974:42). In 
November 1838, the Cape Town Commercial Wharf Company was formed for the 
purpose of further regulating the work of the boatmen in the bay, who remained the only 
means of conveying cargo at the time. The independent or privately owned operations of 
boatmen were amalgamated into the construction of the harbor by 1870 and placed under 
the auspices of the Port Offices and Harbour Board (Figure 4.4). 
A further outcome of the prolonged and inefficient harbor system was the 
promulgation of the Cape as the “Tavern of the Seas.” Ilves (2011:7) remarks that due to 
the nature of ports where a multitude of different people come together temporarily or 
seasonally, this liminal or fleeting connection between people has the potential to create a 
tension around social rules and thus facilitate more violent or deviant social behaviors. 
While the crews of vessels that called at the port were responsible for their cargo 
operations, sailors and seamen took advantage of their time in the harbor by frequenting 
the many taverns and inns when the opportunity presented itself. 
This explains the rise in the hospitality industry at the Cape, and also resulted in 
many sailors appearing in court documents linking them to excessive drinking, instigating 
fights with soldiers or other sailors, and generally engaging in socially aberrant behavior 
(Worden 2007:73). In some cases, these acts were a conscious decision made by sailors 
wishing to leave their ship permanently, as many sailors who were arrested on outbound 
voyages cared little about their punishment if it meant living at the Cape for the duration 
of their typical three month sentence, as opposed to the much more difficult life at sea 
(Table Bay Harbour Board 1860). This made the prolonged stay at the Cape even more 
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risky as captains needed to account for the potential of desertion with the interests of the 
sailors needing a respite from their vessel. 
By August 1822, the Cape had become notorious among the international 
shipping community not only for its cargo operations, but also for its lack of suitable 
ship-repair facilities. For a port serving as a halfway house for the refreshment of ships, it 
was reasoned that there needed to be an ability to fix damage done to those vessels during 
long voyages. To this end, Messrs. Nisbet & Dickson, Lloyd’s agents and representatives 
of British shipping interests in the East asked the Cape Government for permission to 
build such a yard at Rogge Bay. While their request was denied, following a severe 1822 
storm in the bay the firm of Aken & Monteith was granted the right to build a small 
repair yard between Rogge Bay and Muntingh’s whale fishery at the end of Bree Street 
(Soonike 1974:16). 
At this time, the small port at Cape Town was not especially linked with the 
interior of the Colony. In 1819, Governor of the Cape Lord Charles Somerset advocated 
for the emigration of British settlers to the newly formed and burgeoning colony. The 
Colonial Office in London supported this notion and in 1820 4,000 settlers (36% male, 
20% female, 44% children) were chosen to relocate to the Cape Colony and participate in 
expansion into the interior to displace the existing Boer and African populations along 
the Eastern Cape (Bryer and Hunt 1984:17-20). This mass immigration prompted an 
influx of shipping into the main port of call for the Colony at Cape Town. 
As more commerce centered on the old jetty, the storage space available at this 
location became intolerably congested. After another heavy storm in 1831 that wrecked 
six ships with a loss of £40,000 of cargo, shipping agents, merchants, and boatmen 
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recognized the lack of government interest in funding a harbor project and set forth in 
raising £3,300 to pay for a separate stone landing place near the Whalefishery (Table Bay 
Harbour Board 1895:6). Under the supervision of Col. Charles C. Mitchell, work on the 
stone pier commenced that year at the bottom of Bree Street. In anticipation of the pier 
being completed, stores and warehouses began to be constructed at the expected site of 
the work. When estimates for the completion of the project proved to be too much for the 
finances of the colony, the colonial authorities suspended all work by the end of 1833 
(Table Bay Harbour Board 1895:6).  
Given the cluttered state of the Old South Jetty, shippers and merchants began to 
move to the site of the less clustered, but incomplete stone pier at the end of Bree Street. 
The new commercial quarter beginning to take shape at this location near the Amsterdam 
Battery made conducting trade that much more difficult, as goods now needed to be 
transferred from the Old South Jetty to sheds located over a mile away. In their own 
subtle way the Cape mercantile community was placing pressure on the government to 
resume work on the stone pier, which would greatly expedite business at the waterfront. 
Therefore, in December 1836, Colonial Secretary Lord Glenelg attained authorization to 
establish a commission for the first Harbour Board in Table Bay with the power to collect 
wharfage money, borrow money on security of charges, and most importantly, complete 
the stone pier (Table Bay Harbour Board 1895:6). 
Col. Mitchell was placed in charge of the construction of the pier, but upon 
further examination of the remaining structure after three years of exposure to the 
elements in Table Bay instead opted for the construction of two wooden dwarf jetties, 
estimated at a cost of £900; work began on these new jetties in 1838. In October, 1839 
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the first of the dwarf jetties, the South Jetty also referred to as the South Wharf, was 
completed at the end of Buitenkant Street immediately to the west of the Old South Jetty. 
With the promise of a new landing site at government expense, a group of private 
individuals raised £2,900 to purchase a tract of land and associated buildings near the 
whale fishery and transferred the property to the government as the site for a new wharf 
made of stone and timber (Soonike 1974:74). On 11 November, 1839 orders were given 
to begin work building the North Wharf at the end of Bree Street. The buildings 
purchased by the local shipping community were to be converted to Customs and Wharf 
Offices to augment the new commercial quarter already established in that area. A total 
of £2,331 10s 7d was raised for the new work, which was eventually completed in 1842 
(Saitowitz et al 1993:99-100). 
In the historical record the terms jetty and wharf are used interchangeably to refer 
to the initial works in Table Bay. A jetty can be defined as a port-related structure to get 
passengers and goods on and off a boat and built perpendicular to the waterline, whereas 
a wharf represents a similar structure built parallel or at an angle to the shore (Khan 
2006:xiii-xiv). The structures built in Table Bay were primarily wooden built, which is 
characteristic of jetties, while stone is typically incorporated into the building of wharves. 
Given the curve of the bay, the North Wharf will be considered such because it was built 
at an angle to the shore and utilized the remnants of the stone pier abandoned in 1833 as 
well as timber. The Old South Jetty, South Jetty, and Central Jetty explained below, were 
all wooden structures and extended directly into the bay and are therefore termed jetties. 
As the number of steamers making the trip to the East rose, the need for coal 
bunkering and storage at ports along the South African coastline became abundantly 
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clear. To address this situation Col. Mitchell commenced with the building of a stone pier 
at the eastern end of the Amsterdam Battery completed in 1844. This would eventually 
serve as the Coaling Pier for steamships entering the port (Table Bay Harbour Board 
1895:7). Additionally, a large corrugated iron building for the storage of coal was erected 
near the Central Jetty, which was utilized to a greater extent than the other Coaling Jetty 
for the victualing of steamers in 1854 (Table Bay Harbour Board 1855:3). 
With the appointment of John Montagu as Government Secretary in 1843, a new 
era began for the Cape Colony’s public works efforts. Montagu utilized methods he 
adopted in Australia by improving the efficiency of convict labor and removed all 
obstacles to implement the program into the construction of roads and bridges (Soonike 
1974:86). With the emancipation of slave labor in Britain’s colonies in 1834, Montagu 
created a system whereby convict labor would become the staple labor force for public 
works in the colony. The precedent established by Montagu’s Central Road Board, which 
was legitimized by the Legislative Council in 1843, inevitably set the stage for later use 
of prison labor on the future breakwater in Table Bay. 
In 1844, the steady improvement of the Cape’s finances led to the eventual 
liquidation of two decades of debt, allowing for a substantial surplus of revenue available 
for use within the colony. With the upsurge of roads, bridges, and tunnels through this 
new Central Road Board, a rising influx of agricultural produce was transported to the 
coast. The volume of wool shipped from Table Bay, for example, doubled from £534,377 
in 1843 to £936,269 in 1844 (House of Assembly 1843, 1844). After his arrival to the 
Cape as the new Governor, Sir Henry Pottinger recognized that the improvement of roads 
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would bring no benefit to the colony if the ports of the colony remained small and under-
developed.  
 
Spurred by requests to develop the foreshore area between the North Wharf and 
the South Jetty, an 1847 survey was conducted. This resulted in another proposal set forth 
by Col. Mitchell for a sea wall running parallel to shore and a second wharf, which ran 
perpendicular to it, built in between the two existing wharves. Fishermen in the harbor 
would then be moved to the space between the Old South Jetty and the sea wall (Soonike 
1974:103). Since the opening of the North Wharf, the site had been the main place of 
landing goods and because of the commercial quarter located nearby, the steady rise in 
commerce and the growth of the town caused high strain on the worn out wharf. Given 
the status of the North Wharf and with suggestions from boatmen in the bay, work on the 
FIGURE 4.5. Section of an 1854 map showing the locations of the South Jetty, Central 
Jetty, and North Wharf in Table Bay. Note the presence of boatmen in the foreground of 
the image at the bottom of the map (Map courtesy of City of Cape Town Environmental 
and Heritage Management). 
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Central Causeway and Jetty at the bottom of Adderley Street was commenced 
immediately and was opened on 11 March 1850 (Figure 4.5; Soonike 1974:109). 
In an effort to see this work through, Pottinger first introduced the Table Bay 
Improvement Bill designed to build two additional wharves at Rogge Bay. Next, he set 
forth the legislation for the overall port and harbor improvement in the colony, which 
abolished Cape Town market dues and passed Ordinance 21 for Improving the Ports, 
Harbors, and Roadsteads of the Colony. This was meant to encourage the export industry 
as well as coastal trade. Additionally, a second piece of legislation, Ordinance 11 in 1848 
provided for the administrative backing for the construction of the harbor through the 
establishment of Boards of Commissioners for the Improvement of the Ports and Harbors 
in the colony. The same year, Sir Harry Smith nominated the Board for Improving the 
Port and Harbor of Table Bay that was given the ability to sell reclaimed land and raise 
money for harbor works through the collection of wharfage dues (Soonike 1974:105; 
Table Bay Harbour Board 1895:8). The Board provided annual reports, but due to a lack 
of funds focused on repairing and modifying the existing works. 
Seen as temporary remedies for the pending construction of the sea wall, the 
jetties were not constructed in a permanent fashion. The sea wall was never built and 
therefore the jetties, which were not built to sustain the volume of shipping flowing 
through the port, were constantly in need of repair and modification to keep up with the 
growing demands for effective commerce. The fundamental problem facing the Harbour 
Board was that the colony had become a one of the largest international ports of call, but 
the harbor could not keep up with the rise in the number of vessels conducting trade. 
Furthermore, the lack of protection for vessels resulted in the continual loss of goods, 
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lives, and generally hindered trade within the bay. Northwesterly storms caused enough 
consistent damage to the wooden structures until eventually in 1853 the Old South Jetty 
built by Van Riebeeck was removed entirely (Table Bay Harbour Board 1895:9). 
The Lighthouses 
To stem the number of shipwrecks in Table Bay, Sir Rufane Donkin, who was 
acting as Governor for the Cape in the absence of Lord Charles Somerset, initiated a 
13,400 rix-dollar lighthouse project at Green Point on the western shore of the bay facing 
the ocean. Upon Somerset’s return, he continued with building Donkin’s structure and in 
April 1824 the twin light was completed (Burman 1967). Designed by Col. Mitchell and 
built by Herman Schutte, the twin lights were housed in a 68-foot square tower. The 
lights were visible for thirteen miles and only used two gallons of oil per night. The 
beacon would eventually be replaced by a dioptric flashing light and raised to its present 
height of 65 feet in 1865 (Cape Times 1974). 
During the course of the construction for the North Wharf, a further succession of 
shipwrecks including Singapore, Mulgrave Castle, and Royal William on Mouille Point 
indicated the ineffectiveness of the Green Point light as well as the need for another 
lighthouse to guide vessels away from the rocky headland of the bay (Figure 4.6). The 
poor construction and ineffective reflectors of the lights cast a relatively weak beam that 
was not visible to ships in dense weather or to those farther out to sea. Many captains 
could not accurately judge the distance from the Green Point light to the rocks at Mouille 
Point due to the weaknesses of the dual beams. 
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To avert further shipwrecks, the port instructions were altered to steer clear away 
from the rocky headland at night, which was the primary cause for wrecking on these 
western shores of the bay. Further efforts by Governor Sir George Napier resulted in the 
erection of another light at Mouille Point in July 1842 just 1,215 yards away from the one 
at Green Point. The new lighthouse was a pyramidal structure rising forty feet above sea 
level, possessing a single clear white light (Burman 1967:1). In 1908 the Mouille Point 
Light was decommissioned due to its redundancy after the erection of a light at the end of 
the breakwater. 
FIGURE 4.6. Image showing the wreck of the steamship Thermopylae (1899) on the 
rocks in front of the Green Point lighthouse (Cape Town Archives Repository DRJ75). 
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Storms and Shipwrecks 
 Known to occur predominantly during the winter months, gales in Table Bay have 
historically been the most disastrous for shipping and were a primary concern in the 
creation of a harbor of refuge. The British first experienced the impact of these storm 
systems on 9 November 1799 when the warship HMS Sceptre was among fourteen 
vessels caught at anchor during an unexpected summer storm. After parting all cables 
despite using cannons to help weight the anchors down, Sceptre was driven broadside 
onto a rocky reef on the southern shore of the bay. Heavy wave action broke the ship 
apart and by the end of the night Sceptre had become a total wreck. All 349 sailors and 
soldiers perished in the event, their bodies found lying amongst the wreckage (Wilmot 
1869:217).  
Another uncharacteristic summer storm in 1842, deemed a hurricane, further 
decimated shipping in the bay. Four vessels were wrecked along with numerous 
commercial boats, such as whale boats and surfboats, which had been employed to take 
extra cables to the distressed ships (Cape of Good Hope & Port of Natal Shipping and 
Mercantile Gazette 1846). This event also incurred the catastrophic loss of the convict 
vessel Waterloo whereby 143 convicts, 15 soldiers, 14 sailors, 4 women, and 14 children 
all perished within sight of the shore (South African Commercial Advertiser 1842). 
Fishing boats and boatmen provided 90 of the Waterloo’s passengers with enough line to 
make it to safety. One common factor in all accounts of storms in the bay was the 
presence and fortitude of the boatmen who braved the storms to rescue crews and bring 
aid to vessels in need. Many newspapers lamented the lack of a suitable launch for these 
small craft, which primarily set out from the overcrowded North Wharf, but argued that 
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without the boatmen there would be a much greater risk to shipping in the bay (Cape 
Argus 1857a; 1857b; 1857c; 1857d).  
The utilization of boatmen during severe storms has two ramifications for the 
perception of risk in the historical record. First, there would be an increase in the number 
of vessels grounded or wrecked if no cables or anchors could be brought out when their 
cables parted in the high seas. While the boatmen not only served to transfer cargo to the 
port, they also were on call and rendered aid when needed and acted as a kind of 
unofficial life-saving service for the harbor. The boatmen were known to get alongside 
grounded vessels and take crews to safety during storms, which accounts for the 
generally low average loss of life attributed to wrecking events in the bay. Cape historian 
George Theal (1964:199) describes how the “boatmen of Table bay, whose skills were 
utilized on a daily basis, enjoyed the reputation of being among the best in the world due 
to their feats in conveying anchors and cables to distressed ships in winter storms.” The 
Argus stated that during violent gales the boatmen are “a fine set of fellows and deserve 
every penny they get,” likely not knowing that the many volunteered their services 
(Argus 1857b). Further examination of the Port Office records will shed more detail on 
the boatmen who played such a vital role to the safety of Cape Town’s early harbor. 
Despite these efforts, from 1853 to 1859, the Table Bay Harbour Board (1895:10) 
reported an estimated loss of £138,000 with an average of £23,000 annually in Table 
Bay. The wrecking of six ships in an 1822 northerly storm had prompted a survey of the 
harbor by William W. Bird and a flurry of proposals for a harbor of refuge, none of 
which would ultimately be adopted (Bird 1822; Knox 1830; Soonike 1974:37). A report 
submitted to the Table Bay Harbour Board and Municipality of Cape Town by Mr. Scott 
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Tucker in 1854, highlighted the contemporary state of affairs at the port of Cape Town 
(Table Bay Harbour Board 1854). Mr. Tucker emphasized that: 
The present evils attending the exposed condition of the Bay are so 
great, and glaringly at variance with the demands of the age, that 
security was to be gained at all hazards, in order that the growing 
trade of the Colony should be effectually protected; as also that 
that which daily passes its threshold, from between Europe and the 
East, should be invited at all seasons, by the offer of certain 
security, for the purpose of receiving Repairs or Supplies, instead 
of being driven, as at present, for nearly four months in the year, 
by the terror and inhospitability of its coasts, to more distant and 
inferior Ports (CCP 1/2/1/1 A10:1). 
 Another major storm struck in 1857 where one-third of the total shipping in the 
bay was beached with a loss of £25,000, most of which derived from the Port Offices. 
The same year Lloyd’s of London blacklisted the harbor by refusing to insure any vessels 
wintering in Table Bay (Cape Argus 1857a). The editors of the Cape Argus (1857a) 
noted, “this great misfortune falls annually upon us, and that although we may easily 
calculate upon each occasion the direct loss inflicted, that which we can sustain indirectly 
by the large amount of shipping, which passes by without calling, in the winter, is quite 
incalculable, and certainly far exceeds the other amount.” The damage referred to is that 
of the area’s negative reputation as the ‘Bay of Storms’ where the perception of the 
international shipping community was that at any moment a major storm could occur in 
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Table Bay and cause significant harm to any vessel in the unprotected harbor. This 
harmful perception caused much of the potential trade opportunities to be lost by the port. 
 
 
The greatest and most devastating storm in the maritime history of Cape Town 
began on the 16 May, 1865. After a long, hot dry spell typical of late summer months, the 
weather began to drastically shift as winds and rains fell on the bay. By the morning of 17 
May, the system had transformed into a tremendous gale with fierce winds blowing 
across the bay making the water like a sheet of foam tossing ships around their moorings. 
In the course of the day 18 of the 28 ocean-going vessels along with 30 cutters and small 
boats were wrecked or stranded on the beach (Argus 1865a; Cape Town Gazette and 
Mercantile Advisor 1865). Included in the wrecking were the Royal Mail Steamship 
FIGURE 4.7. Photograph of the destructive force to shipping in Table Bay caused by the 
historic Great Gale in 1865 (Cape Town Archives Repository E3411). 
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Athens and the barque City of Peterborough, both of which were completely destroyed 
with all hands lost (Figure 4.7; Argus 1865a, 1865b, 1865c; 1865e). Surfboats began 
running anchors to the distressed vessels, but eventually the trips became too dangerous. 
In total only sixty lives were lost, but the damage to the vessels, their cargoes and the 
perception of the harbor’s safety was insurmountable. 
Coal, Mail and the Rise of Steam 
A new sense of urgency for the construction of suitable harbor facilities was 
placed upon the shipping community in Table Bay with the arrival of SS Enterprise in 
1825, the first steamship to enter Table Bay. This marked the beginning of the steamship 
era at the Cape, which heralded the arrival of vessels with increased tonnage and deeper 
draught (Murray 1933:4). Cape Town’s role as the primary port of call for these 
steamships necessitated the construction of coal bunkering and storage to replenish 
vessels making voyages past the Cape. This was of primary concern for the Cape 
government, and therfore a corrugated iron warehouse was constructed near the Central 
Jetty in 1854 (Veitch 1994:44). The provision of coal would have major impacts on the 
development and selection of harbor works as the harbor developed in the latter half of 
the 19th century. 
As steamers became increasingly common, the British used them for the 
expedited communication with the far corners of the Empire. In the Cape Colony from as 
early as 1836 coasting steamships belonging to the Cape of Good Hope Steam 
Navigation Company and later Phoenix Navigation Company operated a mail service 
between Cape Town and Port Elizabeth (Murray 1933:11-13). By 1851 the arrival of 
Bosphorus inaugurated the new international mail service from London to Cape Town, 
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which was facilitated by steamships belonging to the General Screw Steam Shipping 
Company. This service collapsed after four years but was quickly picked up by the Union 
Steam Collier Company or Union Line in 1853 (Murray 1933:16). 
Competition with the Union Line for its monopoly on the passenger-mail service 
began ten years after its inception with the establishment of Donald Currie’s Castle Line. 
In the hopes of gaining the sole mail contract with the Cape, the Union and Castle Lines 
engaged in a fierce rivalry to progressively build larger and faster steamships. These 
vessels were pushed to the limit, which caused excessive wear and tear on the men and 
machinery, resulting in increased risks for both after several voyages. In 1900 the 
renewal of the British-South African mail contract called for a single carrier and rather 
than continue the decades-long rivalry, the Union and Castle Lines merged into a single 
fleet of 39 vessels under the Union-Castle Line (Murray 1953:178; Newell 1963:91). The 
mail service to the Cape was an essential factor in the construction of the harbor. While 
Port Elizabeth, Durban, and East London harbors lagged behind, Cape Town’s harbor 
faced the responsibility for accommodating the rise in larger ocean-going steamships 
(Newall 1999b:21). This unsatisfactory situation placed a constraint on the passenger-
mail lines and put substantial pressure on the Harbour Board in Table Bay by the end of 
the century. 
The Breakwater and Alfred Basin  
Harbor surveyor, J. Scott Tucker argued that any serious proposal for construction 
of a harbor in Table Bay had to satisfy at least three primary requirements. The first 
requirement called for the facilitation of protection for shipping from ocean swells and an 
uninterrupted communication with the shore. Since Table Bay was the chief port of the 
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colony, the lack of protection from northwesterly seas as well as southeasterly winds not 
only caused the frequent destruction of ships at anchor but also on the small boats that 
were compulsory to the trade of the port. These smaller craft were much more susceptible 
to the dangerous seas. Even the southeasterly offshore winds experienced during the 
relatively benign summer months oftentimes escalated and caused adverse conditions for 
shipping operations between the shore and the roadstead, which needed to be mitigated. 
The second condition was that a means of landing and shipping goods at all times 
without the intervention of the costly cargo boats and boatmen were needed. The 
necessity of lighters and other small boats limited the trading potential of the harbor by 
causing frequent delays due to the time necessary to convey all cargo to and from the 
three jetties. The jetties themselves were too small and ineffective at loading and 
unloading the cargo with limited crane capacity and strength. Lastly, an independent 
shelter was needed for the local fishing and other small craft that were not in immediate 
service to the port or ships in the anchorage, but still contributed to the economy of the 
city (Table Bay Harbour Board 1854:2). 
In May 1855, the Committee of the House of Assembly decided to take a new 
direction for the harbor and consulted with Captain James Vetch, the Royal Ensign and 
Harbor Surveyor to the Admiralty. Vetch suggested that more elaborate docks should be 
constructed comprising of an inner and outer harbor with a breakwater near the site of the 
Chavonnes Battery. In 1858, Act 20 was passed that awarded the Cape Government an 
Imperial grant amounting to £200,000 for expenditure on a new breakwater. Vetch’s plan 
was estimated to be too costly to the Cape Government, so a second opinion was sought 
from Mr. John Coode, regarded as the foremost harbor engineer in England. Coode was 
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consulted and eventually selected as the engineer-in-chief to revise Vetch’s expensive 
plans (Table Bay Harbour Board 1859). Accordingly, in 1860 Coode submitted a revised 
harbor scheme at an estimated cost of £396,475. This plan would be built under the 
auspices of the Table Bay Dock and Breakwater Management Commission formed that 
same year (Figure 4.8; Table Bay Harbour Board 1860a). 
 
The cost for the work was defrayed through the use of convict labor, which had 
shown its effectiveness in Montagu’s schemes of road and bridges construction 
throughout the colony. With previous suggestions for the use of convicts from Britain and 
Australia for the potential construction of harbor schemes and other public works 
projects, the populace at Cape Town expressed their vehement reservations about 
FIGURE 4.8. Plan submitted by Sir John Coode in 1859 for the proposed harbor of 
refuge in Table Bay (Map courtesy of the University of Cape Town African Studies 
Department). 
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introducing large numbers of foreign convicts to the Cape. These sentiments resulted in 
the public boycott and protest of the convict ship Neptune from landing in Cape Town, 
forcing the vessel to wait in the roadstead rather than calling to shore (Veitch 1994:40). 
The colonists did not want the Cape turned into a penal colony. Therefore, for the 
construction of Coode’s proposed harbor of refuge, local Cape convicts and native labor 
were exploited instead. 
In 1859 the Breakwater Prison was built to house the convicts that would work on 
the harbor in Table Bay. With the later introduction of a larger number of natives to the 
labor force, such as workers from Delagoa Bay, separate barracks were also used (Table 
Bay Harbour Board 1881). A study by Deacon (1989:16) demonstrated how the British 
legal structure incorporated the indigenous African and Khoisan populations in a way that 
coerced these people into a system of state-controlled labor that formed a wage-
dependent working class. The prison system sanctioned this control, and with the rise in 
the capitalist economy associated with increases in merchant mining capital further 
contributed to production and control of a division between the white and black 
population at the Cape (Deacon 1989:48 Worger 2004:71). 
While the majority of prisoners at the Breakwater Prison throughout the 
construction of the harbor were black, the number of white convicts generally increased 
between 1881 and 1886 with the rise in illegal diamond buying in the interior. The 
workload for these convicts was strict and they were required to work in the quarry from 
0600 to 1700 every day, except Sundays (Newall 1993:11). For those who misbehaved, 
the use of a never-ending staircase or treadmill was used as a form of punishment, which 
currently remains on display at its original location.  
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On 17 September 1860 H.R.H. Prince Alfred inaugurated construction of the 
breakwater by tipping the first load of stones into the water (Peterson 1980:34). Over 400 
Cape convicts were put to work excavating the rocky shores near the Chavonnes Battery 
to create an enclosed basin of almost ten and a half acres, the sides of which would form 
quays amounting to 4,075 acres in landing space equipped with cranes and railways to 
facilitate the improved movement of goods from the wharves. The shape of this basin 
followed the natural line of the shore, which explains the narrowing of the basin’s 
southern extremity (Peterson 1980:37). 
 
The breakwater itself constituted a rubble mound originally formed from the stone 
excavated in the basin, which was supplemented by the stone obtained from a quarry at 
the bottom of Signal Hill and from further excavations on Harbour Board property 
(Figure 4.9). It was begun 1,100 feet northwest of the Chavonnes Battery and was 
planned to run 3,250 feet in a northeasterly direction into the bay, which would protect 
867 acres of water from the northwest winds (Table Bay Harbour Board 1860). A 
shortage of rubble from the basin excavations temporarily halted the work at 1900 feet at 
five fathoms of water. 
FIGURE 4.9. Cross-section of the Table Bay rubble mound breakwater with high and 
low water tidal ranges shown (Vernon-Harcourt 1885:Plate 6). 
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By 1865, the onset of one of the worst storms in the history of the colony 
reiterated the necessity of completing the harbor breakwater. Seven staging bays were 
swept from the work and several more were significantly damaged. Furthermore, 270 feet 
of the breakwater bank was levelled and 60,000 tons of stone had shifted from the heavy 
swells. Repairs from this single storm cost £3,000 and took six months to complete 
(Vernon-Harcourt 1885:204). Despite the damage dealt to it, this storm as well as others 
in 1870 and 1878 actually revealed some positive effects on the constitution of the 
breakwater as the rubble compacted and a natural slope was formed on the seaward side 
from the wave-driven accumulation of sediment (Table Bay Harbour Board 1865; 1871; 
1879). 
While the effect of the gales reinforced the decision for a rubble mound 
breakwater, the length originally proposed did not adequately protect a large enough area. 
In 1878 Sir John Coode once again proposed a plan for extending the breakwater at a 
northeasterly bend to shield the southeastern shores from northwesterly and northerly 
winds (Vernon-Harcourt 1885:204). Excavations in the Harbour Board quarry provided 
stone for the harbor works and sediment used in land reclamation for quay space along 
the breakwater. As the Outer Harbor docks developed, the breakwater extension was 
continued until after 1903 with the addition of a capping wall. This wall provided a 
backbone to further protect the breakwater against the higher seas experienced in the bay 
and lessened the amount of material needed for maintenance (Table Bay Harbour Board 
1904). 
The cofferdam holding the water from entering the enclosed Alfred Basin was 
removed in 1869 and the harbor was officially opened for world shipping on 17 May 
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1870. Dubbed the Alfred Basin, the harbor was formally inaugurated by H.R.H. Duke of 
Edinburgh on 11 July. The total amount of rock and soil moved for the works was 
approximately 1,082,782 cubic yards, with 115, 580 tons supplied to ships as ballast, 
while the total capital for the harbor expended amounted to about £389,736 (Table Bay 
Harbour Board 1871). The finished harbor at this point consisted of an Outer Harbor with 
the main Breakwater and attached East Jetty; an Inner Harbor with warehouses, and 
Alfred Basin composed of an East, North and West Quay. Furthermore, a road was built 
that connected the docks with the sheds and approaches to the North Wharf and Central 
Jetty and the South Jetty (Table Bay Harbour Board 1871). 
Fishing and Whaling 
 Fishing was a staple occupation for many people within the maritime community 
of Table Bay. The Cape Malay population developed as the preeminent fishermen during 
the 18th and early 19th centuries and would launch small fishing craft from the fishing 
grounds to local catchment areas in Milnerton, Hout Bay around the Peninsula, and along 
the rocky shores of Robben Island (Veitch 1994:52). In small watercraft measuring 5 to 8 
meters in length, and 2 meters in beam, fishermen would typically stick close to the coast 
and employ techniques known as Trek fishing, where nets would be used from the beach 
along with some line and stake net fishing. Fish such as snoek and yellowtail were 
commonly found, providing as essential part of the diet for many living along the coast. 
  While Cape Town was the fishing center at the Cape, it remained a small 
operation limited to small businesses that employed other men’s slaves as crews. Similar 
to the business of boatmen in the early part of the century, fishing provided an 
opportunity for the marginalized classes of society to make a living on the waterfront. In 
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the early 19th century there were approximately 40 boats utilized for fishing purposes, 
with this number increasing to over 400 boats and 2,500 fishermen by 1900 (Figure 4.10; 
Veitch 1994:52). Sealing and whaling activities were also carried out in the bay as early 
as 1604. By 1822 there were seven whale fisheries along the Cape, two of which were 
located in Table Bay. 
 
FIGURE 4.10. Postcard dating to 1912 with a depiction of the locally utilized fishing 
harbor (Kerham 2005). 
 
Traditionally, the fish market at Rogge Bay was the center of fishing activity. In 
his report to the Harbour Board, Tucker noted the need for protecting these fishing 
activities that were a major component of maritime culture in Cape Town (Table Bay 
Harbour Board 1854:2). The fishing beach at Rogge Bay underwent several 
modifications with the development of the harbor, but was eventually covered up with 
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land reclamation projects by the end of harbor construction. Nevertheless, the fishing 
industry in Cape Town was an important part of the cultural landscape of the city and 
characterized the local utilization of the harbor during the 19th century. 
Repair Facilities 
As a port of call for outward and homeward bound ships making the arduous 
voyage to the Indies, Cape Town was a constant stop for disabled vessels along with 
vessels awaiting instructions from home. Cape Town’s role as a refreshment outpost 
naturally obliged any new harbor to also contain ship repair facilities. Coode’s original 
plans for a harbor called for a Patent Slipway for ship repairs as well as a separate dry 
dock for larger vessels. By 1867 a slip was completed by De Pass, Spence & Co. outside 
of the harbor, likely near the spot of the previous repair yard by Muntingh’s whale 
fishery, but was later moved to the narrower southeastern end of the Alfred Basin in 
1870. The Patent Slip was in continuous use throughout the year and a cradle was added 
to it in 1875 to facilitate easier repairs (Table Bay Harbour Board 1876). 
Evidenced by the number of vessels using the Slip, in 1875 work began 
excavating land on the southwestern corner of the Alfred Basin for a dry dock capable of 
housing vessels with deeper draught. The excavations for dry dock provided much of the 
stone used in the Breakwater extension as well as land reclamation for the Outer Harbor. 
Granite from a Paarl quarry was used to step the sides of the 530 foot-long work with a 
width of 90 feet at its coping, and 38 feet at the bottom (Table Bay Harbour Board 1883). 
Officially opened on 20 October 1882, and named after Governor of the Cape, Sir 
Hercules Robinson, the Dry Dock demonstrated the improved opportunity for carrying 
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out repairs by inaugurating its completion with the repair of the 3877 ton RMS Athenian 
of the Union Steamship Company.  
 Both works were continuously used throughout the course of the year with the 
Graving Dock filled 109 days by 15 vessels totaling 18,568 tons in its first year (Table 
Bay Harbour Board 1883). In some years the Graving Dock saw upwards of 40 different 
vessels. The Patent Slip was then used for smaller tonnage vessels, but ranged from 16 to 
over 20 vessels repaired annually. With Cape Town situated at a crossroads of trade, the 
risks of long voyages were at least partially alleviated by the presence of these facilities 
to outfit any necessary repairs or modifications when necessary. 
Diamonds and Gold 
 The Alfred Basin was completed just prior to a major transformation in South 
Africa’s economy due to the 1866 discovery of diamonds along the Orange and Vaal 
Rivers in Griqualand (Table Bay Harbour Board 1873). In the early half of the 19th 
century, products such as wine, wheat, barley and oats had led the Cape’s export industry. 
After the arrival of the 1820 Settlers, the growth of the pastoral herding of woolen sheep 
in the Eastern Province had grown to such an extent that the volume of wool traded at 
Rogge Bay vastly increased between 1832 and 1839 (Soonike 1974:55). By 1850 wool 
had increased from 0.7% of the total exports from the colony to 44.8%. 
The discovery of diamonds, however, prompted an influx of international and 
local interest. Soon, mining towns were installed away from the rivers and established at 
Vooruitzigt, a farm owned by Johannes Nicholaas De Beers. The mining locations on the 
farm were assumed by the British and by 1873 the newly established town of Kimberley 
was the second largest in southern Africa (Meredith 2008:34). In April of 1880 Cecil 
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John Rhodes consolidated several joint-stock companies controlling the mining industry 
that would later develop into the De Beers Consolidated Mining Company. Nearly ten 
years later De Beers oversaw a monopoly over the Kimberley mines, nearly 90 percent of 
the world’s diamond production, making it one of the most powerful companies in the 
world located in Southern Africa (Meredith 2008:162). 
In 1884 the first discovery of gold was made on a barren stretch of Highveld in 
the Transvaal named Witwatersrand, or Ridge of White Waters. Similar to the diamond 
rush, a flood of prospectors and small joint-investment companies were initially 
established, but were later supplanted by larger magnates such as Rhodes and J.B. 
Robinson. South Africa continued to produce gold throughout the century with the 
exports eclipsing that of diamonds by the turn of the century with over £15 million worth 
of gold produced in 1898 (Union-Castle 1903:6). 
Diamond and gold mining stimulated new markets in the interior and the mining 
industry created new opportunities for employment as well as the prospect of riches for 
many travelers and fortune hunters from across the globe (Muller 1969:204). The Union-
Castle Steamship Company advertised for travelers to the ‘Sunny Cape’ stating that “this 
‘Cinderella’ of the Empire stood by its ‘Stormy Cape’ neglected and almost 
ignored…[but through the discovery of diamonds and gold] was uplifted, in a day, from 
obscurity into universal notice, while its destiny was advanced hundreds of years at a 
bound” (Union-Castle 1903:5). The mining industry provided the assurance of a 
continuous influx of ships entering Table Bay, and fuelled industrial expansion within the 
colony despite the opening of the Suez Canal the same year gold was discovered in 1886. 
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Victoria Basin  
As evidenced from several gales rivaling the intensity of the historic Gale of 1865 
the Breakwater afforded the necessary protection for vessels in the bay, but the risks 
associated with the harbor shifted to concerns of the exponentially rising maritime 
commerce. The existing works in the harbor were consistently inadequate for the extent 
of shipping in the harbor. During this time, material excavated at the site of the 
Chavonnes Battery along with excavations at the Graving Dock were used for the first 
extensive land reclamation projects along the breakwater to make room for additional 
quay space. To compensate for the number of steamships entering the bay, a new 
Breakwater Jetty was completed above the East Jetty in 1880 equipped with a shed 
capable of storing 2,000 tons of coal (Table Bay Harbour Board 1879). The new jetty was 
built specifically for the provisioning of coal and therefore the locus of steam traffic 
shifted from the site of the old Coaling Jetty near the Amsterdam Battery to the current 
Breakwater Jetty within the confines of the Outer Harbor.  
With the reclamation of land along the East Jetty, moorings were then laid within 
the breakwater to enable vessels to be moored stem to stern along the southern end of the 
work, further increasing the ability to conduct trade (Table Bay Harbour Board 1881). 
This new quay between East and Breakwater Jetties allowed for accommodation of large 
steamers. In 1877 a new coal store was placed on the East Jetty capable of housing 1350 
tons while alterations were made to the Coaling Jetty along the breakwater to 
accommodate vessels with side coaling ports (Table Bay Harbour Board 1878; 1885). By 
1883 plans were made to further augment the coaling of steamers by constructing a jetty 
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for the provision of colliers, or bulk cargo ships designed to carry coal. This jetty would 
not be completed until 1903 (Table Bay Harbour Board 1904). 
Supplemental improvements to the harbor at this time included an 1881 contract 
with the South African Dynamo-Electric Light and Brush Company, which illuminated 
the harbor with 22 electric lamps to minimize the number of accidents occurring with 
vessels working at night. Furthermore, a Clock Tower was built and synced with the 
Royal Observatory. This allowed for a more regulated workday and for dock workers to 
utilize the tower’s self-recording tide gauge to more accurately record tidal change 
throughout the day (Table Bay Harbour Board 1883; 1883). The land between the 
Amsterdam Battery and the North Wharf, which had been ultimately abandoned 
commercially, was covered up during additional reclamation deposits. The old Fishing 
Jetty at Rogge Bay was displaced by the land filling, and so a retaining wall was placed 
along the shore and a fish landing for salting and drying fish was established in 1884. The 
beach alongside the jetty was allocated for fishermen and local boating purposes (Table 
Bay Harbour Board 1885). 
In 1880 Coode conceived plans to widen the Outer Harbor by enclosing it with a 
new South Pier parallel to the Breakwater increasing the area of the harbor from 44 to 62 
acres (Figure 4.11; Table Bay Harbour Board 1883). An East Pier with quay space on its 
inner face and rubble mound on its seaward face was commenced in 1889 perpendicular 
to the breakwater. This new work was completed in 1902 and sheltered the innermost 
jetties of the Outer Harbor (Table Bay Harbour Board 1903). To further compensate for 
vessels of deeper draught that were visiting the harbor on a frequent basis, a jetty was 
also built 220 feet between the Breakwater Jetty and the East Pier. Due to the activity of  
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FIGURE 4.11. Detailed map showing the existing Outer Harbor, Inner Harbor and Alfred 
Basin with the proposed new works to enclose the Outer Harbor outlined in red (Map 
courtesy of the National Library of South Africa, AZ1984-10). 
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marine worms and the danger of fire with wooden structures, the Loch Jetty, named after 
Sir Henry Loch, was made of iron (CCP 1/2/1/77 G30 1890). The South Pier was 
extended from its original proposed length and included a western facing elbow that 
faced the East Pier. It was completed just prior to the onset of the Second Anglo-Boer 
War in 1899. 
Hostilities between the British the Dutch settlers, who had formed independent 
republics in the interior of the colony, rose throughout the course of the 19th century. 
These tensions mounted following the discovery of gold in the independent Republic of 
Transvaal, which had begun to make the Vaal an economic hub of the colony (Nasson 
2010:25). The imperial eye of Britain was never far from these developments and 
following events such as the failed attempt at usurping the independence of the Transvaal 
of President Kruger by Leander Starr Jameson in 1895, the spark had ignited and one of 
Britain’s most extensive wars ensued. With the possibility of war looming over the head 
of the British colony, shipping traffic in Table Bay once again took a significant leap. 
During the two-and-half year war ships moored along the newly built South Pier 
were at times double or triple banked with more than 50 vessels anchored in the bay at 
any given time (Figure 4.12). Cape Town was the only harbor in Southern Africa that 
was capable of landing troops and equipment directly onto the quayside and with over 
609,000 troops, 1.4 million horses, and over 1,000 mules shipped, the harbor was 
incessantly congested (Newall 1999a:2). For locals the effects of the war were further 
augmented by the Royal Navy and Army seizing control of the sheds and warehouse, 
which further hindered trade within the harbor (Table Bay Harbour Board 1904). 
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By the turn of the century, the town’s tramway was extending into the docks in an 
attempt to better facilitate the transport of passengers and cargoes with the large numbers 
of people entering the bay due to the wartime activity (Table Bay Harbour Board 1898). 
Any additional developments within the harbor had to be forestalled until the cessation of 
hostilities in 1902. In the meantime the harbor continued to be distinguished by its 
congested moorings and crowded roadstead. 
 
 
 Following the war, work on the harbor was able to resume as the number of 
vessels entering the anchorage dropped slightly. Additional warehouses were built in 
1904 and 1905 as the number of vessels conducting trade and the bulk cargoes now being 
shipped necessitated additional storage space. A cold storage warehouse for the stowing 
of fruit bound for Australia was built in 1902 (Table Bay Harbour Board 1903). The 
FIGURE 4.12. Photograph showing the crowded state of the harbor during the Second 
Anglo-Boer War (Photo courtesy of the National Library of South Africa, PHA 5058). 
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facilitation of produce transport had become a rising industry at the Cape Town harbor, 
but it would not be until the formation of the Union of South Africa and the South 
African Railways and Harbor Administration in 1910 that any further improvements to 
the harbor took place (Figure 4.13). 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter outlined the development of Cape Town’s harbor and demonstrated 
how risk is evident in the historical record of the harbor. The various elements of Cape 
Town’s history that influenced the decision-making process of Cape Officials to carry out 
harbor modification schemes were outlined. Two underlying themes permeate the 
historical record of Table Bay: 1) the protection of ships at anchor in the bay, and 2) the 
FIGURE 4.13. Map designed by the South African Railways and Harbor Administration 
showing the state of Table Bay's harbor in 1911 following the formation of the Union of 
South Africa (Map courtesy of the University of Cape Town African Studies 
Department). 
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safe and effective loading and unloading of cargo and passengers. Early developments 
were largely influenced by the economic status of the colony and the overbearing 
influence placed upon the Cape’s finances by the Imperial Government. As a result, 
harbor works were minimal and the trade carried out in the bay was hindered by the 
corresponding lack of infrastructure. 
This resulted in the frequent loss of ships and goods to severe storms in addition 
to the ineffective transaction between vessels calling at the port and Cape Town’s 
shipping community. Later developments alleviated the risks of using the bay by 
affording adequate protection, but the harbor never fully achieved the ability to keep up 
with the demands of shipping carried out in the Bay. Therefore, harbor developments in 
the latter half of the 1800s were characterized by increasing the commercial infrastructure 
of the port over the risk associated with shipwrecks and the loss of cargoes in the bay. 
Using data and themes derived from the historical record, a better picture of the 
maritime cultural landscape of risk can be understood. By combining this information 
with archaeological, natural and environmental data a holistic conception of risk in Table 
Bay is revealed. The following chapter will outline the environmental influences of the 
bay and discuss how these natural processes may affect cultural material and how the 
cultural material influences the natural features of the bay. 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE BAY THAT SHAPED THE HARBOR AND THE HARBOR 
THAT SHAPED THE BAY 
 
 
Introduction 
 Despite the preeminence of the Cape route in world maritime commerce, the 
turbulent geographical nature of the Southern Cape coastline has caused major problems 
for shipping throughout the centuries and has hindered the overall development of 
harbors and ports in South Africa. It has been suggested that a landscape approach is 
particularly relevant to archaeology through its ability to facilitate the recognition and 
evaluation of the dynamic, interdependent relationships that people maintain with the 
physical, social, and cultural dimensions of their environments across space and time 
(Anschuetz et al 2001:159). While the landscape is not necessarily synonymous with 
environment, the natural features of an area have a distinct impact on how people use and 
perceive the space that they occupy, and is therefore a key determining variable in the 
construction of a cultural landscape. 
This chapter will examine the relationship between the environment of Table Bay 
and the construction of the maritime cultural landscape of risk in Cape Town. It is 
ultimately argued that the development of the harbor was a cognitive reaction or 
behavioral response influenced primarily by the natural environment of Table Bay. These 
responses have actively shaped the cultural and physical landscape of the harbor, and are 
reflected within the natural and archaeological record of Cape Town. The natural 
environment of the Cape of Good Hope has had a profound influence on how people 
have utilized Table Bay as a landing site, port of call, and harbor of refuge while 
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correspondingly, that interaction has had a significant impact on the physical 
environment of the Bay itself. 
 
 
General Landscape of Table Bay 
 Table Bay is a shallow bay located just north of the Cape Peninsula in South 
Africa’s Western Cape Province. The longitudinal boundaries of the bay run from 
approximately 33°45’S at the rocky headlands to the north of Blaauwbergstrand to 
33°55’S off Mouille Point. The bay is bounded laterally by the Atlantic Ocean to the west 
FIGURE 5.1. Satellite imagery of Table Bay with the major areas of development 
labeled (Image by author, 2014). 
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at 18°21’E and by the sandy beaches of Milnerton, Blaauwberg and Paarden Eiland to the 
east at 18°29’E (Figure 5.1). Robben Island marks the northwestern perimeter of Table 
Bay and is located at approximately 33°48’S and 18°22E, which is 9.5 km north of 
Mouille Point and 7 km west of Blaauwbergstrand. The island takes up about 6.8sq km, 
while the total surface area of the bay encompasses approximately 100sq km (Werz 
2003:13). Approximately 2 km south of Robben Island there is a rock formation known 
as Whale Rock, which has historically been marked on navigational charts as a major 
shipping hazard. 
Along the eastern shores of Table Bay, numerous industrial and population 
centers form the present-day greater Cape Town area. Starting north and running south 
these include Blaauwberg, Rietvlei, Milnerton and the industrial center at Paarden Eiland. 
From Paarden Eiland the bay runs in a westerly direction along the modern harbor, the 
central business district, turning northwards at the current Victoria & Alfred Waterfront, 
through Granger Bay, and ending at Mouille Point and Green Point. Overall, the 
planimetric shape of the bay resembles a negative or anticlockwise log-spiral curve 
(McLachlan 1991:8). 
The most significant rivers that empty out into Table Bay are the Diep and Salt 
Rivers. At the time of Van Riebeeck’s 1651 landing at the Cape, the Diep River entered 
the sea through two mouths. The first was approximately 3 km south of its present 
location and the other even farther south near the site of the current Salt River mouth. 
These two openings effectively cut off Paarden Eiland from the shoreline and created a 
marshland that separated the eastern shoreline from the city of Cape Town (Figure 5.2). 
The contemporary Salt River also enters the bay approximately 3km north of its old 
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natural mouth (Grindley and Dudley 1988:2-4). Since 1786 both rivers have undergone 
extensive silting. The total sediment yield into the bay for the Diep has been estimated to 
be about 41,000 cubic meters annually (Smith et al 2001:2826). At present, the discharge 
from the Salt River is negligible compared to the Diep River. This, in combination with 
effects of 20th century harbor construction has led to the degradation of the two rivers 
whereby Paarden Eiland is no longer separate from the mainland. 
 
 
 
Originally, the Diep River flowed through an estuary called Rietvlei. The latter 
name is still used, but currently describes an area that was artificially created through the 
dredging of a wetland for construction of the Ben Schoeman Dock in the 1970s (Durden 
1992:4). The river now enters the bay through the Milnerton Lagoon. Both the Salt and 
FIGURE 5.2. Lithograph by Thomas Bowler showing a view looking north towards 
Blaauwberg through the Salt River marshland in the nineteenth century (Brown 
1955:Plate 34). 
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Diep Rivers underwent significant changes throughout the history of Table Bay, chiefly 
due to the 19th and 20th century harbor developments. These artificial constructions in 
combination with other natural variables such as the dominant wave action and sediment 
distribution patterns discussed below, makes this section of the coast susceptible to an 
increased amount of erosion, which affects the physical landscape of the eastern sections 
of the bay significantly (Smith et al 2001:2828). 
Geomorphology 
The onshore and offshore bedrock of Table Bay consists of two prominent rock 
types. The first is Malmesbury Group pelitic (very fine-grained) and semi-pelitic rocks 
mainly including shales (mudstone), hornfels (metamorphosized mudstone), and 
greywackes (sandstone rich rock fragments). These Malmesbury rocks are thought to be 
the dominant source of clay materials found in the Milnerton Lagoon area. Southwest of 
the Sea Point contact at latitude 33°54.5’S, Cape Granite intrudes into the Malmesbury 
formation and is predominant from this position southwards. Pedogenic or calcite rich 
materials like calcrete also occur within the bay (Woodborne 1982:8; McLachlan 1991:8; 
Durden 1992:7). 
Sediment Movement and Distribution 
Table Bay has large areas of exposed bedrock and the distribution of sediment in 
the bay appears to be controlled by a combination of these bedrock features and wind-
driven currents. As evidenced by the integration of Paarden Eiland to the shoreline since 
the mid-19th century, the beaches in the bay are in a constant state of dynamic flux. 
Therefore, the movement of sediment within the bay is incredibly important to the 
physical landscape of Cape Town. In general, sediment transportation cycles in a 
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northerly direction as a result of the predominant wind-induced southwesterly swells. 
Originating on the littoral drift, these waves strike the shore at an oblique angle and are 
responsible for the increased generation of longshore currents. This causes the net 
movement of about 19,000 cubic meters of sediment annually (Woodborne 1983:272). 
 
A summary of the distribution of sediment types is provided in Figure 5.3. In 
most areas, the bedrock has only a surficial covering of sand with varying proportions 
along with gravel and mud (Woodborne 1983:268). Fine sand is generally confined to the 
near-shore region along the eastern perimeter of the bay. The sediment size in this area 
FIGURE 5.3. Sediment and bedrock distribution in Table Bay (Van Ballegooyen 
2007:34, adapted from Woodborne 1983:Fig.8). 
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can be ascribed to the beach gradient and wave action of the area. Milnerton is 
moderately protected by Mouille Point and Robben Island, and is characterized by a 
gentle beach gradient resulting in the deposition of medium to fine sands (McLachlan 
1991:55). 
A concentration of fine sand extends into the bay along the seaward side of the 
harbor breakwater in the embayment of the Ben Schoeman Dock and Milnerton Beach to 
a depth of about 25 meters in the northeastern part of the bay. The reasons for the 
formation of this tongue of fine sand are potentially due to discharge from the nearby 
rivers as well as recent harbor extensions. In 1940, the building of the Duncan Dock 
created a “dead corner” near Woodstock along the southern shore of the bay (McLachlan 
1991:6). This allows for the accumulation of finely textured sand due to a general 
weakening of wave action in this area. In contrast to this section of the shoreline, the 
beaches to the north at Rietvlei and Blaauwbergstrand are characterized by a steeper 
beach gradient and consist of coarser textured sand. Coarse and very coarse sand (0.5-2 
millimeters) deposits also occur in the center of the bay, and for the most part are 
separated from the finer sands by deposits of medium sand (250-500 microns). Gravel 
(>2 millimeters) follows the pattern of the coarse sand, but tends to be found chiefly 
towards the center of the bay (Woodborne 1983:269-271; McLachlan 1991:6). 
Oceanography 
Bathymetry  
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FIGURE 5.4. Image by the author depicting the bathymetry of Table Bay. Shaded areas 
represent the bathymetry from 1858-1860 obtained from historic soundings originally 
assessed by British hydrographer Francis Skead. The accompanying lines and curves 
signify modern bathymetric profiles provided by the South African Navy Hydrographic 
Office. 
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North-south bathymetric profiles suggest that the bay slopes gently from both the 
historic shoreline and Robben Island to form a relatively deep central channel with a 
maximum sounding of about 35 meters (Figure 5.4). Recorded east-west profiles indicate 
that there are a number of wave-cut terraces in the topography of the bay, which may be 
indicative of previous sea levels (Woodborne 1982:5-16). Side scan sonar surveys have 
identified a number of features on the sea floor itself. One feature is a prominent ridge, 
known as the Green Point Ridge that is situated 4 km to the west of what is considered 
the entrance channel between Robben Island and Mouille Point. This ridge begins about 
1km west of Green Point and runs 8 km in a northwesterly direction, culminating in a 
rocky shoal 2 km southwest of Robben Island (Woodborne 1983:267-268). 
Another feature consists of smooth, regularly spaced isobaths, or contours of 
equal depth, between Robben Island and Blaauwbergstrand. This suggests that the 
unconsolidated sediment is indicative of a submerged tombolo, or a submerged spit of 
sand caused by current actions that is protruding from the mainland and connecting with 
the island. The crest of the tombolo appears at a depth of 14 meters, not making it a 
significant danger to shipping in the bay. Regularly spaced sea bed contours also appear 
along the entire eastern and southern near-shore margin (Woodborne 1982:5; 1983:267). 
Winds, Currents, and Waves 
Table Bay is situated within the southern Benguela upwelling and while its 
circulation and water properties are characteristic of this region, the Benguela Current 
itself has relatively little impact on the currents in the bay. There are little to no strong 
tidal currents, and the mean tidal range is roughly one meter or 1.8 meters maximum 
during spring tides. Therefore, tidal changes are also insignificant in the movement of 
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currents in the bay. Rather, water movement is primarily wind-driven with minor impacts 
from inner-shelf currents and with waves or swells influencing the flow of water closer to 
shore. The speed of these currents generally decrease as the depth of the bay increases 
while the center of the bay experiences little to no subsurface current activity, which 
results in poor water circulation (Van Ieperen 1971:13; Quick and Roberts 1993:279). 
Due to the fact that currents are predominantly wind-driven, the directions of the 
currents shift with the prevailing wind patterns. In the summer the winds typically enter 
the bay from the southeast and the water entering the bay between Robben Island and 
Mouille Point is pushed in a northerly direction. In the winter, winds come from the 
northwest, creating a southerly flow (Van Ieperen 1971:4-14). Swells in the bay are also 
influenced by the wind velocity, but due to the geographic location of the Cape 
Peninsula, generally over 80% of swells enter the bay from the southwest while only 
about 5% enter from the northwest (Smith et al 2001:2824). 
Typically, the southeasterly winds occur most frequently and at the highest 
velocities during the spring and summer months from October to March. During winter 
this trend is reversed and winds dominate from the northwesterly quarter (Van Ieperen 
1971:21). This change is due to passing depressions between seasons, where low-
pressure systems often move to higher latitudes in April and May high causing velocity 
winds to blow across southern Africa, with particular ferocity at the Cape. These winds 
have the potential to form severe storms within Table Bay, mainly in the period between 
April and September. The depressions that form severe storms are associated with cold 
fronts to the southwest of the Cape Peninsula and influence waves generated in the bay 
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when the oceanic swells come into contact with the front, which increases the height and 
force of the swell (McLachlan 1991:12). 
 
 
 
Wave refraction is the bending of waves due to changes in the depth of an area. 
As a bay shallows, wave shape must alter itself accordingly. This results in the diffusion 
of waves to the center of a bay and the subsequent convergence of wave activity onto the 
Figure 5.5. Image depicting the estimated wave height and strength in Table Bay 
following construction of the harbor. Note the exposure of the eastern shoreline to 
increased wave action in addition to the lessening of wave height on the southern 
shoreline in the lee of the breakwater (Map adapted from Seifart 2012:83). 
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headlands. Geological formations such as the rocky headlands at Mouille Point and the 
entrance to the Salt and Diep Rivers typically form areas of highly concentrated wave 
energy (Durden 1992:15). During the summer in Table Bay, the southwesterly swell is 
refracted by the shoaling bottom of the bay and waves approach the eastern beaches from 
the west and perpendicular to the shore. In the wintertime the northwesterly and 
southwesterly swells are also refracted by shoaling and then locally refracted by near 
shore bars, resulting in waves approaching the beach from the northwest (McLachlan 
1991:22). In all cases, the eastern shore receives relatively little protection while the 
southern sector is slightly more sheltered (Figure 5.5). Construction of the Table Bay 
Harbor has played a role in the changing effects of waves on the shores of Table Bay, 
particularly in the southeastern section. 
Month Average Wind Velocity (mph) 
January 14.15 
February 13.87 
March 12.29 
April 9.44 
May 7.62 
June 7.78 
July 7.80 
August 8.92 
September 9.94 
October 11.72 
November 12.75 
December 13.54 
TABLE 5.3. Historical observations regarding average wind velocity for Table Bay made 
by Maclear from 1860 to 1870. Yellow highlighted numbers indicate summer months. 
 
Northwesterly gales during the winter months have historically been the most 
disastrous for shipping in Table Bay (Werz 2003:15). As shown above, the climatic 
conditions that affect these storms as well as the oceanic conditions of the bay are 
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primarily influenced by wind direction and velocity, which changes with the season. 
Observations made at the Royal Observatory in Cape Town from 1860 to 1870, however, 
demonstrate that the mean wind velocity for Table Bay during the winter months was 
actually less than that of the summer (Table 5.1). This indicates the relative rarity and 
cultural significance of northwesterly storms for people living in Table Bay. These 
storms were not a predictable occurrence and when one materialized, the shape of the 
bay, coupled with the dominant wave dynamics created an optimal environment for 
shipwreck incidents. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the meteorological findings of the 
observatory, the high velocity winds of the summer months would have greatly affected 
the landing and loading of goods in the early stages of harbor development when the use 
of cargo boats was necessary. It is clearly evident that the climate of the Cape would have 
played a major role in the shaping the landscape of risk in Cape Town. 
How the Bay Shaped the Harbor 
Cape Town is bordered on its landward side by Devil’s Peak, Table Mountain and 
Lion Mountain along with the Atlantic Ocean to the seaward edge. The city was therefore 
inherently limited in the way it could expand. During the first half of the 19th century, a 
number of jetties were placed along the southern shoreline of the bay. The water along 
this shoreline was at a depth of only a few meters, which was not conducive to the deep 
draught of the vessels frequenting the harbor in the latter half of the century, which led to 
additional harbor expansion. From the onset of the construction of a harbor in Table Bay, 
excavated rock and soil were used to aid in the seaward expansion of the city (Durden 
1992:43). It was reasoned that the shallow space along the southern shore could be filled 
in with this material and reclaimed from the sea. This decision opened valuable space to 
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compensate for the sprawling growth of Cape Town in addition to placing the harbor 
facilities closer to the deeper water (Halkett 2012:12). 
 
 
 
In the early stages of harbor excavations soil from the Alfred Basin and in the 
Harbor Quarry was primarily used to reclaim land. The higher quality stones were 
deposited onto the end of the breakwater and later onto the South Pier expansion, while 
lesser quality stones were supplied as ballast. The remaining stone and soil was used to 
create the ground upon which additional harbor infrastructure could be placed (Figure 
5.6). Sediment accumulation had already occurred on the lee side of the breakwater and 
Outer Basin when in the 1870s an embankment was constructed on the southeastern 
FIGURE 5.6. Map of major land reclamation areas in Table Bay by 1910. Note the 
change in the shoreline as a result of reclamation processes as well as sediment 
accumulation mentioned above. 
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shore to prevent land from being eroded by wave action. Five years later in 1875 the first 
major reclamation scheme took place with the removal of 16,500 cubic yards of material 
from the excavation of the Graving Dock, which was deposited between the Central Jetty 
and the Castle. This reclamation covered about five acres of valuable land and effectively 
buried the South Jetty (Table Bay Harbour Board 1876).  
The practice of reclaiming land became firmly established in Table Bay with each 
succeeding construction in the harbor. More stone and soil from the Graving Dock 
excavations were used to extend the ground to the east of the Alfred Basin, near the 
Amsterdam Battery in 1879. The Graving Dock excavation supplied additional material 
for constructing land in front of the Somerset Hospital in 1881 and between the North 
Wharf and Central Jetty (Table Bay Harbour Board 1881; 1883; 1883). During 1890, 
8,476 cubic yards of excavated stone were used for the reclamation of land on the East 
Quay of the Outer Basin and 862 cubic yards were deposited behind the breakwater wall. 
By 1895 a sea wall was constructed at the edge of the newly reclaimed land which ran 
from the North Wharf to the fishing harbor at Rogge Bay and formed a promenade from 
the Central Jetty to an intercepting pipe jetty. This area became known as Combrink’s 
Concession and an expanded causeway was then built to replace the Central Jetty, which 
had fallen into a state of relative disrepair (Table Bay Harbour Board 1898). 
The Department of the Conservator of Woods and Forests oversaw the planting of 
vegetation on the filled in land in an effort to stabilize the loose sand as well as reduce the 
time that developers would have to wait in order to construct foundationally sound 
buildings (Table Bay Harbour Board 1885). One of the first constructions on the 
reclaimed foreshore area was a coal store in 1877, and later a Cold Storage administration 
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building and warehouse were built on the land reclaimed during Combrink’s Concession 
(Halkett 2012:12). It is likely that these early buildings required substantial foundations 
due to the infancy of the soil that they were placed upon. These foundations and plant 
material would likely have an impact on any shipwreck material along the older 
shoreline, which was covered up during these early reclamation projects.  
Even the earliest harbor schemes called for the use of dredging due to the relative 
shallow depth of the bay (Table Bay Harbour Board 1855). As shown by the bathymetric 
profile above, the shallow water close to the shoreline needed to be deepened to 
accommodate the increasing draught of vessels entering the harbor. The use of divers, 
cranes and dredges to excavate the sea bottom was an essential, evolving process 
throughout the construction of the harbor. These techniques were first utilized at the 
mouth of the Alfred Basin, which needed to be widened and deepened from its original 
measurements (Table Bay Harbour Board 1867). Additional work was needed along the 
Outer Harbor jetties that received the majority of bulk cargo and deep draught shipping 
traffic. 
In 1907, Mr. C.E. McLeod proposed a scheme for developing the foreshore of 
Table Bay due to the overcrowding of the shoreline as a result of railways and harbor 
development (Veitch 1994:85). Later 20th century harbor works implemented this plan 
with additional extensive reclamation of land on Cape Town’s foreshore (Clark 1947). In 
1926, the constructed mole at Rogge Bay and Municipal Pier at the old Central Causeway 
built in 1913 were removed and the land filled to make room for the Duncan Dock for the 
express purpose of sheltering larger, deep draught vessels and tankers. By this time the 
South Arm had been widened to accommodate the amount of goods passing through the 
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port, but once again ancillary space was needed for the ever-increasing size of vessels 
entering the harbor. The Duncan Dock was completed in 1945 and by 1976 the Ben 
Schoeman Dock reclaimed an extra 180 hectares seaward of the existing foreshore and 
industrial area of Paarden Eiland. These historic and recent improvements of the harbor 
have significantly altered the coastline and coastal process affecting the physical 
landscape of Table Bay. 
How the Harbor Shaped the Bay 
 The construction of the harbor in Cape Town had profound impacts on the natural 
landscape of the bay. Two of the major impacts of harbor development on the natural 
landscape of the bay are the result of the anthropogenic modification of the shoreline in 
the form of land reclamation, and the shifting equilibrium of the natural state of the 
harbor as a result of the locations of the harbor works. In each case, the construction of 
the harbor has changed or influenced the natural conditions within Table Bay and 
consequentially, the landscape of the harbor in general. 
As described previously, large tracts of land were reclaimed during the 
development of the breakwater and Victoria and Alfred Basins. The dredging operations 
required for the deepening of each basin for larger draught vessels and the excavations 
for quay extensions produced thousands of tons of rocks and rubble. With the extensive 
growth of the city at the time, the expansion of the foreshore and waterfront area can be 
seen as a reasonable risk mitigation measure to compensate for the lack of space for the 
extent of business carried out within the harbor. Older, unused features of the landscape 
such as the North Wharf, Coaling Jetty and South Jetty could be covered up and new 
infrastructure for the current harbor constructed in their place. 
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By 1913, the Victoria and Alfred Basins and additional quay space were once 
again deemed inadequate. Further harbor installments required the reclamation of at least 
480 acres of land over the Central Causeway and Promenade for the construction of the 
Duncan Dock begun in 1937 and completed in 1945, as well as an additional 180 hectares 
on the existing coastal road, foreshore and industrial area near Paarden Eiland during the 
building of the Ben Schoeman Dock in the 1970s (Figure 5.7). All of the future works 
reflect an evolving landscape of modernity and citywide expansion that continued 
throughout the twentieth century.  
FIGURE 5.7. Aerial photograph showing the beginning of twentieth century harbor 
expansion and the covering up of the 1910 shoreline to make room for a new foreshore 
section of the city (Photo courtesy of the City of Cape Town Environmental and Heritage 
Management). 
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These harbor works and reclamation projects represent a blatant altering of the 
physical landscape to fulfill the growing needs of the city and harbor. These changes also 
had severe impacts on the stability of the bay. Based on a parabolic equation for 
determining historic sediment transportation and distribution methodology devised by 
Hsu et al. (1989), Smith et al. (2001:2827) were able to state that the 1870 coastline 
configuration in Table Bay was close to that of complete equilibrium. With the addition 
of harbor works into the bay, several changes in the natural environmental conditions of 
the harbor ensued. One such change was the breakwater structure, which shifted the 
position of the headland, or diffraction point of the bay, from Mouille Point to a more 
easterly position at the tip of the breakwater. The new equilibrium configuration 
calculated with the new diffraction point indicates that to achieve a state of balance, the 
flow of energy must shift shoreward to the location between the Salt River Mouth and the 
wreck of MV Winton near the Milnerton Lighthouse, signifying an increased likelihood 
of erosion in this area (2001:2828). 
 Reports on the state of the shoreline indicate that from the harbor to the mouth of 
the Diep River, approximately 30 to 45 meters of erosion has taken place at a rate of 
about 1 meter per year (Seifart 2012:67). Estimates for the total amount of erosion for 
sections of this coast suggest that it has retreated up to 60m just above the Salt River, and 
upwards of 75m between the Diep River and the 1934 shipwreck of MV Winton. Due to 
the increased amount of erosion, the sediment transport in the bay has also been 
amplified whereby a maximum coastal recession of 30m is possible during a severe storm 
(Grindley and Dudley 1988:21). Grindley and Dudley (1988:21) suggest that this 
shoreline had historically been in a state of accretion between at least 1780 and 1900. 
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Therefore, this shift in the rate of erosion can be directly correlated with the construction 
of the Victoria Basin, completed in 1905. Further harbor expansion has only served to 
augment these processes. 
 
 
 
The processes outlined above have affected cultural material greatly. With 
additional harbor and urban development in Table Bay there are little to no permanent 
historic structures remaining along the shoreline, but rather the bulk of cultural material 
consist of more dynamic sites such as shipwrecks, especially on the eastern shoreline of 
the bay (Mavrodinov 1999:64). As the effects of the harbor change the natural landscape 
of the bay, cultural material becomes exposed and in some cases can be indicative of 
shoreline changes (Harris et al 2013:129). This is evidenced along the eastern shoreline 
FIGURE 5.8. Photo of the Milnerton Wreck thought to be the remains of Commodore II 
exposed on the beach in Milnerton, Table Bay (Photo by bernd68, 
http://www.panoramio.com/photo/16542891). 
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of Table Bay by the discovery of skeletal remains dating to the late 18th or early 19th 
century on the shore in Milnerton as well as the exposure of a shipwreck believed to be 
Commodore II, which ran aground in 1945 (Figure 5.8; Abrahams 1983:33; Gribble 
2004:7). Furthermore, as shown by Seifart’s (2012:156-157) research into the 2009 
wrecking of Seli One shipwreck in Blaauwberg, the presence of shipwrecks along the 
shore have the potential to actively shape and affect shoreline sediment accumulation and 
wave distribution. The combination of natural and cultural processes outlined above 
influence the maritime cultural landscape of Table Bay and will be used to analyze risk 
within the cultural landscape. 
Conclusion 
 The environmental and natural conditions of a space play a major role in 
constructing the way that meaning and culture are created in a landscape as much as the 
culture determines how the landscape is both perceived and utilized. This chapter 
highlighted the various ways that the Cape society in Table Bay actively shaped the 
physical landscape of the harbor through their cognitive perceptions of and behavioral 
responses to the natural conditions of the region. These conditions played a significant 
role in determining how the development of the port of Cape Town took place and the 
meaning placed on the physical landscape. The harbor works that were built since Prince 
Alfred tipped the first load of stones for the Breakwater in 1860 have since functioned to 
reform and change the physical landscape of the bay itself. 
 At this point, the overall maritime cultural landscape of risk in Cape Town has 
been investigated in the natural or physical record in addition to the historical record of 
the region. The next chapter will sum up the previous sections to analyze how risk is 
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evident in the cultural landscape of Table Bay. Each natural and cultural variable outlined 
previously will be examined along with the archaeological features in the landscape of 
Table Bay. 
CHAPTER SIX: ANALYZING RISK IN THE BAY OF STORMS AND TAVERN OF 
THE SEAS 
 
 
Introduction 
 Thus far, various natural and historical elements comprising the cultural 
landscape of risk within Table Bay have been discussed. This chapter will synthesize all 
of the information obtained from the various data sources listed throughout this thesis to 
ascertain how characteristics of risk are implicated in the construction of Cape Town’s 
harbor. The associated risks to maritime activity in Table Bay will first be outlined. This 
line of inquiry will focus on the assessment of risk using shipwrecks as indicators of 
potential hazards in the bay prior to harbor development. Furthermore, shipping statistics 
will be utilized to determine the range of values that were potentially affected by risk to 
harbor operations for the local and international maritime community of Cape Town. 
Coinciding with this analysis, it is necessary to discuss the perceptions of identified risks 
and how these perceptions are manifested in the cultural landscape of Table Bay. Lastly, 
how the management of risk and risk mitigation measures are imbued within the cultural 
landscape will be explained. This discussion will be defined by two dominant themes that 
exemplify the development of the harbor during the study time period. 
 In order to complete these assessments of risk a combination of statistical and 
geo-spatial analyses will be utilized interchangeably throughout the chapter. Due to the 
availability of certain data included in historical sources for some years and omitted in 
others, some of the statistics will vary in time coverage, but all data spans the relevant 
construction phases of the harbor. To supplement these figures, a multitude of data 
116 
 
sources will be drawn upon whereby each builds upon another in a complementary 
manner. 
Identifying Risk in Table Bay 
	   Table Bay has historically been a locus of shipping activity in the southern 
African continent. As the Mother City to the Cape Colony and original port of call for 
vessels making the voyage to the East Indies, Cape Town was an essential crossroads of 
trade for not only the British Empire but also for all seafaring nations due to its favorable 
position along major international shipping routes. Over 29 different nationalities are 
listed on Port Office records for vessels calling at Cape Town. Of these countries, the 
number of British vessels calling at Table Bay far outweighs that of foreign shipping 
(Figure 6.1). The variation between the numbers of British and foreign vessels is 
indicative of Britain’s dominance in world maritime commerce during the 19th century 
and the importance of Cape Town for Britain’s worldwide shipping interests. 
	  
FIGURE 6.1. Extent of British and foreign shipping in Table Bay for each year between 
1806 and 1910 (Data obtained from the Cape Town Archives Repository, 2014). 
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Since the British occupied the Cape Colony and were in control of trade within 
the Colony’s ports, the gap between total numbers of British and foreign vessels logged 
at Cape Town are to be expected. The historic Table Bay study region contains 320 
historically and archaeologically known shipwrecks during the selected timeframe from 
1806-1910. The number of British wrecks during this period amounts to 161, while the 
next closest number is 20 American vessels lost. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 demonstrate the 
general wreck distributions in the bay. What this meant for the maritime community in 
Table Bay was that any potential risk to shipping would have a direct impact on primarily 
British global maritime interests. One of the chief aims of this study is to examine the 
risks of using the port at Cape Town and how these risks impacted the development of 
the harbor. To accomplish this goal, shipwrecks will be used as indicators of risk in the 
cultural landscape. 
Shipwrecks were plotted according to the availability of general locational and 
temporal data in the SAHRA shipwreck database. Some entries were listed as unknown 
or as wrecking in Table Bay, and were therefore not included in the distributions 
presented below. For analytical purposes the distribution of shipwrecks were divided into 
two temporal periods and four zones. The time periods are divided into shipwrecks prior 
to initial harbor completion in 1870 and those occurring after 1870. These wrecks were 
further divided into historically and archaeologically known sites determined by the 
availability of GPS coordinates in the SAHRA database. Some archaeologically known 
sites may be represented as historically known due to the paucity of available spatial data. 
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FIGURE 6.2. Distribution of historically and archaeologically known shipwrecks in 
SAHRA’s shipwreck database along the historic shoreline prior to harbor development in 
Table Bay. Locations were plotted according to general spatial data and in actuality may 
be further from the depicted shoreline than indicated. 
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FIGURE 6.3. Distribution of all historically and archaeologically known shipwrecks 
within SAHRA’s shipwreck database at the completion of 19th century harbor 
development. Shipwrecks after 1870 are colored in yellow. 
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FIGURE 6.4. General densities of shipwreck activity occurring in Table Bay between 
1806 and 1910 with the SAHRA shipwreck database. Darker blues and reds indicate a 
higher wreck density. 
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The Western Shipwreck Zone encompasses the area from Sea Point around the 
southern entrance of the bay to the historic location of the Central Jetty when the 
shoreline turns eastward. The Southern Zone is the southernmost section of the bay from 
the South Jetty to historic Fort Knokke. The Eastern Zone is comprised of the area around 
the entrance to the Salt River through Milnerton. The Northern Zone runs from Rietvlei 
to Blaauwbergstrand and includes shipwrecks around Robben Island in the middle of the 
bay. These zones were selected according to prevailing clusters of shipwrecks in the area 
that could be analyzed to determine spatial and temporal trends of risk in the harbor 
(Figure 6.4).  
Risk of the Bay of Storms 
Safety of ships while at anchor was of primary concern to British officials at the 
Cape, who recognized the danger inherent to the storm systems and high winds that often 
blew throughout the region. These early perceptions were drawn from prior experiences 
as well as from the initial discovery of the sea route around the southern tip of Africa 
when Portuguese navigator Vasco de Gama labelled the region as the ‘Cabo 
Tormentoso’, or ‘Stormy Cape’ (Theal 1896:85). De Gama’s descriptions led to the 
conception of the supernatural figure Adamastor, the spirit of the Cape of Storms, who 
would open the sky and unleash tempests that threatened every vessel rounding southern 
Africa (De Camoens 1877:146). Further stories told of a Dutch East Indiaman that was 
the only vessel of its consort wrecked in a storm off the Cape. When the remaining fleet 
set sail some sailors saw their lost comrades sailing in a ghost ship that later became 
known as ‘The Flying Dutchman’ (Barrington 1800:45). This notion of the Cape of 
122 
 
Storms played a major role in shaping the perceptions of the risk for all mariners sailing 
in the region, especially at the main port of call in Table Bay. 
Of the total number of wrecks in Table Bay, the circumstances of loss for 220 
could be determined, representing 68.8% of the total sample of 320 vessels. The general 
zone of wrecking was entered into SPSS along with the circumstances of loss for each 
vessel and controlled by the time period of harbor development. The statistical results are 
presented in their entirety in Appendix 1. One of the most noticeable trends among the 
wrecking events in Table Bay is the number of vessels lost to severe storms prior to 
harbor construction. Within this sample, 44.1%, or almost half of total numbers of 
shipwrecks were lost in severe storms. Of the 183 shipwrecks prior to the decision to 
create a harbor, 47.0% of the total wrecks were caused by severe storms. This clearly 
demonstrates that the natural conditions of the bay had a significant impact on the risks to 
shipping for Cape Town. 
In Table Bay, the seasonal variation in wind velocities and direction causes 
dramatic changes in wave and current dynamics. Due to the presence of low pressure 
systems along the southern African latitudes, the shift in winds coming from the 
southeast to the northwest during winter month brings about a southerly flowing current 
and increased wave activity through the natural entrances of the bay. An unsuccessful 
attempt to suppress this wave activity at the southern entrance to the bay through the 
construction of a rudimentary breakwater at Mouille Point, which is named for the 
abandoned construct, shows that these conditions were recognized by the maritime 
community of Table Bay as potentially hazardous. 
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While these weather patterns are characteristic to the region, it is during these 
winter months that the low pressure systems had a greater potential of turning into a 
severe storm or gale. Gales were typically preceded by a spike in temperature and a 
gradually falling barometer as the winds shifted to the north. The danger associated with 
these storms was that the wind oftentimes changed direction suddenly and with little 
indication to mariners (United States Hydrographic Office 1908:56, 510). 
 
 
The chronological spread of shipwrecks in Table Bay reveals a pattern of spikes 
in wrecking events associated with major storms in 1822, 1831, 1842, 1857 and 1865 
(Figure 6.5). The average of 10 years between events is indicative of a cyclic nature to 
these major storms, with less severe storms occurring on a more regular basis. Once a 
FIGURE 6.5. Chronological distribution of shipwrecks in Table Bay. 
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gale formed in the bay, winds entered from the northwest causing heavy swells and the 
currents pushed the waves southwards. As a result, the natural confines of the bay, the 
curvature of the landscape and associated oceanic influences had a distinct effect on 
where vessels were wrecked during these storms (Figure 6.6). 
 
 
Given the above data, the number of shipwrecks caused by storm systems along 
the southern shores of the bay is far greater than any other area. Forty-nine vessels during 
this time period were wrecked in the Southern Zone, whereas the next greatest amount is 
16 vessels in the eastern Zone. The spatial clustering of these wrecks is shown in Figure 
6.3. A number of paintings, drawings and photographs show the city and primary 
FIGURE 6.6. Distribution of shipwreck events according to spatial location and the causes 
of wrecking prior to breakwater construction. 
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anchorage tucked into the southwestern shoreline between the Castle and Chavonnes 
Battery. This meant that the beaches between the Castle and Milnerton were in a direct 
line with the prevailing wind during storms. There is increased shipwreck density 
particularly in the area from the Cape Castle to the historic mouth of the Salt River, 
which was the point in the bay where the land begins to curve from a vertical north-south 
orientation to an east-west alignment. This pattern of wrecking demonstrates how the 
overall shape of Table Bay created a natural ship trap for vessels that broke loose from 
their anchor cables during severe weather. The exception for this trend was the wrecking 
of RMS Athens off Mouille Point during the historic Great Gale of 1865, explained 
below. 
During these storms, the risks for shipping during winter months were 
exponentially greater. As shown by the number of vessels calling at Cape Town by 
season, a greater amount of shipping entered Table Bay during the summer months when 
storms were less frequent (Figure 6.7). When the British inherited the Cape from the 
Dutch, the practice of wintering vessels at the Simon’s Town anchorage in False Bay was 
common. The seasonal numbers of British vessels entering Table Bay demonstrates that 
the British continued to exercise this caution throughout most of the 19th century. 
Furthermore, Lloyd’s of London recognized the risks of using Table Bay during the 
stormy winter season and decided against granting insurance claims to vessels wintering 
in Table Bay. Despite the natural benefits of using False Bay, however, Simon’s Town 
harbor was unsuited for the majority of shipping that called to the Cape. As a result many 
vessels were forced to anchor in Table Bay where the potential risks of wrecking were 
much higher. 
126 
 
 
FIGURE 6.7. Seasonal variation in the number of vessels entering Table Bay during the 
19th century (Durden 1992:Appendix 2). 
Case Study: RMS Athens (1865) 
 RMS Athens built in 1856 by Alexander Denny in Dumbarton, Scotland. The 
vessel was a 750-ton iron steamship. While it had a barque rig, the ship was propelled by 
a simple 130 horsepower, two-cylinder engine attached to a screw propeller built by 
Tulloch and Denny and capable of 8-10 knots. This compound engine was simple 
compared to later 19th century advances in steam navigation, but it represented the height 
of technology for the time. Athens was part of the first wave of new screw steamships 
introduced to augment paddle-wheel steamers already in use. It originally ran a service 
from Liverpool to Constantinople for J.P. Schilizzi and spent the first years of its use 
running the line between Britain and the Mediterranean (Murray 1933:265). In May 
1858, the vessel was bought by the Union Steamship Company, known for its mail 
service at the Cape, and after six years running the western route Athens started the 
Mauritius Mail Service in November 1864. 
0	  
100	  
200	  
300	  
400	  
500	  
600	  
700	  
1806	  
1809	  
1812	  
1815	  
1818	  
1821	  
1824	  
1827	  
1830	  
1833	  
1836	  
1839	  
1842	  
1845	  
1848	  
1851	  
1854	  
1857	  
1860	  
1863	  
1866	  
1869	  
1872	  
1875	  
1878	  
1881	  
1884	  
1887	  
1890	  
1893	  
1896	  
1899	  
N
um
be
r 
of
 V
es
se
ls
 
Year 
Number of Vessels Entering Table Bay by Season, 1806-1900 
Vessels	  Entering	  in	  Summer,	  n=25,551	   Vessels	  Entering	  in	  Winter,	  n=18,692	  
127 
 
 It was during this service that Athens was anchored in Table Bay on May 16 for 
the onset of one of the greatest storms to ever strike Table Bay. A Parliamentary 
inspection was due for the pending construction of the harbor breakwater when the storm 
system brought waves rolling in with “immense volume” that caused vessels at anchor to 
“pitch and grind with violent force” (Cape Argus 1865a). When the wind originally 
began to shift to the northwest, Athens Captain Smith made a call to the Port Office to 
enter the safety of the Alfred Dock, but the not yet completed work could not 
accommodate the vessel. Boat crew’s surfboats were deployed to render assistance to 
vessels, but the efforts of the boatmen could not address every ship. By seven o’clock 
that evening, seventeen vessels had been run ashore and Athens had parted its last anchor 
cable. A signal was made that the steamship would attempt to drive out to sea to avoid 
getting pushed onto the beach. 
 Two hours later the engines of Athens had either been put out by the waves or had 
broken down when the vessel was pushed broadside against the rocks at Mouille Point 
within sixty or eighty yards from shore (Cape Argus 1865a). Life buoys, ropes, lights, 
and the rocket apparatus to deploy a cable to the distressed vessel were sent to the 
shoreline, but the torrential rain and darkness prevented any rescue attempt. Screams 
were heard by on-lookers unable to render any aid when the vessel broke apart in the 
ensuing wave activity, killing all 22 passengers and crew onboard. By morning only the 
top of the steam engine could be seen when bodies began washing up on shore (Figure 
6.8; Cape Argus 1865b). The only survivor of the wreck was a pig who managed to reach 
the rocky beach despite the heavy seas. In total, 60 lives were lost in the storm along with 
18 of the 28 ocean-going vessels and 30 cutters or small boats (Cape Town Gazette and 
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Mercantile Advisor 1865). City of Peterborough and Athens were the only steamships 
lost. 
 
 
 
The Great Gale of 1865 is a milestone in the cultural landscape of risk for the 
development of Cape Town’s harbor. A poem published in the Cape Argus (1865d) 
commemorated the storm remarking that, “the wind came down o’er the bay and town, 
with rain and icy sleet, and dashed before its might, the sea upon the fleet.” The 
breakwater had not yet been completed and therefore vessels that required assistance 
relied upon boatmen coming from the shore to provide supplementary anchors and cables 
as the wave activity pushed ship’s moorings to the point of breaking loose. For the 
FIGURE 6.8. Wreck of the RMS Athens on the rocks at Mouille Point in the 1930s. The wreck 
serves as a marker in the cultural landscape of Table Bay's reputation as the Bay of Storms 
(Photo courtesy of the Iziko Museum of South Africa). 
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perceptions of risk in Table Bay, the gale reinforced the necessity of protecting vessels 
during winter months when the potential hazard of storms was at its greatest. 
The attempt made by Captain Smith to steam out to sea was a decision that 
reflected either overconfidence in the power of steam technology or an underestimation 
of the influence of risk posed by Table Bay storms. Instead of passing out of danger’s 
reach, Athens entered a location where the higher power waves converged on the rocky 
headland of the bay, which would have naturally increased the risks for the steamship. 
The remains of the vessel currently serve as a cultural marker in the landscape of risk for 
historic gales characteristic to Table Bay. 
Wind Patterns  
 The wrecking of Athens demonstrates another trend of risk for shipping in Table 
Bay. Whether during the winter or the summer, Cape Town is known for high winds that 
blow along the southern Cape. As shown in the previous chapter, the primary seasonal 
change in winds is the direction while the velocity remains relatively constant, with the 
summer months sometimes averaging greater wind speeds than winter. The risk of 
southeasterly storms during the summer was less than winter but still affected shipping. 
Since all harbor operations were carried out by lighters and porters who conveyed cargo 
to and from the shore to vessels in the bay, these southeasterly summer winds would have 
pushed these small sailing craft away from the shoreline. This would have made getting 
to the small jetties to unload the cargo an especially slow and difficult process. These 
characteristics made early 19th century harbor operation in Table Bay incredibly 
inefficient. 
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The wind patterns in the bay also had an effect on the types of vessels lost in the 
bay.  Only two steamships, including Athens, were among the eighteen vessels wrecked 
during the Great Gale. This is indicative that there was a greater risk to sailing vessels 
than steamships during severe storms. Given the prevalence of high velocity winds at the 
Cape, the reliance of sailing vessels upon wind energy for navigation and propulsion was 
potentially hazardous. The distribution of shipwreck types lost in the bay during the study 
time period confirms this assumption (Figure 6.9). 
 
  
The data presented in Figure 6.9 demonstrates that the amount of sailing ships 
wrecked in Table Bay significantly outnumbered that of steamships. During the 18th 
century, as technology progressed the engine-driven steamships that frequented the 
FIGURE 6.9. Percentage of sail and steam powered vessels wrecked in Table Bay as 
included in the SAHRA shipwreck database. 
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harbor were easier to maneuver and had a more powerful propulsion that was not reliant 
on wind. For sailing vessels, the contrary winds in Table Bay, especially in the winter, 
oftentimes trapped these vessels as they attempted to leave the harbor and pushed them 
onto the shallows (Werz 2003:20). The numbers of vessels grounded along the western 
and northeastern shoreline further demonstrate this effect (Figure 6.5). The advanced 
technology afforded by steam engines allowed these vessels to better counter the risks 
posed by these adverse weather conditions, resulting in less frequent groundings. 
Therefore, the risks to sailing ships were much greater than that of steamships. In the case 
of Athens, the extreme force of the winter storm system made the steamer the exception 
to the norm. 
The Western Zone in particular had a large number of wrecks associated with the 
grounding of vessels along the rocky shore (29). As ships either departed the bay heading 
south around the Cape to the East Indies or entered the bay from this direction, these 
ships were exposed to the full force of the winds and swells coming from the open ocean. 
As a result, ships under sail were particularly susceptible to grounding on the shore 
especially if stays were missed, which was commonly noted in many of the wrecking 
events along this western shore. Similarly, the Northern Zone comprising Rietvlei and 
Blaauwberg had an increased amount of groundings (17) associated with sailing vessels 
either missing stays or running ashore due to foggy conditions, discussed below. 
Toponymic evidence suggests that certain areas cautioned of these inherent risks. 
The shallow bay immediately south of Green Point, Three Anchor Bay, is named for the 
common procedure of using at least three anchors when vessels were moored in the 
roadstead (Raper 2005:432). The naming of this area was a cultural indicator of risk in 
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the landscape for mariners that warned of the danger posed by the prevailing weather 
patterns in the bay. Furthermore this particular name served as a way of suggesting a 
possible solution to these risks for sailors entering the harbor. 
Case Study: Fame (1822) 
 The five-decked East Indiaman Fame was a chartered sailing brig for the English 
East India Company in India. Built in Calcutta in 1818, the vessel was 629 tons and made 
of teak, sheathed in copper. Fame was sailing from Madras bound for London when the 
vessel left Table Bay on 14 June, 1822. Upon leaving the confines of the bay a heavy 
northwest wind began blowing with big swells rolling into the shore. When the ship 
began rolling in the seas, anchors were put down to ride out the gusts when it lost the 
moorings and was driven onto the rockiest part of Sea Point. The vessel soon became a 
total wreck in the subsequent wave activity. Boatmen were sent from Table Bay to assist 
the stranded vessel and succeeded in rescuing the majority of passengers with minimal 
loss of life (Cape Town Gazette and Mercantile Advertiser 1822; Rawe and Crabtree 
1978:616). 
  The wrecking of Fame demonstrates the potential risks of wind patterns in the 
bay. According to the historical record, Fame was headed to London, which would have 
meant that the vessel should have been sailing north from Cape Town. Instead, the 
northwest winds pushed the sailing vessel to the south and into a dangerous area subject 
to higher winds and stronger waves. Much like Athens that wrecked just to the north of 
Fame, once the vessel was on the rocks the strong winds, which were not described as a 
gale, caused the total loss of the vessel. Therefore, even when storms did not hit, there 
were potent risks created by the strong wind patterns in the bay. 
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Hazards to Navigation 
 After grounding events and shipwrecks caused by storm systems, the next greatest 
number were wrecked due to navigational errors. Nine vessels were lost because of errors 
in navigation prior to 1870 and one more in the period after. The two areas that these 
circumstances were prevalent were within the Northern and Western Zones. These two 
areas represented the approaches of the bay. From the south, vessels would typically 
round Green Point and Mouille Point while ships coming from or heading to the north 
passed by Robben Island or Blaauwberg. These areas were known to experience thick fog 
at times, chiefly during summer months with southeasterly winds, and later navigational 
instructions would caution of this for sailors entering the bay (United States 
Hydrographic Office 1908:507). The fog would typically sit low enough to obscure the 
shoreline and while masts could be seen at the western location from the foot of Lion 
Mountain, these vessels could not make out the rocks and were at risk of running 
aground. 
 Even after construction of two lighthouses along the western shoreline, indicated 
by red dots in the above maps, at least two instances in the SAHRA database include 
notes that describe how captains mistook the placement of the lights while entering the 
bay at night and subsequently wrecked their vessel. This was caused by the earlier Green 
Point light built in 1824 at a place that was too far from the rocks at Mouille Point so 
captains who did not know the bay would attempt to round the bend before the actual 
entrance of the bay and run into the rocky shoreline. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that early navigational charts for the Cape surveyed by Dutch hydrographers oftentimes 
misrepresented the placement of the shoreline. This led to an increased risk of captains 
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sailing closer to the actual shore than was planned for. These hazards were prevalent 
throughout the 19th century, as evidenced by the wrecking of such vessels as the 
Thermopylae in 1899 pictured in Chapter Four, and help explain why there is a 
significant cluster of shipwrecks around the western location in the bay. 
 Furthermore, features in the landscape were marked within navigational charts as 
potentially dangerous areas. The most prominent of these was Whale Rock just offshore 
of Robben Island. Located in the Northern Zone of wrecking, Whale Rock was the cause 
of two shipwrecks that were wrecked by colliding with the submerged rock. Another area 
that was marked on maps was the mouth of the Salt River that was known to contain 
dangerous quicksand that would make it difficult to refloat any vessel pushed close to the 
shore. 
Shipping Risks 
The earliest notion of the Cape of Storms originated by de Gama was altered by 
Portuguese King John II who looked to the newfound access to Asian markets and 
deemed the recently discovered passage as the ‘Cape of Good Hope.’ The actual Cape 
that King John was referring to was the location where vessels would make the turn 
eastward around the African continent, located along the Cape Peninsula south of Table 
Bay. The Cape of Good Hope was also the common way to refer to the British-owned 
Cape Colony in the reports sent back to London. With the rise of ocean-going steamships 
in the latter half of the 19th century, more sailors and passengers began to make the 
voyage to the Cape. The discovery of diamonds and gold further instigated travel to the 
growing Cape Colony. Advertisements to passengers created an ideal image of potential 
opportunity and wonder to be experienced if one was to venture to South Africa: 
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Passing a few rocky islands, we enter Table Bay, along the curving shores 
of which extends the metropolis of all South Africa – its main avenues 
running straight from the sea to the pine and silver-tree plantations, which 
clothe the base of a titanic wall of rock, the flat-topped Tafel berg or Table 
Mountain, that, with the picturesque Devil’s Peak and the grotesque 
Lion’s Head on either flank, enclose the city and its immediate environs, 
forming an amphitheatre comparable in scenic effect to Naples or Rio 
(Union-Castle Steamship Company 1903:9). 
This made Cape Town, situated just prior to the actual Cape of Good Hope, the 
main commercial and passenger center in South Africa. For many, Cape Town was the 
gateway to the east. As the original halfway stop on this voyage, Cape Town’s urban 
character had earned it a reputation during the 18th century Dutch period as de Indische 
Zeeherberg, or tavern of the Indian Ocean (Ward 2007:140). Up to the mid-19th century 
sailors would typically only stop in Table Bay as part of a much longer voyage. By the 
time that the Union and Castle Lines had merged at the turn of the 19th century, the 
amount of people making Cape Town their final destination prompted the creation of 
popular perceptions of the city as no longer the gateway to the east, but rather the 
gateway to South Africa. Therefore, shipping in Table Bay underwent significant changes 
during this transformative period of Cape Town’s identity in the 19th century. The risks 
associated with these changes are demonstrated by relevant shipping statistics for the 
harbor at Cape Town. 
The total number of vessels calling annually in Table Bay was previously 
demonstrated in Figure 6.1. From this data it is clear that there was a steady rise in the 
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number of vessels entering Table Bay during the study period. Two low points during the 
1870s are indicative of an uncertain economic climate in Britain that would have caused 
the number of ships travelling to the Cape to decrease. The year 1806 represented the 
lowest number (133) of total vessels in Table Bay while 1902 witnessed the inundation of 
the harbor with vessels (1431) during the year. The latter figure can be attributed to the 
Second Anglo-Boer War, which caused a significant influx of primarily British vessels 
through Cape Town to supply Britain’s wartime efforts in the interior. 
Another influence for this rise in shipping traffic was the competition between the 
Union Steamship Company and the Currie-owned Castle Packets Company that increased 
the risk taking behaviors of sailors entering Table Bay. The granting of a joint-mail 
contract for each company to run an individual mail service to the Cape in 1876 resulted 
in a fierce rivalry between both lines. With the growth of steamships, the voyage to the 
Cape was growing significantly shorter. Awards were given to mail ships that made a 
speedy passage and these vessels were known to be seen racing one another, with the date 
of arrival becoming more conjecture in London papers (Murray 1933:65). In Cape Town, 
vessels were arriving weekly with mail from around the globe, which would have swelled 
the numbers of ships recorded by the Port Offices in Table Bay during the latter half of 
the century. In the pursuit of economic gain, these vessels were pushed to the limit and 
led to an increase in risk-taking behaviors during these voyages. 
While the large number of ships entering Table Bay benefitted the colony, it also 
posed certain risks for the harbor. As previously explained, the harbor operations were 
continually lagging behind in granting sufficient accommodation for vessels. The transfer 
of cargo and passengers was done in the early half of the century by individual boats and 
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boatmen that charged increased rates despite the inefficiency of the exchange. This 
forced vessels to wait long periods just to engage in trade with the port, which would 
have affected total voyage time if the vessel was only stopping in the bay and increasing 
the danger of exposure to natural risks outlined above. Furthermore, even as additional 
harbor expansion projects increased the amount of space in the harbor, long periods of 
waiting due to the chronic congestion at the port also caused some vessels to anchor in 
the roadstead, which further exposed them to the natural dangers of the bay. This 
situation is exemplified by the wrecking of SS Hermes, explained below. 
 
FIGURE 6.10. Compiled annual tonnage of all vessels entering Table Bay for each year 
between 1806 and 1910. 
 
In a similar fashion, the tonnage of ships making their way to Table Bay also 
increased during the 19th century. The total annual tonnage of all vessels in the harbor is 
depicted in Figure 6.10. Each year not only brought about more ships into the bay, but 
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also vessels of increasing size. By the time the decision was made to expand Cape 
Town’s Outer Harbor in 1889 with the addition of the East Pier perpendicular to the 
breakwater, the average tonnage of vessels entering the bay numbered in the thousands 
per vessel. In November 1881 the Union Line had received a “tempting offer” to build a 
ship of 5,000 tons, but the bar afforded by the Cape Town dock obliged the company to 
decline it (Newall 1999b:21). By 1897 the Union line built the first ever 10,000-ton mail 
ship Briton, which was closely followed by the Kinfauns Castle of 9,664 tons and later 
the Union Line Saxon boasting 12,000 gross tons (Murray 1933:69). These vessels 
pushed the limit of even the newly constructed, but not yet completed Outer Harbor in 
Table Bay. 
 
FIGURE 6.11. Total monetary value of imports and exports in Table Bay along with the 
revenue collected by Customs Officials in the Cape Town harbor. 
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These statistics for shipping in Table Bay reflect the risks of running successful 
and efficient harbor operations. Whether or not there was a harbor in Cape Town, the city 
would become the chief commercial and passenger port in South Africa. While early 
harbor development was stagnated by a lack of financial infrastructure, the rise in 
shipping caused the risks of not having sufficient harbor facilities to outweigh the risk of 
increased colonial expenditure. Especially as the industrial and productive output of the 
colony increased and Cape Town was linked to places such as the gold reefs and diamond 
fields through the construction of several rail lines, the trade flowing from the colony 
through its main port increased the value of adding harbor facilities to expedite maritime 
commerce. This value is demonstrated by the overall monetary value of goods imported 
and exported from Cape Town (Figure 6.11).  
The initial spike in the value of goods is likely due to the mass emigration of 
settlers in 1820. Following the first stage of harbor construction in 1870 there is a rise in 
the value of goods brought into the bay, which demonstrates an increase of commercial 
capability within the port. The large drop off at the turn of the century can be explained 
by the Second Anglo-Boer War. The most substantial aspect of this data, however, 
coincides with the discovery of gold in 1886 when the value of exported goods 
skyrockets. What this meant for the harbor was that Cape Town could no longer be 
perceived only as the Tavern of the Seas on the voyage to the east, but was now a 
productive participant in global maritime trade. Therefore, shipping in Table Bay during 
the second half of the 19th century was marked by the large mail steamships frequently 
bringing passengers and merchandise to the Cape, while cargo vessels worked to 
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facilitate the exchange of goods between nations. Once again, the risks to the harbor were 
the availability of infrastructure to cope with these dramatic changes to maritime activity. 
 It is also important to note Table Bay’s role as the primary repair station for 
vessels making the voyage around the Cape. Coinciding with Cape Town’s symbolic role 
as Tavern of the Seas, the port was also the place where vessels would stop in to make 
the necessary modifications and repairs to the hulls of vessels that were damaged on route 
to London or ports in the Indian Ocean. The construction of the Robinson Graving Dock 
and Patent Slip as part of the harbor scheme reinforced this ideal, and both facilities were 
consistently used throughout the year (Table Bay Harbour Board 1873; Table Bay 
Harbour Board 1883). Marano (2012:165) notes how shipwrecks tend to cluster around 
areas with potential opportunity for rescue or aid. Similarly, the presence of these repair 
facilities would have increased the amount of wounded vessels attempting to get to Table 
Bay, and was also a factor in the potential risks of an increased number of ships calling in 
the bay. 
Case Study: SS Hermes 
SS Hermes was registered in Liverpool, Scotland in 1899 and belonged to Robert 
Houston's British and South American Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. Hermes was one of a 
series of cargo ships built for the line in the late 1890's. On 12 May 1901, a windy 
afternoon in Table Bay, the steam-driven cargo ship let go of its starboard anchor in 10 
fathoms of water (Board of Trade 1901:76). The vessel had arrived following a voyage 
from Rosario, Argentina with a large consignment of forage. The vessel had arrived in 
the middle of the Second Anglo-Boer War and the dry conditions in the South African 
interior coupled with the vast numbers of horses and mules requiring fodder as a result of 
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the war necessitated the importation of fodder. A further result of the war was the 
crowded state of Cape Town’s harbor, where in some places vessels were triple-banked 
on the docks (Murray 1933:77; Newall 1999a). Given the overwhelmed status of the 
docks, and with the prospects of berthing in the immediate future seeming remote, 
Hermes banked its engine fires and made preparations for the long wait in the roadstead. 
That night, the wind had picked up and a strong northwesterly gale had come 
upon the bay. The captain of the vessel was called by the second officer for permission to 
let go the second anchor as the seas were swiftly becoming dangerous, but the captain did 
not come on deck. The second officer remained on watch, but in the commotion of the 
storm lost sight of his bearing lights. An hour after the storm had begun the second 
officer noticed a white streak on the starboard quarter of the vessel and once again called 
for the captain. Realizing that the ship was likely in danger, the captain came above deck. 
Ten minutes later SS Hermes ran aground on Blaauwberg Beach, over a kilometer from 
its anchorage (Board of Trade 1901:76). 
 
 
FIGURE 6.12. SS Hermes on the beach one kilometer north the present-day Milnerton 
lighthouse (Cape Town Archives Repository, E 8855). 
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Soon after wrecking, lifeboats were deployed and in the heavy seas, two women 
were drowned after the small craft capsized in the heavy wave activity (Cape Argus 
1901a:5). The remainder of the crew stayed aboard and were got off when the rocket 
apparatus secured a cable to the ship and a breeches buoy could relay the passengers and 
crew to the shore (Cape Argus 1901b:5). Several days after the Hermes was lost, the 
vessel had become firmly embedded in the sand and became a total wreck (Figure 6.12) 
The wrecking of the Hermes displays a chronic feature of Cape Town’s harbor – 
the lack of suitable accommodations for ships in the bay. The Second Anglo-Boer War at 
the turn of the century had resulted in the overburden of vessels on the docks engaging in 
activity related to the wartime effort. This caused a heavy strain on the already 
encumbered and barely completed harbor works that were not yet in a position to afford 
the most efficient loading and unloading of people and goods. This caused the delay of 
vessels at the docks and recently arrived ships, like the Hermes, to wait in the unprotected 
roadstead, which made them susceptible to the natural risks of the bay. The story of the 
Hermes embodies the risks of unsuitable harbor facilities for the extent of shipping in the 
harbor, and the wreck is a prime archaeological feature in Table Bay’s cultural landscape 
of risk. 
Mitigating Risk in the Cultural Landscape 
 The cultural landscape of Cape Town is distinguished by the dialectical 
relationship between that of the Cape of Storms and the Cape of Good Hope. This 
relationship has played a vital role in shaping the general perceptions of risk for shipping 
around southern Africa, and specifically Table Bay. Similarly, notions of inherent natural 
danger and the prospect of potential trading opportunity are reflected in the development 
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of the harbor at Cape Town. Based on data obtained throughout the course of this 
research, two prevailing themes have historically characterized the risks associated with 
shipping and the growth of the harbor. These themes are 1) the protection of vessels 
entering and using the bay, and 2) the safe and effective loading and unloading of cargo 
and passengers. Both themes highlight the cognitive perceptions of risk in the bay 
outlined in the above sections as well as the behavioral responses of the maritime 
community to these risks in the form of risk management. The decisions to modify the 
harbor and mitigate these risks directly relate to the creation of a cultural landscape of 
risk in Table Bay and will therefore be expanded upon in the following sections.  
Protection of Ships in the Bay  
There are several factors that influenced the decision-making process to provide 
adequate protection for ships in Table Bay. The most influential of these was the natural 
environment. The combination of wind, wave, and current patterns in the bay naturally 
created a potentially hazardous area for ships anchored offshore in the typical roadstead 
of the port. With the cyclical occurrence of major northwesterly storms that historically 
devastated shipping in the bay and the symbolic notion of Cape Town as the Tavern of 
the Seas or main stop on the voyage east, the dominant perceptions of the harbor were 
that it was a dangerous but necessary port of call, especially in the wintertime. 
An attempt to mitigate this risk was demonstrated through the decision of Lloyds 
not to insure any vessel that used the anchorage during this dangerous season. This 
reflects an attempt of Crook’s neo-liberal risk management strategies whereby the 
colonial authorities attempted to minimize potential risk exposure through the provision 
of incentives for avoiding the natural risks of the harbor (Duncan 2000:43). The 
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alternative to Cape Town’s port, however, was in Simon’s Town, which had a much 
lesser amount of harbor space or facilities to handle the amount of shipping calling by the 
Cape during this period. This initial attempt to mitigate risks through regulatory 
suggestion was ultimately unsuccessful. 
Duncan (2000:113) notes how periods of neo-liberal risk mitigation will 
correspond with increased numbers of wrecking events. The construction of harbor 
facilities to protect shipping in the bay represent the governmental control of risk in an 
area and are classified as ordered risk management which should coincide with a 
decrease in the number of shipwrecks. The breakwater in Table Bay represents the 
attempt by the Harbour Board regulatory body to control natural risks in the landscape. 
Figure 6.2 demonstrates the effect that the breakwater had on the risks of storms and 
weather in the bay. 
FIGURE 6.13. Distribution of shipwreck events according to spatial location and the causes of 
wrecking after breakwater construction. 
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Following construction of the breakwater, there is a significant decrease in the 
number of vessels wrecked in the bay. In the period after its construction there are several 
years with major storm systems, one of which rivaled the ferocity of the historic Great 
Gale. Each was noted with a corresponding lower consequence to shipping (Figure 6.13; 
Table Bay Harbour Board 1879). Instead, these events prompted the extension of the 
work with a bend to cover a larger area that would further negate the effects of the 
prevailing winds to the northwest and protect the southern shoreline. Five of the seven 
vessels wrecked along this stretch of coast were wrecked in this single 1878 storm. 
Instructions for sailing into Table Bay in this period after harbor construction 
describe the work as “the most important maritime works south of the equator…to 
remove the evil reputation that Table Bay has had for its turbulent sea in S.E. or N.W. 
gales” (Findlay 1876:210). Throughout the early history of harbor development in Table 
Bay, improvements to the harbor were driven by a sense of risk incited by large-scale 
natural disasters to shipping caused by storms. Despite numerous surveys, plans prepared, 
estimates provided, and statistical registers compiled demonstrating the benefits of a 
harbor of refuge, these potential improvements were continually “pigeon-holed and set 
aside for later consideration” (Hammersley-Heenan 1904:208). A severe storm in 1857 
prompted the final consideration of a plan that was approved in 1860 and the 1865 Great 
Gale further reinforced the execution of the breakwater. Therefore, the breakwater is a 
significant feature of the cultural landscape for changing the perceptions of risk in Table 
Bay and symbolizes the taming of the Bay of Storms. 
Another important element under the theme of the protection of vessels in the bay 
is demonstrated by the acts of Table Bay boatmen. From the earliest mention of the 
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severe storm systems in Cape Town, reports mention the valor of these boatmen in 
relaying cables and anchors to distressed vessels as well as rowing out to rescue 
passengers and sailors that were stranded on sinking vessels (Bird 1822:131; Cape of 
Good Hope and Port of Natal Shipping Gazette 1846; Cape Argus 1865a). Many early 
images of Cape Town depict the spare anchors and cables along the shoreline ready to be 
deployed in case of severe weather (Figure 6.14). Prior to the construction of the 
breakwater these boatmen were the sole means of affording protection for shipping in the 
bay. The ability of boatmen to assemble quickly and directly address any shipwreck 
incident significantly decreased the number of lives lost in the bay and played a vital role 
in mitigating risk in Table Bay. 
 
	   	  
	  
 
The construction of the two lighthouses along the western entrance of the bay 
further represents risk mitigation through cultural construction. Research demonstrated, 
however, that the poor placement of the original Green Point light was too far from the 
FIGURE 6.14. Section of a landscape drawing by Robert Gordon in 1778 that 
incorporated anchors on the beach along with a shipwreck to the left of the jetty. 
Inclusion of these images in the illustration is telling of their importance to the cultural 
landscape of early Cape Town (Image courtesy of the City of Cape Town Environmental 
and Heritage Management). 
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actual entrance to the bay and instead caused many of the wrecking events in the area. 
The lighthouse at Mouille Point alleviated some of these risks, but the weakness of the 
lights continually resulted in the wrecking of vessels along the shore, and the risks to 
shipping continued throughout the time period (Figure 6.13). With the completion of the 
breakwater and light placed at its head, the Mouille Point Light was no longer necessary 
and abolished soon after the turn of the century. 
 Additional hazards to navigation were marked through the cultural naming of the 
landscape. Whale Rock, named for the historic whaling activity around Robben Island is 
noted as the prime hazard to ships entering around the island (Findlay 1876:206). 
Furthermore, the Lion Mountain was used as a cultural means to convey avoiding the 
area at the base of the Lion’s Head. Two rock features that were potentially hazardous 
were named the North and South Paw of the Lion and aided in the identification of a 
potentially risky area for shipping. 
 The elements expressed in the cultural landscape of Table Bay that reflect the 
theme of protecting vessels entering and using the harbor changed the perceptions of 
Cape Town as a potentially dangerous port to be utilized with caution, to that of a safe 
harbor able to conduct secure operations during the entire year. This active shaping of the 
landscape resulted in the dramatic increase of maritime activity in Table Bay and 
contributed to the success of the colony as a whole. It also led to the creation of a new set 
of risks associated with keeping up with the rising tide of shipping that would emerge in 
the ensuing years. 
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Safe and Effective Loading and Unloading of Passengers and Cargo 
 The fundamental function of any harbor is to facilitate the linkage of land and sea.  
During the initial phases of harbor use in Table Bay during the study period, all cargo and 
passenger operations were carried out on the North Wharf, Central Jetty, and South Jetty. 
When a vessel entered the bay, cannons would be fired from the Imhoff Battery and later 
the signal station on the Lion’s Rump would send word to the port offices. This instigated 
a swarm of boatmen and vendors to surround the vessel offering to relay people or cargo 
as well as to promote different lodgings or activities in the town (Veitch 1994:49). The 
significance of these boatmen is reflected artistically by the presence of small watercraft 
and boatmen in the majority of historical representations of Table Bay (Bradlow and 
Bradlow 1955:210-244). 
Since there was no place for vessels to come alongside the jetties due to their 
location in the shallow water near the shoreline, use of these boatmen was obligatory. 
This enabled these early entrepreneurs to charge increased fares for their services. 
Therefore, this period from 1806-1870 effectively forced the bay itself to serve as an 
extension of the waterfront whereby the line between the water and the shore was 
blurred. The factors surrounding use of the harbor during this time created a cultural 
landscape of risk for shipping that was guided by the lack of sufficient facilities and the 
agency of boatmen who used the system as a means of extending the waterfront to make 
a living in the maritime community. 
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The creation of a harbor by 1870 ensured the effective removal of ships from the 
anchorage in the roadstead to a contact with the shore via the docks, which would have 
eliminated the need for the boatmen in the capacity of exchanging people and goods from 
vessels to the shore. Boatmen employed under the auspices of the Port Office were still 
utilized as a life-saving service, and many of these men still maintained their status in the 
fishing community at Rogge Bay. Further research is needed to determine the extent to 
which these workers were incorporated into the general dock labor force. As shown in 
FIGURE 6.15. Spatial and temporal development in Cape Town’s harbor with relevant 
harbor works, extent of harbor property and supplementary infrastructure utilized by the 
maritime community. Topographical curves signify the base of the Lion’s Rump and 
shaded areas represent bathymetric differentiations in the bay (Image by author, 2015). 
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previous sections, the exponential rise in shipping continuously created the need for 
additional facilities and infrastructure to accommodate the growing trade at the port. A 
list of all of the relevant works and their chronological dates of construction is included 
in Appendix 1. The spatial distribution of these works is demonstrated in Figure 6.15. 
The spatial patterning of harbor works reflects the management of the risks of 
shipping in the bay. The beginning of the harbor via the construction of the breakwater, 
Alfred Docks and Inner Basin enclosed by the East Jetty ensured the protection of vessels 
and accommodated the number and size of vessels calling at that time. As evidenced by 
the above shipping statistics, these works were begun during a period when they were 
sufficient to manage the extent of shipping calling in the bay. Given the shift in the 1870s 
to the use of vessels with deeper draughts and more vessels requiring the provision of 
coal, the recently completed works and infrastructure were not in a position to handle the 
coinciding changes in necessary harbor operations. Therefore, the Outer Harbor was a 
necessary addition and supplementary jetties were constructed to mitigate the bathymetric 
risks to these larger vessels. Figure 6.14 shows how the Outer Harbor was placed in a 
deeper location and enclosed by the South Pier, which also eliminated the risk of 
southeasterly winds and allowed for even more dock space. 
To facilitate the effective supply of coal to steamships, a Collier Jetty (depicted in 
the 1910 section next to the South Pier) was extended to a deeper location and a coal 
delivery system equipped with eight electrical cranes and an elevator built on the work. A 
Loch Jetty built perpendicular to the breakwater on the deeper end of the Outer Basin 
augmented this service and further addressed the needs of deeper, steam-driven vessels. 
Supplementary warehouses were built that stored this fuel source and supplied the 
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increasing number of steam vessels making their way to the Cape. The Outer Harbor, or 
Victoria Basin, is consequently a response to the requirements of a modern harbor by the 
effective management of larger, deep draught steamships through the provision of a 
primary fuel source for these ships (Weise 1981:84). In this sense, Cape Town continued 
in its original function as the halfway house on the voyage around the Cape and became 
the primary fuel bunkering facility for the new era of vessels plying the seas. 
The Table Bay Harbour Board created a cultural landscape in the latter half of the 
19th century characterized by the ordered management of shipping activity in the bay. 
Not only were the risks posed by the type of vessels calling at the port mitigated, but the 
work of the harbor itself was also managed. This was regulated by additional 
infrastructure in the harbor, such as the construction of a Clock Tower at the entrance to 
the Alfred Basin, which regulated the workday while a Time Ball Tower linked to 
Greenwich Time and signaled the shift in tides (Table Bay Harbour Board 1883). The 
signal station at the Lion’s Rump was made even more operational by the linkage of a 
telegraph system connected to the docks as well as the railways. These rails were 
extended onto the docks and cranes put in place, which allowed for the direct transfer of 
goods from ships to a transport system that further connected Cape Town with the rest of 
the colony (Hammersley-Heenan 1904:222). These constructions within the landscape of 
Table Bay were a response by the colonial authorities to mitigate the risks posed by the 
evolution of Cape Town from a mere halfway house and refreshment outpost to the 
Mother Port for all of South Africa. 
The decision to begin construction of the harbor in 1860 marks the beginning of a 
shift in risk for shipping in Table Bay. Harbor operations and facilities were meticulously 
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managed and controlled through the actions of the Table Bay Harbour Board. Whereas 
the former half of the century was an un-mitigated period of shipping management that 
fostered the rise of individual agents and small businesses to dictate the extent and 
efficiency of the harbor, the new docks were an attempt by the colonial government to 
take control over the risks posed by the exponential rise of shipping in the bay. By 
constructing the harbor in Table Bay, the Harbour Board not only took action to create an 
ordered risk landscape, their actions also facilitated more shipping to call into the bay and 
encouraged perceptions of Cape Town as a safe and effective harbor. This in turn created 
even further risks of increased shipping activity. 
The actions of the Harbour Board reflected by the development of the harbor were 
structured by the risk of shipping in the bay and the subsequent creation of harbor works 
structured the risk of amplified shipping in an on-going process throughout the 19th 
century. Therefore, the creation of the docks mirrors Gidden’s duality of structure 
whereby the mitigation of risk in the landscape was driven by the perception of Table 
Bay as an ineffective harbor, and led to the creation of the modern harbor facilities. This 
action changed the societal structure of risk in Table Bay, which evoked an increase of 
shipping and led to the need for even further harbor development.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter outlined the prominent risks to maritime activity and harbor 
operations in the cultural landscape of Table Bay. Analysis was conducted through an 
examination of shipwreck events and statistics for the extent of shipping in Cape Town. It 
has been shown that examining the spatial location of shipwrecks in the bay reveals 
patterns of risk that show the dominant presence of natural hazards to shipping in Table 
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Bay. Furthermore, the characteristics of shipping throughout the 19th century created a 
situation in Cape Town where harbor development continually lagged behind the 
prevailing trends of maritime transportation. The successful mitigation of these factors 
caused perceptions of risk in the bay to change during the course of the 19th century.  
Two themes of risk management were identified, which counter the identified 
risks of the bay. These were the protection of vessels in the harbor and the effective 
operation of harbor functions. Each theme corresponded with the responses of the 
Harbour Board in Table Bay to the prevailing risks within the harbor. As a result, the 
cultural landscape of risk during the 19th century in Table Bay was characterized by the 
duality between the notion of a Bay of Storms and the maritime culture of Cape Town as 
Tavern of the Seas or Gateway to the East. The development of the harbor can be seen as 
a behavioral response to risks in the cultural landscape that evolved alongside the 
dominant perceptions of the harbor to eventually bring the port city into the modern era. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
General Observations 
 The first and most significant pattern found in this study was the effect of the 
natural environment on the determination of the harbor in Table Bay. Perceptions of risk 
along the Cape of Good Hope and the main port of call for the passage at Cape Town 
were formed by the prevailing patterns of weather that historically caused significant 
hazards to shipping. Past studies have suggested that the beaches at Woodstock and the 
Salt River in the southern sections of the bay were likely hotspots for shipwrecks (Durden 
1992:87; Werz 2003:22). Evidence obtained from the spatial and temporal analysis of 
shipwreck events and harbor evolution confirms how the predominant weather systems 
resulted in a patterning of shipwrecks along this southern shoreline of the bay. Therefore, 
the looming presence of severe storms prompted the colonial government at the Cape to 
take action and enact changes in the harbor to mitigate the dangers posed by these natural 
risks. These reactive responses resulted in the formation of a unique cultural landscape of 
risk that is reflected in the material remains of the historic maritime community and 
development of harbor works.  
 In addition to this, statistical analyses of shipping trends in relation to the growth 
of importance of Cape Town as a terminus have shown how the natural limitations in the 
way the city could expand created the need to extend the waterfront into the bay. As a 
result, the alterations made to the harbor during this time have had a significant effect on 
the natural dynamics of the bay. Furthermore, the reclamation of land even by the turn of 
the century effectively covered up the majority of shipwreck material along the area of 
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the bay that contained the greatest density of shipwreck activity. These natural changes to 
the shoreline over the years have consequences for the deposition of material culture 
remains for this historic period as well as the way that contemporary archaeological 
impact assessments are performed. 
 A second observation involves the extent of harbor facilities in relation to general 
trends in maritime activity at the Cape Town waterfront. The early stages of harbor usage 
during the 19th century were generally governed by small businesses and locally operated 
boats since vessels were forced to anchor due to the lack of accommodation along the 
several wooden jetties that comprised the port. Historical statistical analysis showed that 
with the rise of passenger and mail steamships, along with the amplification of industrial 
expansion within the colony through the mining of mineral resources in the interior, the 
value of goods passing through the Cape Town increased and the number of ships 
entering the bay intensified. The culmination of these factors resulted in the need for the 
ordered mitigation of shipping risks in the harbor. The Table Bay Harbour Board 
therefore functioned as a regulatory entity within the local society that produced an 
ordered landscape of risk management through additional public works projects and the 
effective administration of harbor activities. 
 One final observation made throughout the course of this research was the effect 
of boatmen on the cultural landscape of risk in Table Bay. These Table Bay boatmen 
were identified as a distinctive maritime culture within the local maritime community and 
played an active role in shaping the perceptions of risk as well as the effectiveness of 
operations in the harbor. Historical research into the accounts of severe storms described 
how the loss of life associated with the high number of wrecking events in Table Bay was 
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significantly low and offset by the efforts of these intrepid navigators of the surf. Due to 
limitations in time for data collection and availability of information pertaining to each 
wrecking event, these statistics could not be assessed in this thesis, but would allow for 
the measure of effectiveness of the boatmen in mitigating the risks associated with lives 
lost in shipwreck incidents. 
In addition to their role as an ad hoc lifesaving service, boatmen provided the 
essential assistance of relaying people and goods from the boats to the shore prior to the 
establishment of an efficient dock system in the harbor. Composed of both European and 
other marginalized members of society such as native African and Cape Malay people, 
the local boatmen functioned as an extension of the shoreline into the roadstead and 
merged the line between the city waterfront and the bay. The culture of boatmen formed 
an integral component of the maritime cultural landscape and these men played a vital 
role in the development of Cape Town’s harbor. 
Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
As shown in the methodological approach used in this study, a full investigation 
into the maritime cultural landscape and how risk influenced the evolution of that 
landscape requires the extensive examination into numerous sources of information. 
These data sources built upon one another to relate the concept of risk with how the 
people of Cape Town perceived, understood, and used the sea as well as the sea’s 
relationship to the landscape. Certain features of the maritime cultural landscape that are 
relevant, but due to short duration of fieldwork and the availability of data collection 
could not be investigated include: 
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1. Oral histories/ethnographic accounts of identifying trends of risk or risk 
management for maritime activity in the bay. 
2. Indigenous or native perceptions of the sea as potential influences on the 
cultural landscape. 
Each of these data sources were not consulted in detail and could potentially yield 
invaluable information that would add to a more holistic understanding of how risk was 
perceived in 19th century Cape Town. While some ethnographic accounts were added to 
supplement analysis of certain shipwreck events as case studies reflecting the 
development of the harbor, a survey of the historical newspaper accounts for a range of 
different wrecking events could add to local conceptions of risk for shipping in the bay. 
Additionally, the inclusion of indigenous or native perceptions of risk was omitted. Since 
the decision to construct the harbor was a task set forth by the colonial government, the 
perceptions of risk according to these primary risk assessors and managers was focused 
upon. Perceptions of Capetonians largely outside the economic and political structures of 
power, while a valid component of the cultural landscape, could not be covered in 
adequate detail. 
Ultimately, this thesis provides multiple avenues for additional research. Further 
studies are needed to determine the full extent of how risk shaped the development of the 
port and harbor, especially during the Dutch period when the conception of Table Bay as 
the Bay of Storms was initially formed. Likewise, analysis into the succeeding landscape 
of risk should focus on the evolution of the harbor in relation to the storage of goods, 
effective repair of vessels and supply of fuel for the bigger class of modern container-
cargo vessels that began to frequent the Cape route by the early half of the twentieth 
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century. The advances made during this modern time period shifted away from the Alfred 
(1860-1870) and Victoria (1886-1905) Basins and moved to the newly constructed 
Duncan Docks (1939-1945) and later Ben Schoeman Dock (1969-1977). Therefore, the 
locus of shipping activity was moved away from the historic harbor core created during 
the preceding century. This progression paved the way for the modern harbor and historic 
waterfront area that has seen a recent revival of cultural heritage that promotes the 
historical aspects of shipping activity and Cape Town’s fundamental link with the sea.  
The Cultural Landscape and the Modern Waterfront 
This study revealed how the cultural landscape of risk in Table Bay by 1910 was 
characterized by the dialectical relationship between the symbolic role of Cape Town as 
the Tavern of the Seas along the international shipping route for the Cape of Good Hope, 
and the notion of natural danger from the Cape of Storms. This relationship created a 
unique cultural landscape defined by risk and risk management. Shipwreck material, the 
dock facilities, quays, warehouses, port offices, etc., all formed part of the cultural 
landscape of risk in Table Bay. 
This landscape has undergone a recent revitalization within the last 20 years. 
During 20th century harbor development, the historic harbor outlined in this study was 
functionally cut off from the city and Cape Town’s historic link with the sea along with 
the maritime heritage of the old harbor was severed. In the foreshore area further tracts of 
land were reclaimed as the modern harbor expanded along the southern shoreline. These 
reclamation projects submerged the cultural material associated with the Bay of Storms, 
containing the densest accumulation of shipwrecks in the bay, underneath the growing 
city. The vacant Victoria and Alfred Dockland then became an area utilized by the local 
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fishing industry, with the Graving Dock fitting nicely as a dry dock for the smaller 
vessels used by the fishing community (Killian and Dodson 1996:497-498). Aside from 
the immediate dock space, the harbor infrastructure fell into relative disrepair during 
South Africa’s economic isolation during the apartheid era, was forgotten, and the 
cultural landscape defined in this study became a relict landscape of past maritime 
activity. 
In November of 1988 the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd. (V&AW) was 
established as a subsidiary of the state-owned transport corporation Transet Ltd. The 
objectives for this newfound company were to restore the historic links of the harbor with 
the city (Worden 1996:61). A plan was established for a staged process of redevelopment 
to include the restoration of historic harbor buildings, the creation of restaurants, a fish 
market, exhibition center, souvenir shops, office accommodation, berths for harbor tours, 
plus a boat marina, parking lots, and hotel accommodation (Van Zyl 2005:6). Ultimately, 
the existing fishing culture was allowed to remain, but a combination of new facilities 
and modified harbor infrastructure were added to the landscape, which had changed from 
one of risk mitigation for contemporary shipping activity, to one characterized by the 
promotion of tourism, commercial, residential, and business development. 
The V&AW promoted the area as the romanticized essence of Cape Town’s 
symbolic role as the Tavern of the Seas and the overall success of the historic harbor’s 
revival for the economy of the city is unquestionable (Breen and Rigby 1996:57). Despite 
the economic success of this changing landscape, it has been criticized as an untrue 
reflection of Capetonian identity, and instead promotes the heritage of British maritime 
colonialism that leads to nostalgic feelings reminiscent of the apartheid ideals of white 
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dominance (Worden 1994:43). The waterfront distinctively lacked a presence of the 
African migrant laborers that came to the city to work the docks, the convicts that built 
the breakwater, the fishermen that made a living on the coast, or even the boatmen that 
were identified in this study as an essential component of the cultural landscape (Worden 
1996:62). Therefore, the history presented by the historical revival of the docks has been 
highly selective and alienating to some. 
Other criticisms have discussed the functional conflicts between the development 
of a commercially based tourist industry, and the maintenance of the harbor as an 
operational port for tug and fishing boats (Killian and Dodson 1996:500). Since the 
writing of these critiques, the V&AW has made strides to rectify their representation of 
the harbor by, for example, linking the Clock Tower Precinct with ferries to Robben 
Island (Van Zyl 2005:7). The island became a World Heritage Site in 1999 and provides 
tours of the island where Nelson Mandela spent 18 years of incarceration during the 
apartheid era. Through the facilitation of tourist access to the island, the V&AW 
guaranteed a synergistic relationship between two of Cape Town’s most important visitor 
attractions while recursively emphasizing the struggles of South Africa’s profound 
history of racial struggle. 
What comes to the fore when examining the present utilization of the Victoria and 
Alfred Docks compared to the historical beginnings of the harbor is the notion of a 
continuing or evolving cultural landscape. It has been demonstrated in this study that a 
cultural landscape theme is able to account for the range of material and associations that 
form the heart of Cape Town’s historic links to the sea. Further research into the modern 
waterfront and the links to past cultural remains in the form of shipwrecks buried beneath 
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the current harbor and the marginalized cultures within the historic local maritime 
community is beyond the scope of this thesis. This, however, would be a useful line of 
future inquiry to aid in the creation of inclusive management plans for the waterfront area 
under a landscape theme. 
Geographical Information Systems and Cultural Heritage Management 
 The analyses employed in this study relied heavily upon the spatial locations of 
shipwrecks and harbor works in addition to the analysis of geo-spatial trends in wrecking 
activity as potential indications of risk in the cultural landscape. To facilitate this 
examination, the use of a GIS was essential. The GIS allowed for the relocation of these 
historic sites and rendered an effective spatial representation of these landscape features. 
Given the expansion of the modern harbor over the historic foreshore area, the bulk of 
this cultural material is currently located below the city. 
 As development projects on the Cape Town foreshore area proceeded, the work 
had an impact on the cultural material located along the historic shoreline of Table Bay 
(Figure 7.1).   Since contemporary methods of archaeological surveying were not 
available at the time and the laws regarding the management of cultural resources did not 
address maritime heritage specifically or preclude any development to take on cultural 
impact assessments, these sites went largely undocumented. There were few instances 
where archaeological practices documented these cultural remains as they appeared 
(Lightley 1976; Saitowitz et al 1993). With the progress of heritage laws regarding 
cultural resource management in South Africa, developers are now required to have 
archaeological assessments carried out prior to building anything on the reclaimed 
foreshore. 
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Several of these cultural impact assessments have utilized GIS as a means of 
predictive analysis to determine potential areas that might contain cultural remains within 
the contemporary waterfront (e.g. Durden 1992; Halkett 2012). This research further 
demonstrated the benefit of GIS in this capacity. Through the re-creation of the historic 
shoreline facilitated by geo-referectifying historic maps in relation to the modern expanse 
of the city, general shipwreck locations could be plotted in along the old shoreline 
(Figure 7.2). From the creation of this GIS database, future impact assessments would be 
able to query the data set to evaluate the range of cultural material that would be expected 
in a given area of potential development. This would expedite the assessment of impact 
for developers and allow for a more reliable interpretation of potential cultural material 
located along the historic shoreline. 
FIGURE 7.1. Newspaper article showing the impact of twentieth century foreshore 
development on historic harbor remains (Cape Times 1957). 
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Application of the Research Design 
 One final implication of this research for future studies is the application of the 
general research design for use in the analysis of past harbor usage. A special issue of the 
Journal of Maritime Archaeology, published in 2013, presented a range of different 
articles that explore the role of archaeological theory and interpretation in port and harbor 
studies with a special emphasis on social themes (Rogers 2013:181). These articles 
demonstrated a shift away from describing ports and harbors in purely technical terms, 
FIGURE 7.2. Image depicting the modern shoreline of Cape Town in relation to the 
density of shipwreck material in the bay from 1806 to 1910 (Map by author, 2015). 
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but instead promoted the investigation of these crucial areas of maritime interaction as 
they fit within a wider social and historical context. 
 This study investigated the development of Cape Town’s harbor during the 19th 
century through a lens of risk analysis and risk management. It was argued that risk is 
intrinsically linked to the construction of and use of ports and harbors. Findings presented 
in this thesis support this notion for the development of a harbor in Cape Town. 
According to Giddens’ duality of structure, while people are inherently limited in their 
responses to risk through their physical environment and the prevailing societal 
structures, such as the perception of risk, the actions taken to manage identified risk in 
the cultural landscape function to reshape those structures. The actions taken by the 
maritime community in Table Bay to improve the harbor were driven by the prevailing 
perceptions of risk and as these actions changed the landscape, the perceptions of risk 
changed in an on-going process. Therefore, risk and the perception of risk as a form of 
societal structure, in Table Bay, can be seen as the main influence for harbor 
development. 
The theoretical and methodological foundation for the analysis of risk in the 
cultural landscape was grounded in social theory that describes the manner by which 
individuals and systems identify, assess and manage risk in everyday life. By examining 
a diverse range of data sources included in a landscape study, the generalist approach to 
analyzing risk in the landscape used in this study allowed for a holistic understanding of 
how risk in the harbor changed over time, through the actions of the maritime community 
in Cape Town. Ash (2007:11) notes, however, that to facilitate this wider interpretation of 
harbor development in relation to human behavior, such a study must be based on 
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existing historical and archaeological knowledge. The rich databases of potential 
archaeological sites and several historical sources documenting the development the 
harbor in Cape Town allowed for this research to happen. The application of this 
approach to other similar locations with a range of existing cultural material could 
potentially yield interesting insights into the past usage of different harbors and 
synthesize the existing data for a broader interpretation of how past maritime activity in 
these locations was impacted by human behavior. 
Conclusion 
 The primary objectives in this thesis were to identify the role of risk in shaping 
the development of the harbor in Table Bay, while identifying features in the cultural 
landscape that reflect prevailing trends of risk and the management of identified risks in 
the archaeological record. By utilizing an all-encompassing approach grounded in several 
social theories, the cultural and historical remains associated with the harbor could be 
analyzed from an alternate perspective. Furthermore, the benefits of statistical and geo-
spatial analysis for easy visualization and representation of collected data and analysis 
were demonstrated. It is hoped that future studies will utilize the approaches presented 
here, and further the social interpretation of harbors and ports that represent the 
quintessential linkage between the land and the sea. 
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APPENDIX 1: HARBOR TIMELINE & CHRONOLOGY OF WORKS 
 
 
1806 British Empire begins occupation of the Cape Colony following Battle of 
Blaauwberg on January 8, 1806. 
 
1814 Dutch government formally cedes Cape Colony to Britain. 
 
1821 Sir Rufane Donkin begins construction of a lighthouse project at Green Point 
under the supervision of the head engineer, Herman Schutte. 
 
1822 Severe gale in Table Bay that lasted from 18-21 July and caused the wrecking of 
9 vessels anchored at Cape Town. The storm also caused significant damage to 
structures in the town. 
 
1822 William Wilberforce Bird proposes new breakwater closer to the present Victoria 
and Alfred Basins, but this proposal is set aside due to the cost of the project. 
 
 Small repair yard for vessels built likely near the existing yard at the site of 
Muntingh’s whale fishery. This location is depicted in Plate 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
1823 Green Point Lighthouse is completed. 
PLATE 1. Lithograph by Thomas Bowler showing a view of the original harbor expansion from 
1860 to 1870 (Bradlow and Bradlow 1955:Plate 131). 
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1825 SS Enterprise, the first steamship to enter Table Bay, arrives at Cape Town on 13 
October. 
 
1830 Elaborate plan for an enclosed harbor including a breakwater, landing pier and 
interior sea wall is submitted by Captain Robert Knox, but was not adopted by the 
Admiralty. 
 
1831 During a heavy gale from 16-17 August, 6 ships and £40,000 of cargo were lost. 
A stone pier (original foundation for North Wharf) was begun at the foot of Bree 
Street. Work was suspended in 1833 due to high costs by the Secretary of State 
after the work had reached a length of 200ft. 
 
1836 Lord Glenelg, Governor of the Cape, authorized the creation of the first Harbour 
Board for Table Bay. The purpose of this Board was to collect wharfage charges, 
borrow money on security of these charges and complete the stone pier. 
 
 Formation of the Cape of Good Hope Steam Navigation Company to establish 
steamship communication between Cape Town and other coastal ports. 
 
1838 The Commercial Wharf Company was formed for the purpose of landing and 
shipping merchandise conveyed in boats to and from vessels at anchor 
 
 South Jetty construction began near the site of the old Dutch watering jetty (Old 
South Jetty). 
 
1839 South Jetty was completed at the end of Buitenkant Street at a cost of £1,404. 
  
 Local maritime communities raised £2,900 to purchase a tract of land and 
associated buildings near the whale fishery and transfer the property to the 
government as the site for a new wharf made of the already placed stone and 
additional timber. On 11 November, 1839 orders were given to begin work 
building the new North Wharf. The buildings purchased by the local shipping 
community were to be converted to Customs and Wharf Offices to augment the 
new commercial quarter already established in that area. 
 
1842 North Wharf completed at the end of Bree Street. 
 
 Northwest storm system causes wrecking of six vessels in Table Bay. 
 
1844 Two harbor improvement schemes were submitted by Colonel C.C. Mitchell, 
Cape Surveyor-General of the colony and Sir E. Beteker calling for a breakwater, 
landing pier and sea wall. Neither scheme was carried out due to cost nor extent 
of the work proposed. 
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Col. Mitchell completes work on a stone pier at the site of the Amsterdam Battery 
(Coaling Jetty). A corrugated iron warehouse built at the site of this new pier to 
facilitate the storage of coal (Plate 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
1845 Cape of Good Hope Steam Navigation Company absorbed into the Phoenix 
Steam Navigation Company to facilitate steam links between Cape Town and Port 
Elizabeth with stops in Mossel Bay and Plettenberg Bay. 
 
1848 In 26 July the Board of Commissioners for Improving the Point and Harbour of 
Table Bay was appointed. Their first task was directed to repair and extend the 
wharves and jetties then in existence. 
 
 Construction began on an additional jetty (Central Jetty) to deal with lack of space 
on older docks at the foot of Adderley Street, which was called Heerengracht St. 
at the time. 
 
1849 Captain Pilkington submits plans for enclosing the area between the North Wharf 
and Central Jetty with a breakwater to form a complete harbor. This scheme is not 
adopted. 
 
PLATE 2. Coal warehouse built near the Amsterdam Battery in 1844 (Image courtesy of the 
National Library of South Africa, PHA 4866). 
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1850 Central Jetty construction completed in March. 
 
 Plans submitted, but not approved for a potential breakwater in Table Bay by I. 
Irving, which called for the placement of moorings in the roadstead one the lee of 
the proposed work.  
 
1851 On January 27 the first mail-steamship Bosphorous arrives in Table Bay. 
 
1852 Upon failure of the Phoenix Steam Navigation Company, the General Screw 
Steamship Company assumed the mail service between England and South Africa 
with an extension of the contract to run mails between Cape Town and Natal via 
coastal ports. 
 
1853 Old South Jetty removed after suffering severe damage during several 
northwesterly storms. 
 
1854 Cape Colony granted representative government. 
 
1856 Union Steam Company Ltd. Formed from the previous Union Steam Collier 
Company. 
  
 Capt. James Vetch R.E., Harbour Surveyor for the Admiralty puts forward a plan 
for a harbor of refuge based on the 1846 survey by Capt. Sir Edward Beteker. 
This plan estimates cost at £1,000,000 and consists of a 5,600’ breakwater 
enclosing an inner and outer harbor of 1508 acres with an East Pier starting from 
Fort Knokke. 
 
1857 Central Jetty extended using material from the dismantled Rogge Bay Battery. 
Legislation passed to carry out Vetch’s plan, but promise of financial assistance 
from British Government in London is withdrawn. 
 
 On 4 September the Union Steamship Company was awarded the Cape mail 
contract. 
 
 Severe northwesterly gale causes seven ships to wreck in Table Bay (Plate 2). 
 
1858 Mr. Scott Tucker provided a report to the Houses of Parliament in London for the 
construction of a harbor of refuge in Table Bay. Act 20 passed by Parliament 
consenting for the improvement of the harbor using Vetch’s plan as a guideline 
with a cost of no more than £200,000. 
 
 Sir (then Mr.) John Coode was appointed Engineer-in-chief to prepare definitive 
plans and estimates for the new harbor. His design included a 3,000ft long 
breakwater, an Inner Dock and Outer Basin at an estimated cost of £399,000. The 
labor would be supplied using 400 local convicts. 
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1859 Plans made to begin work on the breakwater beyond the site of the Chavonnes 
Battery. 
 
A Breakwater Prison was built to house the large consort of convict labor used to 
build the breakwater. 
 
1860 On 17 August the Table Bay Dock and Breakwater Management Commission 
was appointed to supervise the construction of the works and manage the finances 
and properties associated with the development. 
 
 On 17 September H.R.H. Prince Alfred tipped the first truck of stones for the 
construction of the breakwater. The stone was taken from a quarry adjoining the 
breakwater, which would be subsequently flooded following completion of the 
works and form part of the Inner Harbor. 
 
1860 Cargo stores developed at the Pierhead, which would become the site of the 
entrance to the Alfred Docks. 
   
Dock house built, referred to as Harbor Master’s residence and offices. 
 
Colonial Shipping Act 13 of 1855 and Act 30 of 1860 provided for police at the 
port and regulations on boating activity. Included under the auspices of this act 
were all registered vessels as well as smaller vessels down to 15 tons. These 
smaller boats arrived in the harbor with native produce to sell. 
 
1862 In June, considerable damage was done to the timber staging of the breakwater by 
a gale lasting for seventeen days. Detail of timber staging shown in Plate 4. 
 
 New Somerset Hospital was opened. 
 
1865 On 16-17 May a violent gale swept over Table Bay, which would become known 
as the historic Great Gale of 1865. Eighteen vessels were driven ashore, sixty 
lives lost, and the breakwater works severely damaged. 
 
 East Jetty, perpendicular to the breakwater, was completed to enclose the Inner 
Basin. 
 
1867 Preliminary excavations for the ship-lift and dry dock in the harbor quarry begin. 
 
A slip for ship repairs was completed by De Pass, Spence & Co. to the southeast 
of the harbor. 
 
1868 Patent Slipway was moved into the narrower, southeastern corner of the Alfred 
Basin. 
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1869 On 15 June the excavations of the Alfred Basin were completed and the 
cofferdam holding the water from entering the old quarry site was removed. 
 
 Suez Canal opened. 
 
1870 On 17 May the first ship to enter the completed Alfred Docks was the sailing 
vessel Haitienne. 
 
1870 The ceremonial opening and naming of the new basin by H.R.H. Prince Alfred, 
deemed the Alfred Basin, took place on 4 July after 10 years of construction 
work. The total harbor to date consisted of an Inner and Outer Harbor, the total 
water area of 4.5 hectares and quay space of 1240m. The breakwater was 545.5m 
long and supported with concrete blocks of 80 tons each. The Alfred Basin 
contained dock space along a North, West and East Quay with warehouses 
alongside the docks. 
 
1870 On 5 November the first Union Steam liner to enter was Saxon. Mail ships that 
previously anchored near the Central Jetty now used the East Quay as their berth. 
 
 A road connecting the Central Jetty and North Wharf with the new docks was 
completed. 
 
1871 Establishment of the Cape and Natal Steam Navigation Company by London 
broker, George Payne. 
 
1872 Donald Currie begins private mail service through Donald Currie and Company 
steam lines. 
 
1873 Discovery of diamond fields along the Orange and Vaal Rivers. The mining town 
of Kimberley was established. 
 
1876 Sir John Coode submitted plans for the extension of the breakwater and for 
increased dock accommodation. Warehouses were built on the East Quay and 
near the Pierhead. 
 
Excavations of the dry dock in the Alfred Basin commenced and the beginning of 
foreshore reclamation using excavated material begins between the Central Jetty 
and Castle. 
 
 Both the Union Steamship Company and Donald Currie awarded a joint-mail 
contract for the Cape. 
 
1877 Castle Packets Company formed by Donald Currie. 
 
Fire Engine House built on the docks, known widely as the “Ratcatcher’s Store”. 
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1878 A severe gale with greater velocity than historic Great Gale hit the Cape between 
18-23 July with five vessels driven ashore due to anchoring too far to the 
southeast. Coode used this event as a way to convince authorities of the need for 
extending the length of the breakwater to the originally intended length. 
 
 Construction began of the Breakwater Jetty inside the breakwater with a shed for 
the storage of coal. 
 
 Excavations of the dry dock extended to accommodate larger, deep draught 
steamships that frequently called in Table Bay. 
 
1880 Sir John Coode proposed additional plans for the expanded Outer Harbor, later 
Victoria Basin. Act passed authorizing the extension of the Breakwater using 
stone from the dry dock excavation. 
 
 Breakwater Jetty is completed to a length of 400 feet with a shed capable of 
storing 2,000 tons of coal. 
 
 Supplemental Coaling Jetty built to the southeast of the entrance to the Alfred 
Docks and root for the later South Arm. 
 
 Barracks built for housing additional native dock workers imported from Delagoa 
Bay. 
 
1881 Castle Mail Packets Company Ltd. formed. 
 
In September a new Table Bay Harbour Board consisting of four government 
nominees and three elected commissioners was appointed.  
 
The Alfred Dock Fire brigade was established.  
 
1882 On 20 October the dry dock was formally opened when the Union Company’s 
RMS Athenian was taken in. The dock and ship-lift was named the Robinson 
Graving Dock in honor of Sir Hercules Robinson (Plate 3). 
 
The docks were first lighted by electricity through a contract with the South 
African Dynamo-Electric Light and Brush Co lit the docks that provided 22 lamps 
on 29 June. 
 
Initial placement of foundations for proposed South Pier to run parallel to the 
breakwater and enclose the Outer Harbor. 
 
Reclamation of land at Rogge Bay with material from the West Quay excavation 
finally removed the Fish Market St. George’s Street. The town constructed a 
retaining wall of concrete blocks at the end of the reclamation which left the 
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beach clear for the fishermen’s boats with a jetty, shed and tramway connected 
with a new Fish Market. 
 
 
 
 
 
1883 Dock Clock and Tide-Gauge Tower completed to the south of the “Cut,” or 
entrance to the Alfred Basin, and linked with the Observatory to calculate 
accurate times. A Légè’s self-recording tide gauge was also put inside the tower 
(Plate 3). 
 
PLATE 3. Engraving of the Robinson Graving Dock located within the enclosed 
Alfred Basin of the harbor (Veitch 1994:76). 
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Time Ball Tower erected and linked with Greenwich-time to regulate the work of 
dock laborers. 
 
 
 
 
1884 Fish Jetty in Rogge Bay erected for the cleaning and drying of fish. 
  
The Board took over and removed the South African Electric Light and Power 
Company plant and machinery to the Docks. 
 
1886 Discovery of gold reefs in the stretch of Highveld, Witwatersrand. 
 
The first truck of material for the mound of the South Pier was tipped on 19 
October. Stone was obtained from the excavation of a quarry to the south of the 
Alfred Basin. 
 
1889 Parliament authorized a loan for the completion of the Outer Harbor scheme 
designed by Sir John Coode in 1883.  
 
1892 First block of the South Pier Quay Wall was laid as well as the mound for the East 
Pier to enclose Outer Harbor and further protect inner jetties. 
 
Sir John Coode dies on 3 March. 
 
PLATE 4. Clock Tower at the "Cut" or the entrance to the Alfred Basin in 1898 (Photo courtesy 
of the National Library of South Africa, PHA 5088). 
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1893 On 6 December the Loch Jetty, named after Governor Sir Henry Loch, was 
opened for trade. The Jetty, 600ft long and 75ft wide was built entirely of iron to 
deter the effects of marine worms and met the pressing need for increased space 
for deep draught steamers. 
 
1896 Additional land reclamation took place in between the North Wharf and Coaling 
Jetty, known as Combrink’s Concession. 
 
1897 Foundations for a Collier Jetty established on the western side of the South Pier. 
 
 Union Steamship Company built the first-ever 10,000 gross ton steamship, Briton. 
 
 South Pier turned to face the East Pier, perpendicular to the breakwater through 
construction of an elbow to the dock. 
 
Boat Jetty built near the Clock Tower for the mooring of tug boats in the harbor. 
 
1899 Beginning of The Second Anglo-Boer War between Britain and President 
Stephanus Johannes Paulus "Paul" Kruger’s republic in the Transvaal. 
 
1900 On 3 March, Union Castle Mail Steamship Company formed after an 
amalgamation of the Union Steamship Company and Castle Mail Packets 
Company. to become the Union Castle Mail Steamship Co. Ltd. 
 
1901 Electric Light and Power Station built. 
 
1902 Cold Storage warehouse built at the site of the North Jetty on land reclaimed 
during Combrink’s Concession. 
 
The Harbor Tearoom built, which was commonly known as the Harbor Café. 
 
1903 Port Captain’s building completed across the Cut from the Clock Tower. 
 
Collier Jetty completed and equipped with eight electric cranes to effectively 
supply coal to steamships and transfer goods directly from the boat to a rail 
system. 
 
1904 Breakwater extension and capping project completed.  
 
Three-story North Quay Warehouse built, which is the site of the present Victoria 
and Alfred Hotel. 
 
 Amsterdam Battery purchased from the government by the Table Bay Harbour 
Board to allow for additional warehouse space. 
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1905 Victoria Basin formally completed with an increase in the available water space 
by 27 hectares and dock space by 1525 meters. 
 
1905 Abolished the use of the treadmill at the old Breakwater Prison. 
 
1910 Table Bay Harbour Board absorbed into the newly formed South African 
Railways and Harbours Administration.
APPENDIX 2: ORIGINAL DATA & STATISTICAL BREAKDOWN 
 
FREQUENCIES 
Statistics 
 Circumstances 
of loss 
Nationality of 
vessel 
Season lost Wrecking Zones Location of 
wreck 
N 
Valid 290 246 301 225 195 
Missing 30 74 19 95 125 
 
Circumstances of loss 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Gale/Storm 109 34.1 37.6 37.6 
Grounded 106 33.1 36.6 74.1 
Beached 1 .3 .3 74.5 
Navigational Error 10 3.1 3.4 77.9 
Abandoned 17 5.3 5.9 83.8 
Collision 5 1.6 1.7 85.5 
Repurposed 11 3.4 3.8 89.3 
Wrecked 28 8.8 9.7 99.0 
Fire 3 .9 1.0 100.0 
Total 290 90.6 100.0  
Missing System 30 9.4   
Total 320 100.0   
 
Wrecking Zones 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Western Zone 62 19.4 27.6 27.6 
Southern Zone 88 27.5 39.1 66.7 
Eastern Zone 32 10.0 14.2 80.9 
Northern Zone 43 13.4 19.1 100.0 
Total 225 70.3 100.0  
Missing System 95 29.7   
Total 320 100.0   
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Location of wreck 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Blaauwbergstrand 18 5.6 9.2 9.2 
Woodstock Beach 36 11.3 18.5 27.7 
Milnerton 3 .9 1.5 29.2 
Paarden Eiland 10 3.1 5.1 34.4 
Cape Castle 9 2.8 4.6 39.0 
Green Point 15 4.7 7.7 46.7 
Salt River 18 5.6 9.2 55.9 
Rietvlei 9 2.8 4.6 60.5 
Sea Point 4 1.3 2.1 62.6 
Robben Island 14 4.4 7.2 69.7 
Military Hospital 8 2.5 4.1 73.8 
Amsterdam Battery 2 .6 1.0 74.9 
Mouille Point 20 6.3 10.3 85.1 
Granger Bay 3 .9 1.5 86.7 
Imhoff Battery 8 2.5 4.1 90.8 
Sceptre Reef 2 .6 1.0 91.8 
Chavonnes Battery 1 .3 .5 92.3 
Black River Mouth 1 .3 .5 92.8 
Old South Jetty 9 2.8 4.6 97.4 
South Jetty 3 .9 1.5 99.0 
Breakwater 1 .3 .5 99.5 
Fort Knokke 1 .3 .5 100.0 
Total 195 60.9 100.0  
Missing System 125 39.1   
Total 320 100.0   
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Season lost 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Summer 110 34.4 36.5 36.5 
Winter 191 59.7 63.5 100.0 
Total 301 94.1 100.0  
Missing System 19 5.9   
Total 320 100.0   
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CROSSTABULATION 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Wrecking Zones * 
Circumstances of loss * 
Year before or after 
breakwater 
220 68.8% 100 31.2% 320 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
Year before or after breakwater Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Shipwrecked Prior to 
Breakwater 
Pearson Chi-Square 80.916b 21 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 87.584 21 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association .907 1 .341 
N of Valid Cases 183   
Shipwrecked After 
Breakwater 
Pearson Chi-Square 33.588c 21 .040 
Likelihood Ratio 40.456 21 .007 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.211 1 .271 
N of Valid Cases 37   
Total 
Pearson Chi-Square 92.834a 24 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 105.213 24 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.557 1 .212 
N of Valid Cases 220   
a. 27 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15. 
b. 23 cells (71.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .16. 
c. 32 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08. 
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Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Wrecking Zones * 
Circumstances of loss * 
Year before or after 
breakwater 
220 68.8% 100 31.2% 320 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
Year before or after breakwater Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Shipwrecked Prior to 
Breakwater 
Pearson Chi-Square 80.916b 21 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 87.584 21 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association .907 1 .341 
N of Valid Cases 183   
Shipwrecked After 
Breakwater 
Pearson Chi-Square 33.588c 21 .040 
Likelihood Ratio 40.456 21 .007 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.211 1 .271 
N of Valid Cases 37   
Total 
Pearson Chi-Square 92.834a 24 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 105.213 24 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.557 1 .212 
N of Valid Cases 220   
a. 27 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15. 
b. 23 cells (71.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .16. 
c. 32 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08. 
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